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ABSTRACT 
International redistribution studies vary in scope from those which 
investigate the full range of all benefits and costs of the fiscal 
system to others restricting their coverage to the distributive 
impact of a single expenditure or tax. In South Africa relatively 
little research has been directed to the distributive consequences 
of state spending and taxing policies. The few existing studies 
have mainly concentrated on race as an explanatory variable in 
analyzing budget incidence. 
This thesis adopted a new technique of measuring the incidence of 
benefits obtained from state spending and the burdens imposed by tax 
payments. The first step involved constructing household-level 
microdata files for sample households. Secondly, allocation 
routines were developed for selected expenditures and taxes whereby 
the benefits and costs of fiscal action could be assigned to 
households. Lastly these routines were applied separately to the 
files of each household. The distributive effects of the 
expenditures and taxes could then be analyzed with respect to any 
relevant household variable. 
(iii) 
There were 666 sample households drawn from urban African and 
Coloured areas in Durban and Cape Town. The original survey was 
conducted in 1982 and covered selected squatter and sub-economic 
housing communities identified as 'poor'. Although initially 
conducted with a view to investi.gati.ng the perceptions and attitudes 
of respondent households, there was sufficient detail extracted from 
the questionnaire also to allow this study of budget incidence to be 
undertaken. 
ExpendJ.tures and taxes covered in this analysis were those for which 
benefits and costs could be more readily allocated to individuals 
and households. The welfare expenditures included were social 
securi. ty payments, education, heal th, housing and transport. For 
taxes, only the burden to sample households of J.ncome taxes, general 
sales tax, customs duties and excise duties were considered. For 
each of these expenditures and taxes procedures were established to 
quantify and allocate benefJ.ts and burdens to households. 
Household cbaracteristics which were found to be signiflca."1t in 
determining the distributive effects of fiscal actions were income, 
race, household sl.ze and settlement type. The influence of each of 
these variables was investigated in regard to the benefits obtained 
from state welfare spendi.ng and the burdens imposed by tax 
payments. Different entitlem9nts or burdens could usually be 
explained by underlying household-specific demographic 
'characteristics or by the special circumstances in which households 
found themselves. 
(iv) 
Four results were identified as having potentially important 
implications for public policy. These were: 
(a) the lack or adequate social security provision for 
households in obvious need; 
(b} the cumulative effect of discriminatory welfare 
entitlements favouring Coloured over African households; 
(c) the potentially prohibitive cost to the poor of the 
privatization of welfare services; and 
(d) the regressive impact of general sales tax on the overall 
tax system. 
This partial analysis of fiscal incidence is a contribution to 
research into redistribution; a field of public sector economics 
still 1n its infancy. Theoretical analysis and empirical findings 
about the fiscal system are important to guide in the choice of 
policies regarding expenditure and tax systems. These are 
decisions which have a direct effect on the levels of social and 
economic welfare in society. 
(v) 
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INTRODUCTION 
Almost all government policies will affect the distribution of 
income, even if this is not their primary objective. Particularly 
important in terms of their effects on income distribution are state 
policies relating to welfare spending and taxing. These constitute 
the core of the welfare state, or 'mixed economy', a social system 
to have emerged in varying degrees and forms within most capitalist 
countries. 
South Africa is no exception with public spending on some welfare 
items pre-dating Union. The range of these publicly provided goods 
and services has steadily increased and by 1.983 welfare spending 
accounted for approximately 351 of total government expenditure. 
However, there is evidence in a number of countries of a developing 
lack of confidence in the Welfare State with deliberate policies 
being introduced to cutback on the provision of social services. 
This has followed on the low levels of economic growth and the high 
rates of unemployment which have strained the resources necessary to 
finance high levels of we.lfare spending. 
Analysis into the redistribution to occur through the tax-transfer 
process presents complex theoretical and empirical problems. This 
has resulted in a lack of knowledge about who does in fact benefit 
(xix) 
from increases in public spending and through changes in tax 
policies. In some cases findings of research into the welfare budget 
have surprised by not conforming to original impressions regarding 
fiscal incidence. 
Within the South African context welfare provision has become a 
particularly sensitive area of inquiry. During the 1970s and 1980s 
problems associated with state provided services have been the 
centre of growing mass protest and resistance. Demonstrations of 
student and community boycott action have been directed at eacll of 
education, housing and transport which has resulted in them having 
become highly politicised. 
This research ls exploratory and investigates some aspects of South 
Africa:state welfare policy. Certain items of expenditure and taxes 
were selected and the patterns of their incidence examined for a 
sample of urban African and Coloured households selected from 
communities identified as 'poor'. 
The method followed was based en a procedure established in recent 
studies of redistribution in the United States and United Kingdom. 
The thesis is planned as follows: CHAPTER 1 presents the theoretical 
framework needed to explain and understand the process of 
redistribution through the welfare state. At a broader level the 
debate hinges around 1deologic3l beliefs and values with theories 
closely linked to normative positions. 
{xx) 
CHAPTER 2 selectively reviews both international and South African 
studies which have attempted to measure redistribution brought about 
through government spending and taxing policies. In CHAPTER 3 the 
objectives of this study are explained together with some general 
methodological issues corrunon to all similar budget studies. The last 
section in this chapter is descriptive and gives an introduction to 
the demographic characteristics of households in the sample. 
CHAPTER 4 provides a historical background to the development of 
state financing for each of the five expenditures covered, namely: 
social security payments, eduation, health, housing and passenger 
transport. Also included in this chapter are the allocation routines 
for expenditures whereby the benefits from state spending were 
assigned to households. 
CHAPTER 5 and 8 detail the empirical investigation. In CHAPTER 5 the 
benefits to respondent households from 'ifelfare expenditures are 
analyzed with respect to various household characteristics. The 
following were found to be of interest: income, race, household size 
and settlement type. CHAPTER 6 looks at the tax side of fiscal 
incidence and examines the burdens of income tax, general sales tax, 
customs duties and excise duties on households in the sample. 
Finally, CHAPTER 7, presents concluding remarks 'ifhich include some 
of the problems encountered, future research suggestions, major 
findings and a general discussion on welfare policy in South Africa. 
- 1 -
CHAPTER 1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
1.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT ON INCOME REDISTRIBUTION 
Early concern with equity and justice in the distribution of income 
was blurred by a lack of clarity arising from the natural law 
concepts. These concepts, which originated in the works of Grotius 
(1583 - 1645), Hobbes (158a - 1679) and Locke (1632 - 1704), played 
a central role in the politics and political philosophy of the 18th 
and 19th centuries.1 
It was in the use of the term 'natural' that ambiguities arose. In 
their analyses of economic justice these early philosophers had 
suggested the existence of natural rights and laws of nature which, 
if adhered to, would lead to some natural harmony and just order. 
Locke, for example, conceived of the law of nature as the pursuit of 
happiness in obedience to a natural impulse ~nd of it being the duty 
of the state to secure this happiness by guaranteeing to every man 
the fruits of his labour. This argument assumed that the actual 
or 'natural' wage existing undar given institutional arrangements 
was of necessity the just or 'natural' one. 2 
Classical political economists continued with this dual 
interpretation of the_ natural law concept. ·•Natural' was used both to 
describe 'what actually was' and 'what ought to be'. An important 
.distinction between the positive and normative interpretation was 
- 2 -
first made in 1836 by James Mill (1773 - 1836) when he outlawed 
questions relating to justice and the distribution of income from 
the scope of political economy. This latter he felt, should limit 
itself to positive theory. 
"The questions : to what extent and under what 
circumstances the possession of wealth is, on the 
whole, beneficial or injurious to its possessor, 
or to the society of which he is a member? what 
distribution of wealth is most desirable in each 
different state of society? and what are the 
means by which any given country can facilitate 
such a distribution? - all these are questions of 
great interest and difficulty, but no more form 
part of the science of Political Economy, in 
which we use the term, than navigation forms part 
of the science of Astronomy." 3 
Yet economists continued to comment about the effects of alternative 
distributive arrangements on the general level of welfare. 
The classical economists were conservative in their views regarding 
redistribution being in agreement that it was not in the common 
interest. Reasons for these views differed. For example, whereas 
Adam Smith (1723 - 1790) had argued the importance of income 
inequality in capital formation, the hiring of productive labour and 
the resultant maximization of incomes, Malthus (1766 - 1834) was 
opposed to redistribution in favour of the labouring classes 
suggesting that this would increase the birth rate among workers 
thus driving down wage rates and leading to no permanent improvement 
in their living standards. 
Ricardo (1772 - 1823) too, supported inequality justifying it on the 
Rawlsian principle of it being in the interests of the poorest. 
The alleviation of poverty could best be achieved by promoting 
economic progress and any redistribution would be detrimental to 
work incentives and savings. 
- 3 -
" ••••• (it) would be more fatal to the poor 
labourer than to the rich capitalist himself. 
This is so self-evident, that men very little 
advanced beyond the very lowest stations in the 
country cannot be ignorant of it, and it may be 
doubted whether any large number even of the 
lowest would, if they could, promote a division 
of property." 4 
' A shift from these strict laissez-faire doctrines of the early 
classical economists was evident in the writings of John Stuart Mill 
(1806 - 1873) with some concern expressed for equity and justice in 
distribution. He distinguished between the laws of production 
which he saw as 'physical truths' and the laws of distribution which 
depended on the laws and customs of society. Under different 
institutional arrangements the distributive outcomes would also be 
different. This was a break with the classical view of the 
'natural' distribution resulting from strict laissez-faire. Mill 
also broached the idea of progressive taxation - not of income - but 
of inheritence or estate duties. The classical beliefs regarding 
~ . ? 
taxation was that it disturb the existing distribution of income as 
~ 
little as possible which called for low non-progressive rates. 
In the same year that Mill was breaking new ground in his Principles 
of Political Economy, Marx (1818 - 1883) and Engels (1820 - 1895) 
published the Communist Manifesto with its very different analysis 
and prognoses of laissez-faire capitalism. To them the natural 
wage of the classical economists was no more than the subsistence 
wage - the minimum wage necessary for a worker to reproduce himself 
and his family. The distribution of income was the result of the 
legal and political framework upholding private property rights. 
- 4 -
As Marxist thought developed, i.t was to be argued that any 
redistribution of income was just an attempt to lessen the 
antagonism of the existing system. This however was merely a stage 
in the process of development of laissez-faire capitalism; an 
admission of the conflict between classes. This Marxist 
alternative is discussed in more detail in section 1.3. 
The decline in classical economics in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century was accompanied by a major break in thinking 
regarding distribution and social justice. Contributing to the 
change was the return of the utility concept to economic 
theorizing. The English utilitarian Henry S!dgwick (1838 - 1900) 
acknowledged his debt to Bentham's (1748 - 1832) interpretation of 
the principle of utility when he argued for equality in the 
distribution of income and wealth on the grounds of this maximising 
'aggregate satisfactions' in society.S In direct contrast to 
James Mill he explicitly proclaimed justice in distribution to be 
one of the major objectives of economic policy.6 
Edgeworth (1845-1926) accepted this utilitarian stance and from the 
principles of diminishing utility justified progression in 
taxation.7 Inequality of wealth was now seen as wasteful and 
recommendations for redistribution now became justified on economic 
grounds. In developing his progressive distributional theory, with 
social utillity as its ultimate end, Edgeworth pioneered the idea of 
interdependent utility functions. 
- 5 -
11 
••• betweeri the two extremes, between the frozen 
pole of egoism and the tropical expanse of 
utilitarianism, there has been granted to 
imperfectly-evolved mortals an intermediate 
temperate region; the position of one for whom 
in a calm moment his neighbour's happiness as 
compared with his own neither counts for nothing, 
nor yet 'counts for one', but counts for a 
fraction. We must modify the utilitarian 
integral •••• by multiplying each pleasure, except 
the pleasures of the agent himself, by a fraction 
- a factor doubtless diminishing with what may be 
called the social distance between the individual 
agent and those of whose pleasures he takes 
account. 118 
Recent theories of redistribution - discussed in the following 
section - have explored these possibilities. 
Popular demands around this time - the close of the last century 
and the beginning of the present one - were also moving in the 
direction of redistribution with the intellectual shift from the 
classical Ricardo-Mill doctrines to nee-classical economies 
significantly influencing the politicians in their attitudes on 
major issues of distribution and taxation. In particular, 
attitudes were changing in regard to both poverty and 
unemployment. It was increasingly acknowledged that the state had 
a role to play in relieving at least the hard core of poverty.9 
Gratuitous payments to persons in distress were supported by Alfred 
Marshall (1842 - 1924) who constantly rejected that these would 
discourage savings and capital formation - as suggested by Smith -
or necessarily reduce wages through reckless procreation - as 
proposed by Malthus.10 His successor at Cambridge, A C Pigou 
(1877 - 1959), shared these sentiments and included unemployment on 
the agenda for social reform. Regarding redistribution in general. 
Pigou held the utilitarian view and wrote: 
- 6 -
"It is evident that any transference of income 
from a relatively rich man to a relatively poor 
man of a similar temperament, since it enables 
more intense wants to be satisfied at the expense 
of less intense wants, must increase the 
aggregate sum of satisfaction." 11 
This he qualified with the proviso that redistribution must have no 
detrimental effect on national product. 
The law of dimin1ishing marginal utility as a base for arguing that 
redistribution would lead to general increases in economic welfare 
was shaken in 1932 by Lord Robbins. With there being no known way 
of measuring the magnitude of one persons satisfaction against that 
of another, Robbins questioned the possibility of making 
interpersonal comparisons of utility.12 This inability 
destroyed the so-called scientific grounds put forward by 
neo-classical economists for redistribution - although subsequent 
attempts to salvage the argument by both Abba Lerner, one of· 
Robbins' former students, and Amartya Sen had egalitarian 
implications in that both concluded that it was best to distribute 
incomes equally. 13 With the exception of these attempts, 
interest by economists in questions of redistribution declined, with 
the new welfare economics which emerged concentrating on the 
necessary conditions to be met for an efficient allocation of 
resources.14 
The demise of the utilitarian theory by Robbins did not however 
result in a reversal of economic ideas regarding poverty and 
unemployment. The inability of the market economy to be self-
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adjusting had already been documented by, for example, both 
Marshall and Pigou. And the severe economic and social costs of 
the Great Depression - as witnessed by decreased production, mass 
unemployment and political unrest - reinforced Keynes' (1883 - 1946) 
position regarding the need for government intervention on the 
demand side of the economy to ensure a sufficient level of economic 
activity. 15 Keynesian doctrine - together with more liberal 
conceptions of social justice - were instrumental in increasing the 
scope of state activity that led to the emergence of the welfare 
state in the years following the second World War. 
During the 1950s and 1960s there was generally a broad acceptance of 
the welfare state.16 Thereafter with the problems of 
stagflation which have been in evidence from the 1970s the 
legitamacy of the welfare state has been increasingly questionned on 
a number of fronts regarding both its efficiency and effectiveness. 
The normative question regarding the amount of redistribution which 
ought to take place elicits a continuum of responses varying 
according to ideological beliefs and values. From the Right - the 
anti-collectivists or market liberals - has come the rejection of 
the mixed economy and the call for a return to the free-play of 
market forces as set out in the classical doctrines. Premised on 
the values of individualism. liberty and private property, 
inequality is acceptable as the natural outcome of the market order 
with no need for public interference to rectify this. Any 
redistribution by the state should be strictly limited to the 
minimal amount for those few unable to provide for themselves. 
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This contrasts with other stances advocating the need for state 
provision. These vary in degree from the moderate collectivists 
(e.g. W H Beveridge, T H Marshall, R Pinker) in the Centre to the 
social democrats on the Left ·(e.g. Anthony Crosland, RM Titmus, 
J Le Grande).17 All have a commitment to the welfare state, 
political democracy and freedom but differ in the extent of state 
involvement they would recommend. Moderates favour more limited 
social protection of citizens against poverty and extreme 
inequality; . social democrats propose a more direct assault on 
inequality with the universal provision of generous social services. 
More recently in response to the problems presented by welfare 
capitalism, a variant standpoint has emerged - corporatism - which, 
while supporting the integrative functions of the welfare state, is 
against the institutional separation by collectivists of social 
welfare from the functioning of the economy. Corporatism 
acknowledges an interdependence by linking the distributional issues 
of social policies to the economic issues of production: 'the 
corporatist view recognises the need to harmonise the economic and 
social within society as a whole'.18 
Leaving aside these normative approaches to income redistribution, 
the next two sections turn to positive theories: that is, to those 
seeking to explain why the redistribution that occurs actually takes 
place. These are more recent in origin with both non-Marxist and 
Marxist theories originating in and around the 1960s. These 
alternatives are discussed respectively in sections 1.2 and 1.3. 
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The non-Marxist theories focus on the actions of individuals and 
groups and suggest reasons why they behave so as to redistribute 
market-determined incomes. The Marxist theories concentrate on the 
welfare state - rather than specifically on redistribution - and 
explain the origins and functions of social policy in the context of 
welfare capitalism. 
1.2 NON-MARXIST THEORIES OF INCOME REDISTRIBUTION 
These can be separated into three distinct groups of theories: 
those based on assumptions of interdependent utility functions; 
those involving a voting process where coalitions exercise 
their political power to redistribute to themselves; . 
. .JJ:.) those which assume that the state is used as an insurance 
agent to provide coverage against risks that the private 
rnarket cannot insure. 
1.2.l. INTERDEPENDENT UTILITY FUNCTIONS 
Underlying these theories is the assumption that the distribution of 
income has effects that are not priced in the market. This results 
in the need for some form of collectivised redistribution. In 
broad terms, the theories divide into two categories: those in 
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which the motive for redistribution is direct; and those in which 
redistribution is viewed as part of a process to achieve some other 
objective. 
When the motive for redistribution is direct, individual behaviour 
is assumed to be altruistic. This form of the model was developed by 
H.M. Hochman and J.D. Rodgers who argued that if individuals derive 
utility, not only from personal consumption but also from the income 
level of others, then redistribution is beneficial to both taxpayers 
and ~eciplents, 19 
In a two-person world, with person A having a higher income than 
person B, then under the assumption of interdependent utility 
functions, A's utility function will be of the form: 
where XA!• ••• XAn are goods consumed by person A and Ya 
represents person B's level of income. Figure 1 assumes:-
(a) a decreasing marginal utility of income schedule for 
A, MU: and; 
(b) a decreasing marginal utility to A of person B's 
income level MUB until B reaches an income level 
A 
of RSOOOpa; thereafter A obtains no utility from 
further transfers to B. 
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FIGURE 1 REDISTRIBUTION WITH INTERDEPENDENT UTILITY FUNCTIONS 
Marginal Utility . 
of A's Income 
to A 
A's Annual ·income 0 
i\ RGOds 
B's Amual Income 10000 
in Rands 
2000 
&000 
4000 
6000 
6000 
4000 
aooo 
2000 
10000 
0 
Marginal Utility 
of B's Income 
to A 
Suppose A's initial share of total income to be RSOOO, and B's 
R2000. Given this distribution of the total income of R10 000: 
and to increase his own utility A will transfer some of his income 
to B. ' Distributional efficiency will be at point q where 
At this point income inequality has been 
reduced with A's share of total. income now RSOOO and B's share 
R4000. Hochman and Rodgers extended this simplified version into a 
ma·ny-benefactor many-recipient situation and calculated patterns of 
i·ncome redistribution under alternative assumptions. 
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welfare. For example, a more equal distribution of income may lead 
to greater social stability which would be of benefit to the quality 
of life of transferors through the positive effect on their personal 
security and well-being. 
These theories can be formalized by postulating a composite utility 
function for A in which at least one good is dependent on the 
redistribution of income as an independent variable in its 
production function. That is: 
XAi = g cz1 • Z2> where z1 is the 
redistribution of income. 
Here the motive for redistribution is a self-interested desire to 
reduce some of the manifestations of inequality rather than a 
genuine concern for the plight of the less well-off?3 
1.2.2. REDISTRIBUTION THROUGH A VOTING PROCESS 
These theories argue that in the world of democratic, competitive 
politics coalitions exercise their voting rights to redistribute 
selfishly to themselves. One such theory is that proposed by 
Anthony Downs - originally formulated as an economic theory of 
democracy - but having implications for redistribution.24 
Downs' theory assumed that politicians formulate policies and serve 
interest groups in order to gain office. With the skewed pre-tax 
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distribution of income in most countries - relatively few persons 
having high incomes and most having low incomes - a government can 
gain votes through redistribution by depriving a few persons of 
income (thereby alienating them) and transferring it to the majority 
(thereby gaining their support). If votes are distributed equally, 
the poorest 51 percent of the population can use their numbers to 
take money from the wealthy. A proposal to redistribute to any 
group other than this coalition of the bottom 51 percent can be 
defeated by one that proposes redistribution to this group 
alone.25 
In his formulation of a voting theory Gordon Tullock was in 
agreement with Downs that people seek to use the government to gain 
special benefits at a cost to others, but critical of Downs' 
assumption that all transfers are vertical between different income 
groups.26 
He argued that in the real world massive redistribution of income 
occurs through the political process - not from the wealthy to the 
poor - but horizontally among the middle classes.27 This 
redistribution does not meet any egalitarian criteria but depends on 
which groups organize to ob~ain transfers and the success of their 
representatives to lobby for these differential benefits. Income 
alone does not usually.form the basis for group organization. The 
costs and problems of organizing Downs' bottom 51% of income 
recipients would be formidable and for this reason it would be 
unlikely this group would rally together to gain special 
privileges. But for other groups, such as trade and employer 
associations. politically powerful organizations already exist which 
are in a strong position to induce government to act in a way 
beneficial to their members. Tullock's theory suggested that it is 
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these groups - rather than the poor - which are the major 
beneficiaries of state redistribution. 
1.2.3. THE INSURANCE MODEL 
The insurance model theory proposes that the state is used by 
citizens as an insurance agent to provide coverage against risks 
that the private market fails to insure.28 As with private 
sector insurance where payments are made into a common pool from 
which claims to members are met, taxes too can be seen as a form of 
premium payment to the state in return for a form of social 
protection. In both the private and public 'insurance sectors' 
redistribution occurs to members whose circumstances are sttch as to 
call for higher than average claims. 
Two reasons have been put forward to explain the failure of private 
markets to develop in areas traditionally covered by the 
government. Firstly there may be imperfections in the capital 
market that prevent the individual from borrowing sufficient funds 
. 
to purchase insurance at the beginning of his earning years.29 
Secondly some of the events insured against by the state are not 
fully random in their incidence thus preventing them from being 
insurable in the private sector.3° 
In general, government provision via cash benofits to recipients is 
more amenable to this interpretation of redistribution than benefits 
provided in-kind. For example the event of becoming unemployed is 
not equiprobable across income and occupation groups with the 
incidence generally higher for the less well-off. The latter would 
form high risk groups for whom the premiums required by private 
- 16 -
insurers would most probably not be affordable - hence the need for 
the state to intervene as insurer. A further complication working 
against the provision of private insurance for unemployment would be 
the ability, under certain circumstances, of individuals to affect 
their probability of becoming unemployed. To the extent that 
individuals find work burdensome and seek to modify their behaviour 
to avoid it, the risk of being unemployed may be unsuitable for 
coverage under private insurance schemes. 
1.3 MARXIST THEORIES OF THE WELFARE STATE 
It was not until the late 1960s and early 1970s that Marxist 
analysis systematically focussed on the capitalist state 31 - of 
which the welfare state was an important aspect. Marxists were 
faced with the problem of explaining the contradictions inherent in 
welfare capitalism. Ori the one hand the growth of government 
appeared to display positive features enhancing social welfare and 
mitigating the hardships of the free-market economy. On the other 
the welfare state appeared as an agency of domination, control and 
. 32 
repression. 
In particular the question became that of why welfare had developed 
to such an extent in capitalist societies. For some writers this 
was explained by the functional needs of capital. O'Connor, for 
example, has argued that in order to reproduce the capitalist mode 
of production the modern state must perform two basic and often 
contradictory functions: accumulation and legitimisation. The 
first refers to the economic functions of ensuring profitability and 
growth; while the second refers to the sociopolitical functions of 
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maintaining or creating the conditions necessary for social 
harmony. 33 Accordingly expenditures by the state can be 
divided into those which are productive for capital in augmenting 
the rate of profit and accumulation in the economy; and those which 
are unproductive but necessary to fulfil the state's legitimisation 
function. 
Both functions have meant an increased role for the capitalist 
state. In particular the Depression years of the 1930s exposed the 
need for state regulation of the economy. Thereafter state 
involvement in maintaining high levels of employment, output and 
growth became part of the accumulation function. With the course of 
capital accumulation new requirements sprung up in the field of 
social policy. Social security systems were developed; the need 
for a skilled and healthy workforce emerged; and urbanisation 
prompted the provision by the state of infrastructure, housing, 
transport and other urban amenities.34 Although O'Conner 
separated accu.~ulation and legitimisation for analytical purposes, 
empirically most state activities encompass both functions; with 
conflicts sometimes arising between these dual goals of social 
policy. 
However for some Marxists it has not been sufficient to explain the 
origins of the welfare state solely in terms of the needs of 
capital. The growth of an organised working class, opposed to 
domination, has also exerted pressures for social expenditures. It 
has been argued that collective social provision has also come about 
in response to these working class demands and to ignore these 
progressive aspects of the social services would be to lose sight of 
real gains that have been won by labour •35.:;, Gough points out 
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that in their interpretation Marxists have tended to veer towards 
one or other of two basic positions. 
"Some writers see the welfare state as a 
functional response to the needs of capital 
(others) as the unqualified fruits of working 
class struggle, as concessions wrested from an 
unwilling state ••. (most) stress both aspects of 
the welfare state but leave open the way in which 
they are related. 11 36 
Mishra suggested though, that the overall Marxist argument is that 
it is the logic of capital that prevails.37 
In either context the welfare state has developed to counteract 
basic contraditions of advanced capitalism. In turn it has thrown 
up its own set of contradictions as evidence of the conflict between 
the functioning of an advanced capitalist economy and a system of 
state involvement and welfare. These conflicts are manifest in the 
fiscal crises currently being experienced in capitalist countries. 
For the working class the positive features of the welfare state in 
the form of state expenditures comprise a social wage - albeit one 
that gets paid for through taxes. But the working class is not a 
monolithic group with tax burdens and state expenditures uniformly 
spread. It is possible to distinguish between different groups of 
workers having distinct and competing interest. Westergaard and 
Resler have noted these sectional interests within the provision of 
state welfare. 
"The impact of social services has tended ••• to 
be divisive: to draw lines between different 
categories of workers ••• social security 
provisions distinguish 'the poor' from others; 
those workers who are given special help ••• from 
those who use only the standard services. That 
by itself is liable to foster mutual 
resentments. 1138 
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This adds a further dimension to the Marxist analysis of the welfare 
state and redistribution, as outlined in this section. The growth 
of state welfare policies must be understood as part of a post-war 
settlement between capital and labour with benefits and burdens not 
equally spread between different fractions of labour. 
In concluding this section it must be emphasized that it has not 
been possible here to examine systematically all the different 
strands of Marxist thought on the welfare state. Rather the 
argument has been presented in a very broad and general form with 
only the fundamental ideas and issues being covered. 
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CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF SELECTED STUDIES OF REDISTRIBUTION 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
-..____ I 
This research study focussed -~ redistribution through the welfare 
budget. Until fairly recently the distribution of benefits from 
public expenditures had received little attention in the study of 
public finance with the emphasis being on taxation.1 Brown and 
Jackson have suggested the following reason for this: 
First there is a lack of information on the 
distribution of public expenditure benefits. 
Second, the theory of public expenditure benefit 
incidence is relatively underdeveloped. Third, 
there has been a general lack of regard by fiscal 
economists that public expenditure benefits 
matter to the income distribution, and finally, 
many of the other problems arise because public 
outputs are difficult to measure.2 
It was in 1954 that Samuelson made an important contribution to 
public expenditure theory when, with the incorporation of collective 
consumption goods into individual utility functions, he formulated 
the theoretical conditions for optimal public expenditure.3 
Following on this, and with the increases in the relative size and 
scope of public expenditures, has come the realisation of their 
importance to redistribution ••• 'Interest in the distribution of 
public expenditure benefits is now gathering momentum•.4 
1 
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Ultimately though, concern rests with the assessment of benefits 
from public expenditure together with the burdens of taxation. A 
joint statement detailing expenditure benefits and tax burdens is 
loosely referred to as a welfare budget. 
2.2 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 
The construction of a full welfare budget was pioneered in Britain 
by Barna with his pre-war investigation for 1937 of the 
redistribution of incomes through government spending and tax 
collections.5 Earlier calculations had been made of the 
incidence of taxation by income class by Jevons (1869) and Samuel 
(1919). 6 For later years budget studies for Britain included 
those by Weaver (1950), Peacock and Browning (1954), Cartter (1955), 
Nicholson (1964), Merrett and Monk (1966) and Nicholson and Britton 
(1976). There were also the studies conducted annually from 1957 
by the government Central Statistical Office, together with analyses 
and related papers by their initiator J.L. Nicholson. In the 
United States early studies concentrated on the tax side - for 
example, Colm and Tarasov (1941) and Musgrave, Carroll, Cook and 
Frame ( 1951). This reflected in nart the difficulties met when -----------~-
dea~p~odl~:.-- However, subsequent studies 
incorporated the effects of both tax and expenditure programs. For 
example,· there were those by Adler (1951), Conrad (1954), Gillespie 
(1965), Musgrave, Case and Leonard (1974), Reynolds and Smolensky 
(1974), Pechman and Okner (1974), Reynolds and Smolensky (1977), 
Ruggles (1979) and Ruggles and O'Higgins (1981).7 
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Studies have not been restricted to developed economies. One 
program under which numerous studies of government redistribution 
policy were incorporated was the Research Program on Income 
~ Distribution and Employment sponsored by the International Labour 
Organisation. (ILO). With the switch in emphasis on development 
strategies from growth to employment creation, and then to the 
provision of basic needs, the importance of the impact of specific 
types of government expenditure and particular taxes led to a series 
of studies on the distributional consequences of government.a 
Traditionally budget studies have attempted to allocate benefits 
from public expenditures and burdens from tax payments across income 
groups. This has involved three major steps: 
(a) choosing an income base which gives the mean original income 
by income group in the absence of government; 
(b) adding government expenditures by income class to this 
original income; 
(c) subtracting taxes by income class to give resultant income by 
income group, given the existence of government. 
In matrix form the problem could be defined as follows: 
or in expanded form as: 
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b11 b12···b1j 
bi1 b22···b2j 
• 
t11 t12···t1j 
t21 t22 ... t2j 
where y11 = the final mean income of the ith income group; 
y0 i = the original mean income of the ith income group; 
Cg1 g2 •.. gk) =the vector giving the actual magnitude of 
the k government expenditures allocated; 
~ = a matrix of order k x j giving proporational 
distributors for each of the k government expenditures 
across the j income groups, i.e. row entries sum to 
1,00 for each row; 
the vector giving the actual magnitude 
of the m different taxes collected; 
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! = a matrix of order m x j giving proportional 
distribution for each of the m taxes across the j 
income groups, i.e. row entries sum to l,00 for each 
row. 
Theoretical and empirical problems are met in the construction of 
each of the vectors in the above equation. These are discussed in 
more detail in chapter 3 but centre around the following: 
(a) the unit of allocation to be used for redistribution, 
individual or household; 
(b) the coverage of the income concept to measure original income; 
(c) the choice of government expenditures to be included in the 
analysis; 
(d) the assumptions adopted in assigning the benefits of 
government expenditures across income groups; 
(e) the choice of tax receipts to be included ·in the analysis; 
(f) the assumptions adopted in assigning the incidence of tax 
receipts across income groups. \ 
In their 1977 study, Reynolds and Smolensky concisely explained 
their choices in the construction of the above vectors. It will be 
useful to outline these as fairly typical of the methodology 
employed generally by welfare budget studies. The question they 
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posed was: What happens to the size distribution of income - across 
income groups - when household income·was defined so as to include 
the benefits and burdens of all levels of gov.ernment?9 
Their choice of unit of analysis was the income-earning or 
income-spending unit regardless of whether this constituted a single 
individual or a multiperson unit. Original income was taken as Net 
National Product on the grounds that all claims to net output 
accrued to people. Their choice of income intervals was dictated 
by their data which did not consist of observations on individual 
income units, but was pregrouped by interval. For example, in 
1970, they used the eleven income intervals as defined by the United 
States Current Population Survey: under $2 000, six $1 000 (} 
~
increments to $8 000, $8 000 to $10 ooo, $10 ooo to $15 000, 
$15 000 to $25 000, and over $25 000. The order of the original 
mean income vector "l..o was therefore l x 11 and each entry 
measured average Net National Product per household for households 
whose original income ~ell, into that interval. 
Regarding government expenditure, this was grouped under the 
headings listed below. The bracketed text adjacent each 
expenditure gives the standard distributor used for that 
expenditure.to For example, expenditure on 'elementary, 
secondary and other education' was distributed across income groups 
according to the distribution of children under age 18 in each of 
the income intervals. This was a relatively uncontroversial 
' 
distributor although it did make the implicit assumption of there 
being no externalities to society from expenditure on 
education.11 More problematic was the distribution of 
general government expenditures for which beneficiaries could not 
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readily be identified. These were distributed one-half by the 
distribution of households and one-half by the share of initial 
income. This was an arbitrary allocation based on the rationale 
that households benefit on some 'equalitarian basis as well as in 
proportion to income•.12 
Federal Expenditure 
1. National defence, international affairs, and space research 
(one-half households; one-half initial income) 
2. Other general expenditures (ditto l above) 
3. Social security (receipts of social security benefits) 
4. Veterans' benefit~ (receipts of veterans' benefits) 
5. Net interest paid (interest income) 
6. Agriculture (net farm income) 
7. Elementary, secondary and other education (children under age 
18) 
a. Higher education (estimated expenditure on higher education) 
9. Highways (expenditure on motor cars) 
10. Labour (wages and salaries) 
11. Unemployment compensation (receipts of unemployment 
compensation) 
12. Other transfers (receipts of other public transfers) 
State and Local Expenditure 
1. General expenditures (one-half households; one-half initial 
income) 
2. Public assistance (receipt of public assistance) 
3. Agriculture (net farm income) 
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4. Elementary, secondary and other education (children under age 
18) 
5. Higher education (estimated expenditure on higher education) 
6. Highways (expenditure on motor cars) 
7. Labour (wages and salaries) 
All expenditures at a federal, state and local level were included 
under these nineteen heads. The order of the g vector was thus 
fixed at 1 x 19; setting the ~matrix at 19 x 11, 
Taxes were also included for all levels of government', as shown 
below. As for government expenditure the text in brackets after 
each type of tax gives the allocation routine used to distribute 
taxes across income groups. Perhaps most controversial of these 
distributors is the apportioning of corporate income tax between 
income groups. This was distributed one-half by the distribution 
of dividends and one-half by estimated consumption expenditure. 
With the theoretical debate over the forward-shifting and/or 
backward shifting of corporate income tax still unresolved, a degree 
of arbitrariness in this assumption is always inevitable in 
incidence studies.13 
Federal Taxes 
1. Personal income tax (payment of personal income tax) 
2. Estate and gift tax (payment of estate and gift tax) 
3. Corporate income tax (one-half dividends; one-half estimated 
consumption expenditure) 
4. Excise and custom duties (estimated consumption expenditure) 
5. Social security (payment of social security tax) 
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State and Local Taxes 
1. Personal income tax (as above for federal taxes) 
2. Estate and gift tax (ditto) 
3. Corporate income tax (ditto) 
4. Sales taxes and excise duties (ditto) 
s. Social security (ditto) 
6. Property tax (one-half estimated consumption expenditure; one 
half housing expenditure) 
Given these distributors for the eleven categories of tax receipts 
the vector ~ and matrix I were determined - ~ was of order l x 11 
and I or order 11 x 11. The problem now became a purely algebraic 
one. Expenditure per household across income groups was given by 
g!; taxes per household across income groups by xT; and final 
income given the benefits and burden of all levels of government as 
zO+g!!-xT 
The results obtained by Reynolds and Smolensky will only be 
presented in summary form. Although they included the full range 
of public expenditures and tax revenues in their analysis, they 
emphasized the partial nature of their results because of the 
omission of the effects of government operating through channels 
other than the budget. However, having taken cognizance of this 
reservation and the limitations imposed by the quality of their 
data, their major results could be summarised as set out below 
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(a) Dispersion in the final distribution of income, that is, after 
government expenditures and tax payments had been accounted 
for, decreased slightly over the period 1950-1970 although 
these changes were not statistically_ significant. 
(b) In each of the years 1950, 1960 and 1970 the final 
distribution of income was closer to equality than the 
original distribution of income although a comparison between 
years revealed that the distributive impact of each dollar 
spent by government had declined over the period.14 
(c) Disaggregation revealed that over the period changes in the 
tax system had led to it drifting from 'progressive to 
proportional or perhaps even slightly regressive by 
1970'.15 
One of the restrictions of the majority of the welfare budget 
studies, including that of Reynolds and Smolensky just discussed, 
was their use of grouped data. Households were grouped by broad 
income categories with benefits from government expenditures and 
burdens from tax payments distributed across income intervals. 
This assumed that benefits and burdens were uniformly distributed 
within any one income class. 
An alternative method was that pioneered by Ruggles and O'Higgins in 
their redistribution analyses for the United States and the United 
Kingdom.16 In both cases they used household level microdata 
as the basis for expenditure and tax allocations. This allowed for 
benefits and burdens to be applied separately to each household 
rather than to each income interval as was usually the case. Apart 
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from increases in accuracy, the additional advantage of this method 
was that it allowed for redistributional effects to be analyzed with 
respect of household characteristics other than income. Examples. 
of.explanatory variables used by these authors were: household 
size, race and gender of head of household, and number of earners in 
household. 
Microdata files were obtained from the statistical offices of both 
governments. For the United States the Public Use Sample from the 
Census of Population was supplemented by data from the Internal 
Revenue Service's Tax File; for the United Kingdom household 
records were obtained from the Family Expenditure Survey and 
augmented with additional estimates from the Central Statistical 
Office. 
In respects other than choice of database, the Ruggles and O'Higgins 
studies were similar in many respects to that of Reynolds and 
Smolensky.17 The unit of analysis was the household; 
•:original income' of households was taken as income before taxes and 
benefits; all public expenditures were allocated with the exception 
of factor returns to lenders and lending by the government; and all 
tax payments were included. Regarding allocation of expenditure 
benefits the utility approach was rejected in favour of the cost 
method. In other words, the benefit to households was measured as 
the cost of the resource being expended on that household rather 
than the actual utility to the household.18 
Table 1 was an example of the results obtained by Ruggles and 
O'Higgins when the effect of an influence other than income was 
investigated. In this case explanatory factors chosen were race 
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and gender of household head.. It can be seen that there appeared 
to be significant differences in both taxes and benefits for 
different race/gender groups. This was not the result of 
legislative intent but rather caused by correlations between these 
variables and others which did influence taxes and benefits. When 
taxes and expenditures were broken down into their component parts, 
these other influences could be identified. A few of these will be 
mentioned in brief. 
(a) Female-headed households were substantially more dependent on 
public assistance and social security payments than 
male-headed households. 
(b) Hospital expenditures were higher for non-white households and 
were, for both races, weighted towards female-headed 
households.19 Ruggles and O'Higgins suggested that: 
"it seems fairly likely that the relatively high 
hospital expenditures allocated to the 
female-headed households reflect the relatively 
large numbers of low-income and especially 
elderly women who may be spending significant 
amounts of time in public hospitals~20 
(c) Households headed by non-white males received more in 
unemployment insurance reflecting the higher rate of 
unemployment amongst non-whites. Non-white females were more 
likely to be in occupations not covered by unemployment 
insurance, and when covered, to have received lower payments 
with these being proportional to prior earnings. 
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TABLE 1 
NET BUDGET INCIDENCE TO U.S. HOUSEHOLDS BY RACE AND GENDER OF 
HOUSEHOLD HEADS 1970 
RACE AND GENDER OF HOUSEHOLD HEAD 
NON- NON-
WHITE WHITE WHITE WHITE 
TOTAL MALE MALE FEMALE FEMALE 
Mean Household Income 9 685 11 304 7 893 5 125 4 207 
in dollars per annum 
Mean Taxes in dollars 5 350 6 204 4 720 2 967 2 939 
per annum (55,2) (54,9) (59,8) (57,9) (69,9) 
Mean Expenditures in 5 433 5 598 5 693 4 584 6 434 
dollars per annum . (56,1) (49,5) (72,1) (89,4) (152,9) 
Net Budget Incidence 83 -sos 973 1 617 3 495 
i.e. Expenditures minus (0,9) -(5,4) (12,3) (31,6) (83,1) 
Taxes 
Notes: Figures in brackets give absolute amount expressed as a 
percentage of mean household income for each race/gender 
group 
Source: _Ruggles, P and O'Higgins, M, (1981), p 156. 
(d) Housing benefits were higher for female-headed households than 
for male-headed households and for non-white headed households 
than for white-headed households. With public housing being 
available only for households earning below a certain cut-off 
income, this pattern reflected the difference in mean incomes 
across race/gender groups. 
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Working through these and other specific influences Ruggles and 
O'Higgins confirmed the importance of race and gender of head of 
household in explaining differences in the burdens of taxes and the 
benefits of expenditures. This seemed to be the case even when 
income was held constant. Their large number of dependents and high 
level of urban residence contributed to the high level of 
expenditure benefits received by households headed by non-white 
females. For those headed by white females, their relatively low 
level of expenditure benefits resulted from their small average size 
and the fact that their heads were often pensioners. 
This type of result obtained by Ruggles and O'Higgins illustrated 
the advantages of accessing microdata in studies of the welfare 
budget. Using household records allowed for an assessment of the 
importance of other influences, in addition to income, on the 
redistribution process. 
Not all investigations followed those of Reynolds and Smolensky and 
Ruggles and O'Higgins in simultaneously allocating the full range of 
expenditures and taxes. Some studies were restricted to inquiring 
after either one or other of expenditures or taxes. Examples of 
tax incidence studies have been referred to earlier in the 
chapter. Alternatively, other investigations analyzed the 
influence of a specific variable on redistribution. For example, 
one of the working papers in the Income Distribution and Employment 
Programme of the !LO - ''The Regional Distribution of Government 
Expenditures in Botswana1' - discussed the effectiveness of 
government programmes in redistributing incomes from urban to rural 
areas.21 Results suggested that several of the group 
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programmes - for example, water provision, health, education and 
certain agricultural programmes - had not resulted in redistribution 
to rural areas despite the government's shift in emphasis to fostar 
rural development. 
Other studies focussed their attention on a partial assessment of 
redistribution. Lampman concentrated on the effect of money 
transfers - both public and private - on the incomes of the poor in 
the United States.22 His definition of transfers covered 
social security, government pensions, veterans' pensions, private 
pensions, workmen's compensation, unemployment insurance and public 
assistance. From his results certain biases in payments were 
evident. For example, the better-off poor were favoured over the 
poorest poor; and small families tended to score more from cash 
payments than large families.23 Lampman identified four 
competing 'mentalities' underlying the provision of all public 
expenditures. The first - the minimum provision mentality - was 
concerned with adequate benefits for those unable to provide for 
themselves. Included in this provision would be special services 
for the very poor, the disabled and the sick. The second mentality 
catered for irregularities in income and expenditure of regular 
earners for providing for insurance against losses - for example, 
through unemployment. This was ref erred to as the replacement of 
loss mentality. Third came the horizontal and vertical equity 
mentality where the emphasis was on treating equals equally and 
narrowing inequality between unequals. And lastly, there was the 
efficiency of investment mentality where the issue was not equity, 
but rather the final benefits to society from costs incurred in the 
provision of transfers of goods and services. He identified a 
balance among these four mentalities in the national system of 
transfers.24 
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In recent years investigations have also included some micro-studies 
of sipgle expenditure items - for example, food subsidies, police 
and fire services, tertiary education, health provision, mortgage 
interest, subsidies - and these have attempted to introduce a class 
dimension into the analyses. In reviewing these latter studies 
Taylor Gooby pointed to the middle classes 'with their superior 
knowledge and ability to negotiate with welfare gatekeepers. their 
determination to realize their aspirations and ••• their "sharper 
elbows" who have benefitted from the welfare state:2s He 
speculated that an introduction of a gender dimension into these 
distribution studies would reveal similar biases in favor of males. 
2.3 SOUTH AFRICAN STUDIES 
Attempts to construct welfare budgets in South Africa are few. 
Perhaps this can partly be explained by the lack of suitable data 
for this type of analysis. The studies which have been conducted 
have mainly concentrated on race as an explanatory variable in 
budget incidence. In most cases studies have concentrated on one 
race group only. 
Three investigations have compared the expenditure of Africans with 
the taxes paid by them. First of these was the Native Economic 
Commission, appointed in 1930. The Commission's fourth Term of 
Reference read: 
"What proportion of the public revenue is 
contributed by the Native population directly and 
indirectly. What proportion of the public 
expenditure may be regarded as necessitated by 
the presence of, and reasonably chargeable to, 
the Native population. 11 26 
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. 
This required that the Commission divide tax payments and government 
expenditures between two groups - Africans and non-Africans. The 
Commission came up against the full set of theoretical and empirical. 
problems associated with the construction of a welfare budget and, 
faced in many instances with an absonce of appropriate data, were 
forced into making some arbitrary allocations. In cases where 
either the beneficiary of the expenditure or the inidence of the tax 
could not be identified, the Commission relied on a 'National Income 
Ratio' (N.I.R.) to apportion between Africans and non-Africans. 
This ratio was the estimated share of Africans in the National 
Income - put at one-eighth by the Commission - and .used as the ratio 
to debit/credit the African ledger when an expenditure/tax receipt 
was unallocable. 
The Commission covered the full.current budget of the central and 
provincial authorities for the financial year 1929/30 and carefully 
detailed their allocation routines.27 These will not be 
discussed except to mention briefly the dissension over the 
allocation of state revenue from mining. The issue at stake was 
the theoretical one of allocating income shares to co-operating 
factors of production. For whereas the Commission apportioned the 
one-eighth ratio of their N.I.R. as the African share, commissioner 
Lucas objected and argued that it would be more fair to put the 
contribution at one-half. 
"It is idle to contend, because there would be no 
mining if there were no Europeans in the Union, 
that therefore all that value must be considered 
to be the creation of Europeans. It would be 
equally idle to argue, because there would be 
little or no mining if there were no Natives to 
work in the mines, that therefore all or nearly 
all that value must be credited to the Natives. 
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It is a joint creation of both. When it is 
remembered that the Natives employed in mining 
' outnumber the Europeans by more than ten to one, 
it would not be unfair to put the contribution of 
each at half. 11 28 
The final result of the Commission's investigation was a net surplus 
of expenditure made on behalf of Africans over their contribution to 
tax revenues. The absolute amount of this surplus was R3 702 822 
which worked out at 64 cents per capita. 
In the Tomlinson Commission 29 - which reported in the 
mid-fifties - a similar effort was made to identify the African 
share of expenditure and revenue for the financial year 1951/52. 
The analysis was seemingly less rigorous than that of the Native 
Economic Commission; their conclusion was a net amount transferred 
to the African population by the state of 'at least' R so 335 000. 
This worked out at R35,08 per head. 
The last of the three investigations to have only concentrated on 
the expenditure and taxes of Africans was that by Leistner and Van 
der Merwe.30 Their estimates of net budget incidence were for 
four selected years over the period 1929/30 to 1964/65. 
on the expenditure side only direct spending was included but from 
both the current and capital accounts and for all levels of 
government. For taxation, both direct and indirect taxes were 
included with sales taxes being allocated according to results from 
studies of African expenditure patterns and excise and customs 
duties allocated to final consumption using data from the 1960/61 
Input-Output tables.31 The possibility of any partial shifting 
to consumers of company tax was not considered. Their results - in 
constant 1958 prices - are shown in Table 2. 
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TABLE 2 
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON AFRICANS FOR SELECTED ITEMS AND TAXES PAID BY 
AFRICANS, IN CONSTANT 1958 PRICESa 1929/30 - 1964/65 
R MILLION 
1929/30 1946/47 1956/57 1964/65 
I. Direct Spending on: 
1. General administration 2,9 10,5 26,2 36,5 
2. Social services 5,2 37,2 84,4 133,9 
a) Housing 1,8 10,3 20,2 
b) Health 1,9 16,0 46,2 67,4 
c) Education 2,5 8,9 17,3 21,3 
d) Other or unspecified 0,8 10,4 10,6 24,9 
3. Capital expenditure 0,8 .2,3 23,8 26,6 
(excl housing) 
TOTAL DIRECT SPENDING 8,9 50,1 134,5 197,1 
II.Taxation: 
1. Direct taxes 6,2 7,4 8,2 e,1 
2. Indirect taxes 7,3 H.,7 16,0 26,1 
TOTAL TAXATION 13,5 22,1 24,2 34,8 
DIRECT SPENDING MINUS TAXATION -4,6 28,0 110,3 162,3 
DIRECT SPENDING MINUS 
TAXATION PER CAPITA (R) -R0,80 R3,56 RU,85 R12,03 
Source: The Africa Institute Bulletin, Vol VI, No 6, 1968, p 175. 
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Given the assumptions determining allocation routines, the pattern 
to emerge was of increasing absolute and per capita net benefits for 
Africans. 
McGrath has illustrated the frailty of these results by altering two 
of the Leistner and Van der Merwe assumptions for 1964/Ss.32 
First, expenditure on health for Africans was deflated to reflect 
their lower cost per patient day for hospital care. In addition, 
company taxes were assumed to be entirely shifted forward to 
consumption expenditure. The effect of these two changes was to 
decrease per capita net benefits for Africans to one-quarter the 
value shown in Table 2. 
For the Coloured population, the Theron Commission assessed their 
tax burden and made a comparison against direct expenditure on this 
group through the Vote of the Department of Coloured, Reheboth and 
Nama Relations.33 Taxes included in their investigation 
were: personal income tax, sales tax, customs and excis~ duties, 
property rates and a small miscellaneous category. Not included 
was company taxation; thus implicitly assuming no shifting of 
incidence.34 On the expenditure side, health spending by the 
provincial administrations was excluded as was any share of general 
government expenditure on shared unallocable expenditures. Given 
these restrictions, direct expenditure on the Coloured community was 
calculated as almost double their tax contribution from the included 
taxes. The Commission concluded that if all expenditures were 
included there would have been a net budget surplus accruing to the 
Coloured community. 
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The most comprehensive welfare budgets to have been constructed for 
South Africa were those by McGrath for selected years over the 
period 1949/50 to 1975/76.35 These had the considerable 
advantage over those previously discussed in that all race groups 
were covered. All taxes were measured and allocated between 
races; as were current expenditures at all levels of government. 
I 
Also useful was a sensitivity analysis using alternative sets of 
assumptions for allocating taxes and expenditures. 
Turning first to taxation, McGrath offered three allocation routines 
which varied from assu."nptions of low incidence tCJ Africans, to a set 
of intermediate assumptions and then lastly, to assumptions of high 
incidence on Africans. The taxes 'which had alternative tax 
allocation routines were: company tax, property tax, customs duty 
and sales tax. With company tax, for example, the low incidence 
assumption was that the incidence of the tax was fully borne by 
shareholders with foreign shareholdings (estimated at 20 per cent) 
excluded. The intermediate assumption was that one-half was borne 
by shareholders and the other shifted to consumers; and the high 
incidence assumption was that the incidence was entirely shifted 
forward to consumption expenditures. 
The results obtained were obviously se_nsi ti ve to the choice of 
·, -·-
assumptions but consistent trends to emerge were: 
(a) the African share of total tax payments increased; 
(b) the White and Coloured share of total tax payments decreased; 
(c) the Asian share rose between the beginning and end of the 
period. 
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TABLE 3 
REAL PER CAPITA TAX BURDEN BY RACE: 1975/76 
(Constant 1970 prices, and intermediate assumptions) 
1949/50 1959/60 1969/70 1975/76 
Af As c w Af As c w Af As c w Af As c w 
Taxes per 
Capita (Rand) 8 37 33 198 11 40 33 245 18 62 50 414 31 123 64 630 
Personal Income 87· 214 146 913 94 194 175 1111 104 306 261 1575 155 432 333 1934 
per Capita 
(Rand) 
Taxes as a S 9 17 23 22 12 21 19 22 17 20 19 26 20 28 19 33 
of Income 
source: McGrath (1979a), p 18. 
Table 3 gives the real per capita tax burdens rinder the intermediate 
set of assumptions. In addition to illustrating the tax incidence 
across races, the increase in scale of taxes over the period can 
clearly be.gauged from these figures. 
To assess the overall impact of the budget required the equivalent 
exercise for government expenditure. As with taxation the 
unallocable portion of expenditure was shared betwe'en groups under 
alternative sets of incidence assumptions. These expenditures 
-~m~- ------"-~ -------- ___ J 
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TABLE 4 
REAL PER CAPITA PUBLIC EXPENDITURE BY RACE: 1949/50 - 1975/76 
(Constant 1970 prices) 
\ 
... __ -
1949/50 1959/60 1969/70 
' 
1975/76 
Af As c w Af As c w Af As c w Af As c Iii 
Expenditure per 33 57 61 131 35 66 69 159 53 108 95 215 77 148 136 321 
Capita (High 
African, benefit) 
Exp. as a % of 40 27 44 15 38 35 41 15 56 36 34 14 54 36 43 17 
Personal Income (High African 
benefit) 
Exp. per Capita 20 50 51 179 22 59 63 211 27 100 86 325 44 131 120 476 (Low African 
benefit) 
Exp. as a I of 24 24 36 20 24 31 38 19 28 34 31 21 31 32 38 25 
Personal 
Income (Low 
African benefit) 
Source: McGrath (1979a), p 28. 
I 
I 
/: 
i. 
,· 
j 
' i 
i. 
<.. 
- 48 ~ 
-·.·, 
This exercise resulted in a range of outcomes. However, ·Under all 
assumptions_post-~udget incomes fot' Blacks were higher than they 
would have been had taxes and .b,enefits been distributed in 
porportion to income levels. The opposite was the case for Whites. 
However, this budget redistr.i?ution to Blacks did not fundamentally 
alter the degree of inequality in racial .income. Whereas estimates 
·Of White per capita pre-distribution incomes in 1975/76 were more 
than thirteen times per capita pre-distribution incomes of Blacks, 
\.. 
,on the assumptioris which yielded· maximum redistribution to Black 
groups they were still eight times larger after. redistribution. 
In his conclusion, McGrath criticised racial welfare budgets in 
that ·they failed to consider income inequality within race 
groups. This, he felt, was a major inadequacy •. ·· 
The most recent of the South African redistribution studies was that 
by Abedian.36 For the period 1968 - 80 he looked in turn at 
the incidence of government spending, taxation and monetary policy 
on the lower income groups. 
Expenditure was studied using two methods: the general approach and 
the direct money-flow approach. The former.divided government 
expenditure into categories by function to provide an indication of 
the impact of the state·on poverty:and inequality; the latter 
identified all expenditures to benefit lower income gro~ps in the 
form of either direct expenditure on them or as wages paid to them 
as state employees. Using both approaches expenditure policies 
emerged as favourable to lower income groups. 
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OBJECTIVES AND LIMITATIONS, SOME METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
AND DATABASE DESCRIPTION 
3.1 OBJECTIVES AND LIMITATIONS 
In addressing the question of redistribution and budget incidence, 
the original intention was to construct a full welfare budget across 
income groups using data collected by the Central Statisical 
Services. This proved impossible with available data not sufficient 
to derive welfare budgets other than with respect to race. These 
have been constructed by McGrath.! 
The first source to be explored was the data files of the current 
Population Survey (CPS), to which access had kindly been granted. 
Off these dataf iles household level microdata records were to be 
constructed in a similar fashion to the Ruggles and O'Higgins 
studies. 2 Unfortunately the CPS files did not allow the 
necessary household data to be accessed off the individual records 
with enough detail to provide the required range of variables for 
the analysis. 
A second attempt to use official data was made; this time with the 
grouped income data from the 1980 Population Census. With the 
exception of the work of Ruggles and O'Higgins, the majority of the 
international attempts to construct welfare budgets had relied on 
grouped income data. Here the problem encountered was the data being 
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collected on an individual rather than household or income spending 
basis; the latter being the. natural unit for budget analysis. Many 
income and expenditure decisions take place within households and as 
such are difficult to assign to individual members of a household. 
Impeded by the unsuitability of both CPS and census data, a decision 
was made to restrict the analysis to a very specific group of the 
population, namely a sample of the urban poor. Access had been 
gained to household records of a survey of urban poor conducted by 
Prinsloo in 1982.3 This investigation had formed part of the 
Second Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty and Development in South 
Africa, an inquiry which had as its precedent the Investigation of 
the Poor White Problem conducted over the period 1928 - 19324. 
The depth of detail in Prinsloo's data allowed household records to 
be assembled covering the important variables for a study of budget 
incidence. Allocation routines for public expenditure and taxes 
could then be applied separately to each household record - much the 
same way as done by Ruggles and O'Higgins - and the results of 
budget actions anaylzed with respect to various household 
characteristics. 
A full evaluation of the redistributive effect of the global welfare 
budget was not undertaken. With sample households being drawn from 
the urban poor, the basis of the analysis was altered. It was 
decided to concentrate on the distributive impact of public 
expenditure on goods and services whose consumption by households 
could be clearly identified. These were: 
social security payments such as pensions, grants and 
allowances; education; housing; health; and transport. 
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Excluded therefore were those indivisible expenditures of government 
which are not easy to allocate and which are usually assigned under 
a range of alternative incidence assumptions. 
The emphasis of this study was therefore shifted. The objective 
became that of, for the urban poor, analyzing and quantifying the 
patterns of public spending on specific items of expenditure. Items 
covered were of two types: 
cash payments in the form of social security to the old, the 
young and the disabled; and 
in-kind provision of 'm~rit goods'. 
These differ in that while the former directly increase the money 
income of recipients, the latter affects their real income by 
increasing consumption of these goods above the levels which would 
normally result from the regular forces of demand and supply. 
Although the emphasis was on public spending, some attention was 
-
also directed to costs in the form of taxes. Again not all taxes 
were covered; the burdens to the sample of income tax. sales taxes 
and customs and excise duties were those considered. 
Associated with all derivatives of welfare budgets are some general 
methodological issues which are discussed in section 3.2. However, 
even given the narrowly defined objectives of this investigation 
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there were some specific limitations which need mentioning. 
(a) Sampling was unfortunately restricted to urban areas thus 
excluding all rural communities from the sampling universe. 
It could be expected that a positive correlation would exist 
between urbanisation and the consumption of public 
expenditures. The access of urban households to public goods 
and services would be significantly greater than for rural 
households, thus guaranteeing their receipt of a higher 
'social wage' from these commodities. McGrath has illustrated 
this urban bias in the supply of health services.S In 
fact, a bias in public spending would reinforce the already 
substantial urban-rural differences in market determined 
incomes. Wilson in his overview to the Carnegie Conference 
commented: ' there is poverty all over South Africa but it 
is really in the rural areas that it is most acute'.6 
(b) Only African and Coloured households were surveyed. Given 
public expenditure patterns in South Africa it would be safe 
to generalise that, other things being equal, public 
expenditure on White households would be higher than for all 
other groups, while that on Asians would approximate that for 
Coloured households. 
(c) Thirdly, given limitations on project resources, Prinsloo 
restricted her areas of selection to Cape Town and Durban. 
To the extent of any area-specific differences in the 
distribution procedure of public goods, care should be 
exercised when generalising the results. However, given 
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random selection procedure inferences drawn from the sample 
should be fairly widely applicable. 
Commenting on her choice of sampling universe, Prinsloo remarked as 
follows: 
"While recognising the existence of severe 
poverty among other ethnic groups and in other 
geographical situtations, especially rural 
African areas, the choice of focus could be 
justified by the levels of deprivation currently 
experienced in urban areas and by the continuing 
growth of South Africa's African and Coloured 
urban population. 11 7 
3.2 SOME METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
Assessment of the redistributive impact of the government budget 
confronts numerous methodological issues which need to be discussed 
before embarking on such an exercise. These will be discussed 
under the following headings: comparative static nature of 
analysis, incidence of government budget action, valuation of 
benefits, exclusion of capital expenditure and lack of life-cycle 
emphasis. 
3.2.1. COMPARATIVE STATIC NATURE OF ANALYSIS 
Studies of budget incidence are static and partial. They involve a 
comparison of the distribution of income with and without the 
government budget, but fail to take further account of the 
repercussions of government spending and taxing policies on prices 
and quantities in the factor and product markets. To take account 
of the full effects of the budget would involve specifying a general 
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equilibrium model of an markets. Brown and Jackson commented as 
follows: 
"To attempt to compute the full general 
equilibrium effects of the public expenditure 
side of the budget would almost be an impossible 
task at this moment in time. Our knowledge of 
the values of many of the key. parameters of the 
system is scant as too is our knowledge of many 
of the economic relationships between parts of 
the system. 11 8 
On a theoretical level however, there have been develop~ents in 
public sector general equilibrium model building. Perhaps one of 
the best know examples is that by Harberger who has developed a two 
sector general equilibrium analysis of taxation under a set of 
simplifying assumptions.9 Atkinson and Stiglitz have also done 
some impressive work on both the expenditure and tax side of the 
budget in formulating general equilibrium models of the impact of 
government policy.10 
A related problem is that of these studies of budget incidence 
comparing a post-budget distribution with one imagined to exist in 
the absence of a public sector. This hypothetical situation of a 
'no government' economy has been severly criticised as a reference 
point against which to measure budget incidence.11 
3.2.2. INCIDENCE 
Concern with budget incidence requires knowledge of the true 
beneficiaries of government expenditure and the identification of 
who actually bears the tax burden. Central to this is the 
possibility~ on the expenditure side, that the recipients of 
expenditure may not be identical to the beneficiaries of 
expenditure. And on the tax side, those paying the taxes may not 
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be the ones to ultimately carry the full burden of the tax. 
Recipients and beneficiaries of government spending may not coincide 
exactly because of externalities or external benefits associated 
with an expenditure. External benefits exist when the consumption 
of a commodity by one person affects others in the community by 
simultaneously conferring benefits on them. 
Le Grand and Robinson approached this issue as follows:12 In 
the absence of externalities efficient equilibrium in the 
consumption of any good is when marginal cost and marginal benefits 
are equal. However, when there are externalities, marginal 
benefits must be adjusted to include both marginal private benefits 
- as in the standard case - and marginal external benefits. That 
is: 
private benefits + external benefits = social benefits. 
The greater the externality, the greater the divergence between 
social and private benefits. This can be illustated 
diagramatically. 
FIGURE 2 SOCIAL AND PRIVATE BENEFITS AND COSTS 
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Benefits and 
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Under a market system equilibrium will be where marginal private 
benefits equal marginal social cost, i.e. at point A. But the 
existence of external benefits leads to the market demand curve and 
the marginal social benefit curve not being identical. The 
socially efficient equilibrium position would be at the point of 
intersection of the marginal social benefit curve and the marginal 
social cost curve, i.e. at point B. 
Assuming a socially efficient equilibrium at B, social benefits ON 
can be divided between private benefits OM and external benefits 
\ 
MN. Incidence studies usually only assign private benefits OM to 
recipients of commodities or direct users of services. For 
example, incidence studies allocate the private benefits from health 
expenditure to those directly receiving medical care and exclude the 
external benefits to the wider community through the decrease in 
spread of communicable and other diseases. Le Grande concluded: 
"If such externalities exist, then to assume that 
public expenditure in a particular service is 
incident only upon the direct users of that 
service, as is done in almost all the relevant 
studies, is incorrect.13 
On the tax side the state of incidence theory prevents determinate 
answers to the degree of shifting of certain taxes - company tax 
being the common example. General consensus does not exist over 
the degree of shifting of this tax. McGrath quotes a selection of 
results of empirical studies which range from 100 per cent of tax 
being shifted forward onto consumers to results of no shifting at 
a1i.14 
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The present study did not attempt to allocate company taxes. But 
even with a sales tax - which was included - there are uncertainties 
about incidence. Whereas standard practice in redistribution 
studies is to allocate sales and similar taxes by consumption 
expenditure, results of partial equilibrium analysis indicate the 
possibilities of shared incidence depending on the elasticities of 
demand and supply of the commodities being taxed. 
FIGURE 3: INCIDENCE OF SALES TAX 
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Consider the case of an ad valorern tax - a tax expressed in 
percentage terms - imposed on commodity X at the rate of 
ac/cQt· The initial price of P will increase to Pt: the 
price rise of Pt-P being .less than the amount of the tax. The 
quantity consumed falls from Q to Qt• Consumers will pay 
PtabP of the tax; producers will pay PbcPs of the tax. 
The relative burdens to consumers and producers will depend on the 
relative elasticities of the demand and supply curves. The 
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allocation of the full incidence of the tax to consumers rests, 
therefore, on the assumption of a perfectly elastic supply schedule 
of the taxed commondi ty •. 
It becomes apparent that on both the expenditure and tax side there 
are issues involving incidance in which the empirical studies of 
redistribution fail to take full account of theoretical findings; 
and also areas in which some of these methodological issues have not 
yet been settled. 
3.2.3. VALUATION OF BENEFITS 
Redistribution studies usually value benefits to households from 
public spending at the cost of provision of the commodity or 
service. This method identifies the recipient or intended 
beneficiary of expenditures and allocates to them the value used in 
providing the service. 
The alternative approach - which rests on the concept of a household 
utility function - looks at the personal value placed on the 
expenditure by the recipient and assumes this to be the benefit 
received from public spending. It is quite conceivable that this 
personal valuation may not equal the cost of provision. However, a 
process to quantify personal evaluation is not readily available. 
Direct inquiry of beneficiaries is problematic in that there would 
be a tendency to conceal true valuations and provide false signals 
if it was suspected that results would in any way bias future public 
spending against them. 
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Personal valuations may not equal the cost of provision for a number 
of reasons. For example, inefficiency in the production of a good 
will lead to valuation of the benefits lying below their cost of 
provision. Or consumption externalities may lead to the marginal 
valuation placed on the expenditure being less than the marginal 
cost. In either case, using input cost as a proxy for benefits 
received can be argued as a potential source of imprecision. 
Furthermore in the allocation routines of benefits from public goods 
there are frequently underlying assumptions regarding household 
utility functions which are not spelt out. A routine often relied 
upon is the allocation of public expenditures on a per household 
basis on the assumption that this leads to all household sharing 
equally in the benefits from the expenditure. But for this to be 
true, households will need to have identical demand curves for the 
good being allocated. In so far as this latter condition is not 
met, then, as a 'quantity taker' each household has a personal price 
or valuation that it will be willing to pay for the quantity 
provided. This suggests a need to know more about the utility 
functions of households. 
Aaran and McGuire offered an interesting insight into the 
measurement of benefits from government expenditure on public 
goods.15 They have shown that if certain assumptions are met, 
then a household's money valuation of a public good will be 
inversley proportional to the marginal utility of its income. In 
other words, for households to receive equal benefits from the 
allocation of public goods, these should be allocated in proportion 
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to the reciprocal· of the household's marginal utility of 
... 
income.16 Their assumptions were: 
.. • 1··. 
(a) each household's utility function is additively separable in 
private and public goods; 
(b) households in each income bracket have identical utility 
functions; 
(c) the allocation of public goods was assumed to be 
Pareto-efficient so that marginal cost equalled the sum of 
marginal rates of substitution (MC = :E MRS) ; 
(d) The marginal cost of public goods equalled the average cost at 
the amount supplied.17 
For purposes of illustration Aaran and McGuire selected two 
arbitary, 'but nevertheless plausible', utility of income functions 
and used these to re-estimate the impact of government expenditure 
across income groups. Their results showed up the sensitivity of . 
budget incidence studies to the tacit assumption usually made of 
marginal utilities of incomes being constant across income classes. 
3.2.4 EXCLUSION OF CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 
Most studies restrict coverage to current expenditure. The 
rationale for this is that spending from the capital account confers 
benefit to future users of the good or service, and so should not be 
credited to current users. What though of past capital expenditure 
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which accrues currently to users? ·r deally past capital expenditure 
should be compounded to a present value·and included with public 
spending. together with current benefits which flow from present 
capital expenditure. 
current benefits.18 
This would provide a more complete measure of 
A further complicating factor is that of portions of current 
expenditure yielding benefits that accrue in the future. Education 
is the classic example here: current spending is often seen as an 
investment in human capital from which future benefits will flow. 
The allocation of the full costs of expenditure in any year to the 
recipients in that year therefore needs questioning. Le Grande 
argued however. that the full cost of the expenditure should be 
allocated in the current year - subject to appropriate discounting -
but to all those who will benefit in the future.19 This ties 
in with his treatment of external benefits, discussed in section 
3.2.2. The investment portion of a current expenditure would be 
treated as an externality, the difference being that its value be 
discounted to a present value. 
3.2.5. LACK OF LIFE CYCLE EMPHASIS 
Benefits from public spending vary with a household's stage in its 
life cycle. Thus it could be argued.that the redistributive impact 
of government be .assessed over a life cycle, rather than in the 
current period only. Atkinson and Stiglitz used the example of a 
state pension scheme to suggest that although in terms of current 
income this would appear to transfer income to lower-income people 
from the better-off working population, when looked at in terms of 
lifetime income a pension scheme may involve no redistribution at 
e 
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all.20 By focussing on tha redistribution of current incomes 
among different households, this alternative aspect of the 
redistribution of income between difference periods of a given 
household's life cycle gets ignored. 
Polinsky has looked at the role of the government in inter-temporal 
redistribution.21 He argued that the government assumes the 
role as an inter-temporal redistributor because of imperfections in 
capital markets which make it difficult to borrow against future 
income. He suggested that to focus on the current redistribution 
effect of the budget is misleading. Two of his hypothetical 
pre-budget and post-budget income profiles are illustrated below. 
FIGURE 4: HYPOTHETICAL PRE-BUDGET AND POST-BUDGET INCOME PROFILES 
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In the first case the individual's income is growing and the effect 
of a progressive budget structure is to transfer income from 
later periods in his life to earlier periods; thus flattening his 
income profile. In the second case this flattening effect is again 
evident as income gets transferred from middle age to both earlier 
and later periods. In either of these hypothetical cases the net 
lifetime effect of the budget will be neutral to the individual. 
However, an analysis of the lifetime impact of tax and spending 
programs would be far from straightforward and has been beyond the 
scope of budget incidence studies. With individuals belonging to a 
number of different households over a lifetime, the problems of 
extending the analysis to cover life cycle aspects of distribution 
become daunting. 
3.3 DATABASE DESCRIPTION 
The source of this data has already been cited as a survey of urban 
poor conducted by Prinsloo in 1982. The sample covered squatter 
and sub-economic housing communities in both Durban and Cape Town. 
In Durban only African respondents were sought while in Cape Town 
both African and Coloured families were included in the sample. 
J 
The selection of the communities to form the sampling universe was 
done by conferring with community and social workers who were in a 
position to identify settlements which constituted the 'urban 
poor'. Prinsloo reported that given the difficulty of sampling in 
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poorer areas, particularly squatter areas where listings of the 
sample universe were not readily available, her project decided to 
use random stratified sampling with different sample frames and 
modes of selection for each community.22 
A total sample of 720 households was selected from the universe. 
Of these 54 could not be used for this particular study of budget 
incidence because of data problems constructing their household 
records. This left a sample of 666 households covering a total of 
4 231 persons. Table 5 shows the distribution of these households 
by area and settlement type. The distribution of households 
between settlement types was similar for African households in 
Durban and Cape Town with 57% and 58%, respectively, living in 
squatter areas. For Coloured households only 29% were squatter 
residents. 
The questionnaire devised by Prinsloo was long with approximate 
completion time estimated at between one hour and 
one-hour-and-a-half. Interviewers did not appear to find this a 
problem and reported a general willingness on the part of 
respondents to co-operate. Questionnaires were translated into 
Xhosa, Zulu and Afrikaans to allow use of the respondents' home 
language. Interviewers were chosen, if possible, from the survey 
areas themselves or, if not, were chosen so that their first 
language corresponded to the interviewing language. Appendix A 
reproduces that portion of the questionnaire applicable to this 
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TABLE 5 
DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS IN SAMPLE BY AREA AND SETTLEMENT TYPE 
Area Settlement Type Number 
of 
Dwellings1 
Number of 
Households 
Sampled 
Ca12e Town 
Crossroads African Squatter 2 200 126 
Guguletu African Township 7 376 90 
Modderdam Coloured Squatter 126 52 
Uitsig Coloured Township 1 008 72 
Bonteheuwel Coloured Township 2 7472 
_M_ 
395 
Durban3 
Chesterville African Township 11 330 8 
Clermont African Squatter 3 000 34 
Folweni African Squatter 1 100 39 
Inanda African Squatter 43 000 53 
Kwa Mashu African Township 15 000 46 
Lamontville African Township 2 758 14 
Malukazi African Squatter 6 000 28 
Umlazi African Township 22 000 ~ 
271 
All Areas 666 
1. 'l'.hese were offical estimates of the number of dwellings at the 
time of the survey. 
2. This figure represented the number of sub-economic houses in a 
community of 7 500 dwellings. 
3. Whie Durban sample sizes were small, Prinsloo noted that: (i) 
in reference to township figures, only sub-economic households 
were sampled within these larger communities; and (ii) samples 
selected for squatter and township areas were intended to 
provide a collective image of their respective settlement 
types-. 
- 72 -
study. The remainder of the questionnaire focussed on the 
perceptions and attitudes of respondents to various aspects of their 
life and was not of relevance. 
Average household size was 6,35 persons per household; above that 
suggested by figures provided by the Bureau of Market 
Research.23 While the latter gave average multiple household 
sizes of 5,98, 4,91 and 4,40 respectively for Durban African, Cape 
Town African and Cape Town Coloured households, this survey found 
these averages to be 6,82, 6,26 and 5,75. It is interesting to 
note that the comparison preserved rank order in spite of the 
differences in magnitude recorded. 
Table 6 gives the spread of households around these means. The 
distribution shows that the sample divided approximately into thirds 
with household size of less than or equal to 4 members forming the 
first third of households, 5 or 6 members the middle third, and 
seven or more members the last third. Breaking this down by race 
and urban area reveals the different patterns for each group. For 
both African and Coloured households in Cape Town, the modal class 
interval was that of 5 to 6 persons with 44% of Cape Town African 
households and 33% of Coloured households falling into this 
category. Noticeable was·the latter's higher-than-average 
frequency of smaller households. While 7,3% of Coloured households 
had two or fewer household members and 26,3% had three or four, for 
African households in Cape Town these percentages worked out at 2,8% 
and 18,5% respectively. For African households in Durban the 
distinctive characteristics regarding household size were, firstly, 
the higher than average proportion of households of size two or less 
and secondly, that of the modal class interval being that of nine or 
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more household members. A x2-test conducted of household size 
- using the class intervals in Table 6 - against the three groups 
Cape Town African, Durban African and Cape Town Coloured was 
significant at above the 99% level of confidence suggesting 
statistical differences in household size between these groups.24 
TABLE 6 
DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS BY NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS, RACE AND 
.URBAN AREA 
No African African Coloured 
of & Coloured Durban Cape Town Cape Town 
H'Hold Total Sample 
Members NO % NO % NO % NO % 
~ 2 41 6,2 22 8,1 6 2,8 13 7,3 
3 or 4 148 22,2 61 22,5 40 18,5 47 26,3 
5 or 6 216 32,4 62 22,9 95 44,0 59 33,0 
7 or 8 129 19,4 47 17,3 45 20,8 37 20,7 
;;?:. 9 132 19,8 79 29,2 30 13,9 23 12,8 
TOTAL 666 100,0 271 100,0 216 100,0 179 100,0 
Table 7 adds settlement type to the argument and is presented as a 
percentage frequency distribution. It is evident that it was 
African township households which were responsible for Durban 
Africans having the high number of members per household. 
Interestingly a comparison of household sizes for Durban between 
squatter and township households reveals the opposite pattern to 
that for African and Coloured households in Cape Town. For both of 
the latter, township households had proportionately fewer large 
households than their squatter counterparts. This is summarized in 
Table 8 which gives mean household size by settlement type. 
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TABLE 7 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS BY NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLD 
MEMBERS, RACE, URBAN AREA AND SETTLEMENT TYPE 
No of African Coloured 
H'Hold Durban ca2e Town Ca2e Town 
Members Squatter Township Squatter Township Squatter Township 
" 2 
9,1 6,8 1,6 4,4 1,9 9,4 
3 or 4 33,1 8,5 12,7 26,7 23,1 27,6 
5 or 6 24,0 21,4 46,0 41,1 34,6 32,3 
7 or 8 16,2 18,8 19,0 23,3 23,1 19,7 
~9 17,5 44,4 20,6 4,4 17,3 11,0 
TOTAL 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
TABLE 8 
MEAN NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS BY RACE, URBAN AREA AND SETTLEMENT 
TYPE 
Settlement African Coloured 
Type Durban Cape Town Cape Town 
Squatter 5,8 6,8 6,3 
Township 8,2 5,5 5,5 
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Households were classified in Table 9. according to a number of 
alternative household structures : solitary, unrelated, nuclear 
family, extended family, compound and lastly, compound plus 
extended. For both Durban African households and Cape Town 
Coloured households the percentage of nuclear families was 48%. 
But whereas the former had 45% of households being extended 
families, the latter had only 34% extended families with the balance 
being compound or compound plus extended. This relatively higher 
proportion of compound formations amongst Coloured households could 
possibly be ascribed to almost three-quarters of Coloured households 
sa.~pled being township residents whom, as a result of the acute 
housing shortage, were forced to share accomodation as an 
alternative to squatting. 
African households in Cape Town were atypical in that 70% were 
nuclear families and only 25% extended families.· A lower incidence 
of extended families could perhaps be explained by the peculiar 
constraints applicable to Africans in the Western Cape with this 
area being a declared Coloured Labour Preference Area. This would 
have made it difficult for older members of the family still 
resident in reserve areas to join adult working children in Cape 
Town. 
Although the relevance of 'head of household' as a demographic 
variable is diminishing, all households in the sample responded to 
the questions regarding gender and age of household head. There 
was a notable consistency in the gender breakdown for each group 
with 69%, 70% and 68% being the percentage male for African 
households in Durban, African households in Cape Town and Coloured 
households respectively. Head of household ages, too, were 
similarly distributed for each group w_i th the only real difference 
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being that of African househol~s in Cape Town recording 
proportionately fewer aged over so years - again perhaps due to Cape 
Town's peculiar position as part of a declared Coloured Labour 
Preference Area. 
TABLE 9 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS BY HOUSEHOLD 
STRUCTURE, RACE AND URBAN AREA 
Household African & African Coloured 
Structure Coloured Durban Cape Town Cape Town 
Both Areas % % % 
Solitary 0,6 1,1 0,6 
Unrelated 1,1 1,1 0,9 1,1 
Nuclear 55,5 48,1 70,4 48,6 
Extended 35,5 44,8. 25,0 34,1 
Compound 4,1 1,9 1,9 10,! 
Compound 
& Extended 3,3 3,0 1,9 5,6 
TOTAL 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
TABLE 10 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF AGES OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD BY RACE AND 
URBAN AREA 
Age of Head African & African Coloured 
of Household Coloured 
in Years Both Areas Durban Cape Town Cape Town 
% % % % 
~20 2,1 3,3 1,4 1,1 
21 - 30 7,7 9,6 3,2 10,1 
31 - 40 24,8 25,1 29,6 18,4 
41 - 50 29,0 26,9 33,3 26,8 
51 - 80 20,S 18,1 22,7 21,8 
~60 15,9 17,0 9,7 21,8 
TOTAL 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
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Table 11 looks at certain key demographic variables. On average 
households in the sample had 3,7 adult members and 2,3 employed 
persons. For African households in Cape Town the number of workers 
did not vary by type of settlement; whereas both Durban African 
households and Coloured households recorded more employed persons in 
the types of settlements with the larger household size. In the 
case of Durban Africans this was in the townships with 2,7 persons 
employed, whilst for Coloured households this was the squatter areas 
with 2,5 persons employed. 
TABLE 11 
STATUS OF PERSONS IN HOUSEHOLDS BY RACE, URBAN AREA AND SETTLEMENT 
TYPE 
Race & 
Urban Area 
All African 
& Coloured 
African 
Durban 
African 
Cape Town 
Coloured 
Cape Town 
1. 
2. 
Type 
of 
Settlement 
Squatter 
Township 
Total 
Squatter 
Township 
·Total 
Squatter 
Township 
Total 
Squatter 
Township 
Total 
Ave 
No of 
House 
-hold 
Mem. 
6,3 
6,5 
6,4 
5,8 
8,2 
6,8 
6,8 
5,5 
6,3 
6,3 
5,5 
5,8 
Ave Ave 
No of No of 
Adults Persns 
~ Employ 
18 yrs1 
3,6 
3,9 
3,7 
3,3 
4,6 
3,8 
4,0 
3,5 
3,8 
3,3 
3,4 
3,4 
2,2 
2,4 
2,3 
1,9 
2,7 
2,2 
2,6 
2,5 
2,5 
2,5 
2,1 
2,2 
Ave 
No of 
Child-
ren2 
2,8 
2,7 
2,7 
2,5 
3,6 
2,9 
3,3 
2,6 
2,3 
2,3 
·1,9 
2,0 
Ave 
No of. 
Pens-
ioners 
0,11 
0,29 
0,20 
0,12 
0,26 
0,18 
0,07 
0,16 
0,11 
0,14 
0,42 
0,34 
Ave 
No of 
Dis-
abled 
& ill 
0,20 
0,33 
0,26 
0,24 
0,33 
0,28 
0,12 
0,11 
0,12 
0,27 
0,48 
0,42 
Includes scholars over 18 years of age and retired 
persons. 
Includes all school children and those of preschool age. 
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Turning to children, the larger size of African households resulted 
in their averaging approximately 3 children per household compared 
with 2 per household for Coloured respondents - children being 
defined for these purposes as all those at school plus those still 
too young for school. The different number of children by 
settlement type - squatter or township - correlated with the 
differences recorded in household size for each group. 
Township settlements consistently registered more retired pensioners 
than their squatter counterparts with Coloured township households 
having the highest average of 0,42 per household. Coloured 
township households also recorded the highest average of 0,48 
disabled or ill persons per household. 
Prinsloo adopted three measures of unemployment. Accepting what 
she termed the 'traditional approach' - unemployed 
economically-active individuals, whether seeking work or not, 
expressed as a percentage of the entire labour pool - the study 
areas recorded a collective 15% unemployment.25 Township 
settlements had consistently higher unemployment rates than squatter 
settlements. For Durban, unemployment rates under this definition 
were particularly high at 26% for township residents and 22% 
amongst squatter residents. This can be compared to rates of 18% 
and 5% for Cape Town African township and squatter households; and 
14% and 6% the equivalent rates for Coloured township and squatter 
households respectively. 
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CHAPTER 4 
STATE SPENDING ON THE WELFARE BUDGET 
ALLOCATION ROUTINES 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND 
For each of the five state 
expenditures included in the study, a chronological outline is given 
regarding changes in their financing by the state. Modifications 
in spending patterns reveal important changes in political 
philosophies as concessions get made - or removed - in various areas 
of state provision. Although this present investigation into 
budget inci~ence was not longitudinal in nature, a need was felt to 
provide a historical background against which current spending 
patterns could be understood. 
Following on each outline is the allocation routine for that 
particular expenditure. For two of these - social services and 
education - the procedure adopted was straightforward and obvious. 
For the others - health, housing and transport - recourse had to be 
made to a series of simplifying assumptions in order to arrive at 
suitable routines by which expenditure could be apportioned to 
households. 
Before discussing each item of expenditure it will be useful to 
outline very briefly the periods identified by Bromberger as having 
a certain amount of internal coherence regarding government policies 
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affecting the distribution of incomes.1 He roughly defined his 
phases as the late 1930s to 1948, 1948 to 1961, 1962 to 1971, 1972 
to 1980. 
(a) The Late 1930s to 1948 
In the early years of Union there had been a start to state 
involvement with the provision of community and social services. 
In 1913 the Union government had begun to provide subsidies to the 
provinces for education; and following on the 'Flu Epidemic of 1918 
the state had realised a responsibility towards the control of the 
spread of infectious diseases and the clearance of slum areas. 
Pensions for white and coloured persons had been payable from 1929. 
However, it was the late thirties and forties that Bromberger 
identified as a period for real government acceptance of the need 
for the increased provision of welfare services. This was in line 
with the development of social philosophies abroad where the war 
years had been followed by a significant surge in welfarism. 
In South Africa this was a period of high growth rate and rapid 
urbanisation during which the government began to realise a certain 
responsibility towards the well-being of all its citizens, both 
white and black. This led Bromberger to label the period as one in 
which there was 'limited progress towards incorporation (of) and 
equality (between)' all races. 
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(b) An Era of Retrenchment:. 1948-61 
The period following on the election victory of the Nationalist 
Parrty witnessed a reversal of these previous progressive trends as 
the foundations of apartheid structures were established. Whites 
were favoured regarding public spending with expenditure on their 
behalf increasing more than proportionately to that of other 
groups. Influx control was tightened and moves were initiated 
towards the implementation of territorial apartheid with the passage 
in 1959 of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Governing Act.2 
(c) Signs of a Thaw: 1961-71 
During this decade the harsh distributional policies of the fifties 
were replaced by less regressive policies with narrowing in some of 
the racial differences in public spending. This though was firmly 
linked to the effort to create separate social and political orders 
for each race group. In particular. the development of the 
reserves became a priority. Towards the end of this era important 
legislation in the form of the Bantu Homelands Citizen Act of 1970 
was enacted in terms of which urban Africans in so-called White 
South Africa were to become citizens of one or other of the reserves. 
(d) A Trend towards Re-Incorporation and Reduced Inequality: 
1972-80 
As a result of both internal and external pressures the seventies 
saw more progressive policies adopted regarding state welfare for 
all races. This was particularly noticeable in education 
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spending. Increased spending was also directed towards reserve 
development as first the Transkei - following by Bophutatswana, 
Venda and Ciskei - accepted the status of 'full independence'. 
However, following on the disturbances of the early and 
mid-seventies there was a softening of separate development ideology 
and some recognition towards urban Africans being accepted on a more 
permanent basis. 
The 1980s has seen a continuation of this trend. But a significant 
shift has occurred in the official viewpoint on public spending 
since Bromberger's first phase when the trend was towards more state 
provision of community and social services. Following in the path 
of the monetarist economic policies of Britain and the Uni.ted States 
have been numerous moves towards the reduction of state expenditure 
on welfare spending.3 These changes have not been 
motivated solely by the free market ideology which has been gaining 
ground from the late 1970s. Important, too, has been the 
realization that given the backlog in public spending on these items 
for groups other than Whites, provision by the state would now be 
beyond its means. A conflict has arisen between available funds 
and the expectations of the community for public provision. 
The remainder of this chapter now traces significant changes in the 
delivery of the five state welfare expenditures covered in this 
study and the routines adopted for each in allocating expenditures 
between households. 
/ 
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4.2 SOCIAL SECURITY SERVICES 
4.2.1. HISTORICAL SKETCH OF STATE FINANCING 
For the purposes of this analysis social security services were 
assumed to include all income support payments to households by the 
state in the form of pensions, grants and allowances. Common to 
all these payments is that they are funded, not from contributions 
by recipients, but from general tax revenue. As such, their 
objective is the provision of income to those in need by means of 
direct cash transfers from general state funds. A brief 
description of the different transfers follows. 
(a) Social Pensions 
Prior to the late 'twenties the care of the aged, blind and other 
dependent persons was left to voluntary organizations with the 
responsibility of the state being confined to poor relief. 
Following on the recommendations of the Pienaar Commission, the Old 
Age Pensions Act of 1928 was promulgated which introduced the 
payment of state pensions from the following year.4 These were 
non-contributory , subject to a means test, and payable only to 
White and Coloured men of 65 and over and women of 60 years and 
over. From the inception there was discrimination between groups 
in the rate of pension payable. In 1929 the maximum social pension 
for Whites was RS per month and for Coloured persons R3 per month. 
From 1936 White and Coloured blind persons, over 19 years, became 
eligible to claim pensions; and in 1937 White persons who were 
physically disabled could also claim a pension. Seven years later 
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in 1944, the provision of old age and blind pensions was extended 
to eligible African and Asian men and women, but ·physically disabled 
African, Asian and Coloured persons had to await the Disability 
Grants Act of 1947 before becoming eligible for payments.5 By 
1948 therefore, a state non-contributory pension scheme had 
developed !or all race groups. For each group the maximum pension 
payable, the allowable free income and the conditions of the means 
test were the same for each of the three types of pension: old age, 
blind persons and physically disabled. In 1947 these rates 
were:S 
MAXIMUM SOCIAL PENSION: 1947 
African 
Asian 
Coloured 
White 
(Rands per month) 
R 2,50 
R 5,00 
R 5,00 
R 10,00 
It must be mentioned that the rate shown above was that for 
cities. For Whites living in rural areas a lower rate was paid; 
while for African, Asian and Coloured pensioners there were three 
rates: cities (the eight metropolitan areas), towns and rural areas. 
A fourth type of pension - payable to War Veterans of the Anglo-Boer 
War, the Zulu Rebellion in Natal (1906) and the two World Wars - was 
paid at a slightly higher rate than the other social pensions, but 
the same pattern of discrimination between groups applied. 
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With the change in government in 1948, and the introduction of 
apartheid, the extent of discrimination in pensions was steadily 
increased. From the ratio of White 100: Coloured and Asian 50: 
African 25 in 1947, the position deteriorated until in 1966, this 
ratio stood at White 100: Coloured 47: Asian 41: African 
13.7 Pollak reported that this was the greatest ever 
discriminaition in regards to pensions ever suffered by Africans. 
However from the mid 1960s this deterioration was halted with the 
racial gap beginning to decrease marginally. Pollak commented: 
"From 1971 the official policy changed 
radically. The objective of the government was 
henceforth to reduce disparities and move away 
from some aspects of discrimination ••• Each year 
from 1971 the percentage annual increase in 
social pensions has been greater for Coloured, 
Asian and African that it has been for White 
pensioners. 11 8 
By 1982 - the year in which the empircal data was collected for this 
study - the ratio had improved to White 100: Coloured and Asian 
60: African 36.9 In actual money terms the following rates 
were payable from October 1982: 
MAXIMUM SOCIAL PENSION: 1982 
(Rands per month) 
African10 R 49-00 
Asian R 83-00 
Coloured 
White Rl38-00 
(b) Other Welfare - Grants and Allowances 
(R98 paid 
every second 
month) 
In addition to social pensions, under certain circumstances, 
"".".--,--:-·- . --.-- .-.· ·.· ·- ...... ~.,... ·-··~--··--- ···- .. 
... ' ·. -.. • ~ -----
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households are eligible for maintenance grants. foster-care grants 
and family allowances. 
. . 
Maintenance and foster-care grants were introduced under the 
Children's Act of 1937 whose aim it was to provide means for 
orphans. widows with young children. deserted children. and 
families whose breadwinners were incapable of earning. Grants for 
Africans were only payable to children in urban areas (cities and 
towns) and in special cases only. It was recorded by the Social-
Security Conunittee of 1943 that maintenance grants were for some 
time withheld from African urban children if they could be 
repatriated for care to relatives in the reserves.11 
Family allowances were introduced in April 1547 for Asian. Coloured 
and ·white families. with low income and have since been paid in 
respect of third and subsequent dependent children. These 
allowances have never been extended to African families. but 
according to Hellman. few families actually receive this 
allowance. For low-income White families more favourable forms of 
assistance are ususaly available; while the regulations governing 
the eligibility of Coloured families are so harsh that few ever 
qualify.12 
Scales of payment are complicated for both maintenance grants and 
family allowances. But for foster-care an indication of the 
different rates applicable around the time of this study can be 
gauged from the monthly grants for the financial year 1982/83. 
These stood at R90 for a White child. RS1 for a Coloured or Asian 
child and R24 for an African child - a ratio of 100:68:27.13 
. ""."":'"'··-~, ..... - ... ~ ..... ..- "<""""--=:""".""--..... -·-·7· --·-·:··,...··-· - -·· .. , .. -·-····----... !-- ···.•·• ' .. ~ .•. _ ....... . 
. .. _ -, /·. 
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4.2.2. PROCEDURE FOR ALLOCATION OF SOCIAL SECURITY EXPENDITURE 
For the purposes of this study, it was assumed that the monetary 
transfers to households from any one of the social security services 
discussed above - social pensions, maintenance grants, foster-care 
grants or family allowances - was the extent of the benefit received 
by that household for this expenditure. The method of allocation 
was therefore straightforward and required no further procedures to 
identify beneficiaries. Respondents to the questionnaire furnished 
the amounts received by the household for each type of social 
security; these were summed to give total benefits received by 
that household from state social security payments. 
It could be argued that this method of allocation exagerated the 
benefits to the recipient household. For example, there might be 
externalities associated with these payments that made at least part 
of their incidence beneficial to· others. The security received 
from a maintenance grant might increase the productivity ~orkers _) 
in the family, by reducing financial stress, thus leading to a 
growth in output. As such part of social security payments could 
be viewed as investments in human capital benefitting society at 
large, rather than merely the recipient. However, these and other 
indirect effects were ignored in the method of allocation adopted, 
with the benefit received by households being assumed identical in 
value to th~ cost to the state. 
'. 
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4.3 EDUCATION 
4.3.1. HISTORICAL SKETCH OF STATE FINANCING 
~-
Only primary and secondary education ~cons~dered. Respondents 
in this investigation were unlikely to have benefitted from tertiary 
expenditure; nor their pre-school children from pre-primary school 
attendance. 
Educational provision in South Africa was initially controlled by 
the Church. Only after 1806 when the British took over power in 
the Cape did a system of secular schools, mainly for Whites, 
evolve; African, Asian and Coloured education remained 
predominantly under the control of missions and churches until the 
twentieth century14. 
In the Cape the appointment of a Superintendent-General of Public 
Education in 1839 was followed by the commencement of grants-in-aid 
from ~antral funds for state-aided schools. This system was later 
adopted in Natal and the Boer Republics. With the advent of Union, 
education other than higher education became the responsibility of 
the provincial authorities. 
Under the Financial.Relations Act of 1913, each province was given a 
subsidy by the Union Government from which to assist in the 
financing of the education of all groups under their jurisdiction. 
The subsidy was calculated according to a formula based on the 
expenditure of the province the previous year, with the allocation 
of the funds between race groups being left to the provincial 
authorities. 
- '""="·-:----.-::- -~ -
:.· .-·· -- ·- .. 
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The Financial Relations Act of 1922 introduced a new system for the 
financing of African education. The Union Government was now to be 
responsible for the provision and allocation of funds; in addition 
some of the revenue received from the direct taxation of Africans 
would be specially earmarked for the financing of their own 
schools. The same Act of 1925 confirmed this method for financing 
of African education and specified that: 
(i) the government would make available R680 ooo from the 
Consolidatad Revenue Fund for this purpose; and 
(ii) one-fifth of the African poll tax would be paid into the 
'Native' Development Fund and be used specifically for 
education. 
This was the first time that expenditure on African education was to 
be linked specifically to their capacity to pay taxes rather than 
being provided from general state revenue. 
This Act also changed the sub~idy formula for Asian, Coloured and 
White education and based it on a per capita grant for each pupil 
attending school. Although the formula determining the subsidy was 
based on differential rates with that for Asian and Coloured pupils 
lower than for Whites, the intent!on was that the overall subsidy be 
a general one. However, the provinces tended to limit the 
expenditure on Asian and Coloured education to the amount of their 
annual subsidy; this was fixed at Rl0,50. The differences in 
annual per pupil expenditure are shown below:15 
. _-:··-~·-. "':. ~· ··:- .- ... ··· 
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ANNUAL PER PUPIL 
EXPENDITURE: 1930 
African R 4,27 
Asian and Coloured R 9,23 
White R45,20 
This gave a ratio of White 100: Asian and Coloured 20: African 9. 
The per pupil subsidy scheme for Asian, Coloured and White pupils 
was replaced in 1945, under the Financial Relations Consolidation 
and Amendment Act, when a scheme similar to that in operation prior 
to 1925 was introduced. Again the subsidy was to be linked to 
provincial expenditure, this time of the current year, with any 
additional funds having to be raised through the revenues received 
from the limited tax base of the provinces themselves. This 
removed the racial bias of the subsidy between Asians, Coloured and 
Whites, although considerable differences in the per capita amounts 
spent on pupils remained. In the case of Whites, this Act with 
varying amendments is presently still in operation. 
Around this time there were also progressive moves made in the area 
of black education. By 1943 the full contribution of African 
taxes were being allocated for education; in addition the grant 
from the Union Government had also been increased. In 1945 the 
linking of African expenditure to their capacity to pay was 
discontinued and a new central government vote of 'Native Education' 
was created. This was an important change in that it signified a 
willingness to redistribute to African education from the common 
revenue pool. 
--~..-· ... _.,.. ·-·-· -· - -- ... -......... ---·-:·.·•·i···-· -· - ·---
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The initial years of National· Party rule did not result in any 
immediate attack on African education. Until 1953 expenditure 
continued to be drawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund, but with 
the passage in this year of the Bantu Education Act spending on 
African education was again to be linked to taxable capacity. In 
terms of this Act a Bantu Education Account was created into which 
the state would make an annual contribution of Rl3 million for 
African education. The rest of the funds would come from the 
allocation of four-fifths of the general tax paid by Africans. 
Control of African education was transferred from the provinces to 
the newly-formed Division of Bantu Education of the Department of 
Bantu Affairs. 
This was the first step in the fragmentation of education to be 
undertaken by the Nationalist Party after coming to power in 1948. 
Their policy required that education, together with all other 
services, should be part of the total development of each group 
apart and separate from any other group. The second stap under 
this policy was the transfer in 1963 of Coloured Education from the 
provinces to the Department of Coloured Affairs; the third was the 
start of the transfer of Asian Education to the Department of Indian 
Affairs in 1965/66. However, unlike African education, education 
for Asian and Coloured pupils was to be financed from general 
revenue through the Consolidated Revenue Fund. 
Within African education, and in keeping with the unfolding 
political ideology, plans were made to divide urban and rural 
African education with the latter ultimately to be transferred to 
the reserve authorities. After being granted partial 
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self-government in 1963, Transkei became the first reserve to assume 
responsibility for education with"in its region. Its budget, 
including that on education, was heavily subsidized by the 
government. These subsidies were not deducted from the R13 million 
allocated annually to the Bantu Education Account.16 
Self-governing status and responsibility for services was granted to 
Bophutatswana, Ciskei and Lebowa in 1972 and to Gazankulu and Qwaqwa 
in 1974. 17 
The linking of African education to their taxable capacity had led 
to per pupil expenditure declining steadily from R17,00 in 1953/54 
to Rll,56 in 1962/63.18 During the sixties - with mounting 
deficits in the Bantu Education Account - the less harsh approach of 
the Nationalist government was evident with several measures 
introduced to augment the funds allocated for African education. 
But with the high increase in. pupils, and the faster rate of 
increase in expenditure on White education, per capita differences 
in education expenditure remained significant. 
F.STIMATES OF ANNUAL PER CAPITA 
EXPENDITURE BY THE STATE ON 
SCHOOL PUPILS: 1971/7219 
African 
Asian 
Coloured 
White 
R 25,31 
Rl24,40 
R 94,41 
R46l,OO 
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This gave a ratio of Whites 100: Asian 27: Coloured 20: African 
s.s. 
The Bantu Education Account Abolition Act of 1972 abolished the 
Bantu Education Act and made provision for the funding of African 
education through the Consolidated Revenue Fund. Control of 
African education remained ln the hands of the Department of Bantu 
Education and those reserve authorities which had legislative 
assemblies. This situation still holds now. The Department of 
Education and Training - formerly the Department of Bantu Education 
and renamed under the Education and Training Act of 1979 - is 
responsible for African education in the non-reserve areas with the 
education departments of the ten reserve authorities in charge of 
education in the areas under their jurisdiction.20 
For Asian and Coloured education, the segregated structures remain 
more or less as outlined above, although attempts and failures by 
the Government to set up representative bodies for the Coloured and 
Indian communities have led to changes in the actual department 
delivering the services. 
Coloured education passed into the control of the Administration of 
Coloured Affairs when the Coloured Persons' Representative Council 
(CRC) was instituted in 1969; when the CRC disbanded in 1980 the 
Department of Coloured Relations resumed responsibility for Coloured 
education. Indian education too, was transferred from the 
Department of Indian Affairs to the Executive Committee of the South 
Africa Indian Council in 1976 and then redelegated to the Director 
of Indian Education. In 1980 the Departments of Coloured Affairs. 
Indian Affairs and the Interior were incorporated to form the 
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Department of Internal Affairs; subsequently renamed in 1984 the 
Department of Home Affairs and National Education. 
By the 1980s there had been some improvement in the relative 
expenditure on the other groups relative to Whites. From a ratio 
of 100:27:20:5,5 in 1971/72 the 1982/83 per capita expenditure 
ratios were White 100: Asian 63: Coloured 43: African 14. Per 
capita expenditure figures are shown below:21 
ESTIMATES OF ANNUAL PER CAPITA 
EXPENDITURE BY THE STATE ON 
SCHOOL PUPILS: 1982/83 
African22 
Asian 
Coloured 
White 
R 192 
R 872 
R 593 
Rl 385 
4.3.2. PROCEDURE FOR ALLOCATION OF EDUCATION EXPENDITURE 
As with welfare services, the procedure adopted for assigning 
benefits from education was straightforward with benefits being 
valued as equal to the cost of providing the service. 
Per capita expenditure by the government on African and Coloured 
education was divided between primary and secondary education on the 
assumption that the 1977/78 ratio between these two expenditures 
still held in 1982/83. This assumption was necessary with 1977/78 
being the most recent year for which official per capita expenditure 
figures were provided for the different levels of schooling. For 
1982/83, estimated expenditure worked out as follows: 
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PER PUPIL EXPENDITURE AFRICAN COLOURED 
Primary Schools Rl68 R464 
Secondary Schools R321 Rl 130 
Households were assigned benefits from education according to their 
number of primary and secondary school pupils. 
Assuming education expenditure was all consumed in the same year as 
spent. ignored the investment component of education. Also by 
attributing the full expenditure as a benefit to the recipient 
assumed no externalities from education expendi~ There are a 
range of external benefits from education which accure not to the 
beneficiary of education. but to others in society. This 
allocation of benefits by cost of provision could therefore have 
tended to overstate the individual valuation placed on education 
expenditure. 
4.4 HEALTH 
4.4.1. HISTORICAL SKETCH OF STATE FINANCING 
The deli very of heal th care in South Africa has never· ·been the 
responsibility of a single authority. Provision has always been 
shared between the various levels of government with the major 
source of funding coming from central government in the form of 
subsidies. This system has been repeatedly criticised for its 
divided control and lack of co-ordination. 
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Prior to Union, each colony was responsible for its own health 
matters. With Union, the newly-formed provincial authorities were 
assigned the task of establishing and administering all hospital 
services. Other health functions were to be controlled by the 
Union government with the exception of environmental services, such 
as water sanitation, which were to be the task of local 
government. The latter, however, were under the overall control of 
the provinces. 
The outbreak of plague in Natal shortly after Union, together with 
the high mortality in the 1918 'Flu epidemic, led to the Public 
Health Act of 1919. Under this Act the Department of Public Health 
was created as an independent department of government. Provincial 
control of hospitals was left unchanged with the Department of 
Public Health to provide for preventitive and other public health 
matters. Provision was made in the Act for the delegation of 
control for infectious diseases from central to local authorities, 
with a system of subsidies for this financing. Local authorities 
would retain responsibility for environmental sanitation. 
The Vos Committee was appointed in 1924 to report on the existing 
position regarding the delivery of health services.23 It 
proposed, inter alia, that all control be co-ordinated by the 
Departmenmt of Public Health, rather than being split between the 
three tiers of government. No action was taken on these 
recommendations; the systems continued to operate and develop 
independently. 
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A steady increase in the scope of health services undertaken by the 
state resulted in strains to the health system. Particularly 
affected were the local authorities who found themselves rendering 
hitherto unprovided personal and family services. . Rapid 
urbanisation during the thirties and forties led to a deterioration 
of social conditions which in turn exposed the inadequacies of the 
health system. 
A number of conunittees and commissions were set up by the Smuts 
( 
government in response to changing conditions. The Gluckman 
Conunission was appointed in 1942 with terms of reference to advise 
on the proper organisation of health services.24 The 
Commission's report provided a blueprint for a National Health 
Service to be financed from a National Health Tax and to be 
centrally controlled and co-ordinated. This recommendation was 
rejected by the Minister of Health and the provincial authorities 
remained in control of hospital services. 
Subsequent committees and commissions in the fifties and sixties -
not specially appointed to investigate the health services - also 
commented on the need for rationalisation and co-ordination but no 
major restructuring of existing health services resulted. The 
Commission of Inquiry into the Financial Relations between the 
Central Government and the Provinces appointed in 1960 under Dr C G 
W Schumann commented as follows: 
"It is also apparent from the reports of the 
various Commissions and Committees which have 
been appointed to enquire into the Health 
Services of the country, that they have been 
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unanimous in finding that the existing divisions 
of health functions between the various 
authorities is unsatisfactory and should be 
rationalized in the interest of the sick and more 
economical and efficient administration. 11 25 
.. 
Unlike the welfare services and education, prior to the unfolding of 
the policy of separate development the approach to national health 
had been predominantly non-racial. There were disparaties in the 
amount of services received by different groups but these were not 
the result of legislation directly related to health. It was in 
1970 that a proclamation distinguishing one group from others was 
first passed. Under this proclamation all duties regarding health 
in the reserves would be transferred to the Minister of Bantu 
Administration and Development with expenditure to be defrayed from 
the then s A Bantu Trust Fund. This was to be a temporary 
measure and in the ensuing years responsibility for health matters 
in the reserve areas was transferred to the respective reserve 
authorities. Transkei took over control in 1973, Bophutatswana and 
the Ciskei in 1975, Lebowa, Gazankulu and Venda in 1976, Kwazulu and 
Qwaqwa in 1976, and KaNgwane and KwaNdebele in 1984. 
The first major revision of health legislation since 1919 was 
contained in the Health Act of 1977. This did not change the 
existing system of delivery by the various levels of government but 
was a consolidation of legislation which aimed to regulate and 
co-ordinate health services, outside of the reserves, between 
central government, the provinces and local authorities. Two 
bodies were established to assist with this: the Health Matters 
Advisory Committee and the National Health Policy Council. In 1980 
the Department of Health published the Health Services Facilities 
Plan which joined the Act in subscribing to seemingly more 
enlightened ideas of community health by recognising the importance 
"-'• --.·,--;----
0 
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of basic subsistence needs and preventive medicines in the 
improvement of health status. However the responsibility for this 
was shifted to other state authorities, vo~untary organisations and 
individuals themselves. In his discussion of the Health Act and 
the Health Plan de Beer noted the official stance as tending away 
from state health provision towards the privatisation of health 
services.26 
With the new South African constitution of 1984 there was a move 
towards a further fragmentation of health services with health being 
assigned an 'own affairs' concern and thus delegated to each of the 
Inidan, Coloured and White councils. In September 1984 when the 
new constitution came into operation, three 'own affairs' health 
services and welfare ministers were appointed. 
4.4.2 PROCEDURE FOR ALLOCATION OF HEALTH EXPENDITURE 
Attempts to apportion health expenditures by race in South Africa 
have been made in a few instances.27 These require certain 
assumptions since hospital, clinic and other health costs are not 
usually kept on a racial basis. For the purposes of this study, 
the problem was not just that of allocating between races, but also, 
within each race, to allocate between households. This raised the 
whole question of access to health services and utilization rates by 
households with different characteristics. It is generally held 
that the poor have less access and a lower utilization rate than 
their better-off counterparts. In their paper 'Access to Health 
Services in the Greater .Cape Town Area', the Community Health 
Research Project had this to say: 
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"What has been found is that areas with the 
greatest need are areas in which there is least 
access to health services. Even where services 
are fairly evenly distributed geographically, 
e.g. preventive services, the quality of the 
service in terms of over-crowding, doctor/patient 
ratios, expenditure, etc., varies. An example 
of this is the discrepancy in services between 
the Divisional Council Areas, where the morbidity 
and mortality are higher and socio-economic 
conditions poorer, as compared with the City 
Council areas. 11 28 
In the allocation of state expenditure u~ed for this study, an 
attempt was made to allow for both the racial bias of expenditure 
and the different utilization rates between households. The first 
stage was to calculate a per capita health expenditure by the State 
for each race for the financial year 1982/83. The procedure 
adopted was very similar to that used by McGrath.and is outlined 
below?9· 
(a) Expenditure by the provinces and •non-independent' reserves 
was apportioned by taking patient days (out-patient 
attendances treated as 0,33 of a patient day),_ and weighting 
the expenditures on provincial and reserve hospitals by the 
estimated difference of the cost per patient for each group. 
McGrath estimated that for 1959/60 and 1974/5 this proportion 
was approximately 40%, i.e. ratio of cost per patient for 
White: Coloured: Asian: African was 100: 40: 40: 40. 
For this study these proportions were assumed to have narrowed 
to 100: 60: 60: 50 in keeping with trends in other state 
services to narrow differentials. The following 
qualifications should be noted: 
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(i) patient days and.out-patient visits were available 
only to 1980 and it was therefore assumed that the 
proportional attendance by races had not changed in 
the two-year period to 1982; 
(ii) the above included attendance at all hospitals in 
South Africa excluding those in the Transkei, 
Bophutatswana and Venda (Ciskei was not granted 
'independence' until 1982); . it was for this reason 
that expenditure by the provinces wa.s combined with 
expenditure by the 'non-independent' reserves; and 
(iii) with the exception of the Transkei, the budgets for 
all other reserves included health and welfare under 
the same vote. On the basis of estimates provided in 
the 1982 annual report of the Institute of Race 
Relations, it was assumed that 47% of the estimated 
vote was spent on health and 53% on social 
welfare.30 
(b) All expenditure on health by Transkei, Bophutatswana and Venda 
was allocated to Africans. 
(c) Expenditure by the Department of Health and Welfare on health 
- excluding that on mental health and infections, com.~unicable 
and preventable diseases - was apportioned between Africans, 
Asians, Coloured and Whites in the ratio of the 1982 
population (excluding that of Transkei, Bophutatswana and 
Venda). 
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(d) Expenditure by the Department of Health and Welfare on mental 
health - both directly and through subsidies - was allocated 
between the groups in the 1980 ratio of patient days in 
psychiatric hospitals (out-patient attendances treated as 0,33 
of a patient day) and assuming equal cost per patient for all 
groups. 
(e) Expenditure by the Department of Health and Welfare on 
infectious, communicable and preventable diseases was 
allocated as for mental health but using the 1980 ratio of 
patient days for tuberculosis and leper hospitals. 
(f) Health subsidies by the state to the local authorities, which 
did not fully cover the service provided, were increased to 
the 100% amount and this was apportioned between African, 
Asians, Coloureds and Whites according to their share of the 
urban population. 
excluded) 
(Transkei, Bophutatswana and Venda 
The financial details of this apportioning are contained in Appendix 
c. Under the above assumptions per capita health expenditure by 
race for 1982/3 worked out at: 
African 
Asian 
Coloured 
White 
R 46,42 
R 54,25 
R 84,10 
R132,14 
Respondents in the survey were also questioned about their monthly 
expenditure on medical care. Answers ranged from zero expenditure 
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to a maximum of R96,00. Only 13 respondents, or 2% of the sample, 
did not answer the question. 
TABLE 12 
DISTRIBUTION OF MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE ON MEDICAL CARE 
EXPENDITURE INTERVAL (R) FREQUENCY 
Q 239 
l - 5 216 
6 - 10 95 
11 - 25 80 
26 - 50 19 
51 - 75 1 
76 - 100 3 
Unspecified 13 
TOTAL 666 
If it was feasible to assume that none of the expenditure on medical 
care was for private health care or actual hospitalization ·· in 
other words all health expenditure was for out-patient visits - then 
given household income, household size, health expenditure and the 
provincial hospitals tariff structures, it was possible to get some 
estimate of the number of hospital visits per household. This 
could serve as a proxy for utilization of health services by each 
household.31 
The estimation, from the tariff structure, of the number of 
outpatient visits per household assumed accurate reporting of 
average monthly health expenditure. This latter, not being a 
regular payment of households,· could have involved a considerable 
margin of error. For example, table 12 shows that 36% of 
households reported no expenditure on health. This was 
particularly high for Coloured households with almost two-thirds 
reporting no expenditure in comparison to the one-quarter of African 
households stating zero expenditure. This made the adoption of an 
allocation routine problematic with it highly unlikely that so many 
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households in the sample received no state health benefits at all., 
For this reason the procedure chosen 
l"\LJ,..,, ·~ vvt...-1-- 7 
allocating to households 
automatically apportioned to each s~ re according to 
household size. The remainder was divided between households 
according to estimated number of outpatient visits on the assumption 
that reported health expenditure - even if not accurate in money 
terms - at least reflected an ordinal utilization of health services. 
The method followed to allocate to each household a state subsidy 
from health is detailed below. Subsidies for African and Coloured 
households were separately apportioned but the procedure was 
identical for both groups; the steps followed for Africans are 
outlined. 
(a) It was assumed that as. a group the African households in the 
sample received their exact share of per capita public 
expenditure on health.32 Given a total of 3 202 African 
household members in the sample, this amounted to health 
expenditure of Rl48 637 on this group by the state during the 
1982/3 financial year - i.e. 3 200 x R46,42 = Rl48 637. 
(b) Each household member was assumed to automatically receive 
half of their per capita annual share, i.e. each household 
received R23,2l times their household size.33 
(c) The other hal£ was put in a common pool for Africans in the 
sample and allocated to households according to their 
proportional share of total out-patient visits for their race 
group as a whole. 
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Although somewhat arbitrary it was hoped that this procedure would 
introduce a household-specific element into the estimate of benefits 
received from public health expenditure. 
4.5 HOUSING 
4.5.l HISTORICAL SKETCH OF STATE FINANCING 
During the early years of Union there was little provision of 
housing by public authorities. Increased urbanisation, together 
with the virtual standstill in building activity during the First 
World War, both contributed to the development of a housing shortage 
in the post-war period. Following the directives from the'Flu 
Epidemic Commission of 1918 for urgent attention to slums and 
locations, a Housing Committee was appointed in 1919 with the 
following terms of reference: 
"Whether it is advisable for the government to give financial 
aid or other assistance to local authorities and others in 
providing housing accommodation in urban areas for persons of 
limited means including Coloured persons and natives, and if 
so, the best method of doing so. 11 34 
The recommendations of the Committee led to the passing of the 
Housing Act of 1920. This was the first state attempt to supervise 
the allocation of funds for housing. Under the Act local 
authorities could borrow money from the Administrator of the 
province, or with his consent, from other sources for the 
construction of approved dwellings or schemes. The Central Housing 
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Board, established under this Act.as part of the Department of 
Health, was to control this borrowing of funds. -
The realization that low income groups could not aff crd the rentals 
required of economic interest rates led to an amendment to the Act 
in 1930 which introduced the granting of loans at sub-economic rates 
of interest. Initially Africans were excluded from this benefit, 
but from 1934 under certain circumstances relating to slum 
clearance, sub-economic loans were extended to Africans. Special 
provisions were made for the aged, poor and totally unfit. 
Although some local authorities did make use of these sub-economic 
loans - almost 18 000 houses were provided from sub-economic funds 
between 1930 and 1943 - continuing rapid urbanisation aggravated an 
already existing housing shortage. A contributory factor to the 
increase in urban population was the demand for labour, particularly 
African, stimulated by the Second World War. For the duration of 
the war the construction of houses was drastically curtailed. By 
1943 it was estimated by the Social and Economic Planning Council 
that the shortage of houses in urban areas was approximately 185 ooo 
- 60 000 for Whites and 125 000 for Blacks.35 
An amendment to the Act in 1944 led to the Central Housing Board 
being replaced by the National Housing and Planning Commission 
entrusted with more extensive powers than the original board in that 
it could itself erect houses and grant loans directly to 
individuals. An important change also, was the introduction of 
differential renting within sub-economic housing schemes with rent 
varying according to the income of tenants. This signified an 
acceptance of the principle of payment according to means. The 
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further deterioration of the housing situation led in 1945 to the 
promulgation of the Housing (Emergency Powers) Act which made 
provisions to speed up building progranunes. 
Progress was slow, and by 1948 a series of shanty towns had been 
erected by homeless Africans in the Johannesburg townships of 
Orlando and Alexandra. Changes in legislation introduced by the 
newly-elected Nationalist government were aimed jointly at the 
segregation of races and the curtailment of squatting. 
included: 
(a) the tightening of influx control measures; and 
These 
(b) the establishment of new townships on the outskirts of White 
areas where African families were resettled (by the 
newly-appointed Native Resettlement Board).36 
\ 
Policies were also introduced to reduce the costs of African housing 
and townships services to ~he State and local authorities. For 
example: 
(a) the Bantu Building Workers Act of 1951 made allowances for 
Africans to build houses in township areas, thus reducing the 
cost of erecting houses; 
{b) a Bantu Services levy introduced in 1952 was payable monthly 
by all employers of African workers with these contributions 
to assist in the financing of township services; 
(c) site and service schemes were introduced in 1954; 
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(d) a reduction in the granting of sub-economic loans for Africans 
but not for other population groups. 
The formal separation of the responsibility for housing was 
legislated in the 1957 Housing Act. In terms of this, the National 
Housing and Planning Conunission was replaced by the Bantu Housing 
Board, controlling aspects relating to African housing, and the 
National Housing Conunission responsible for all other groups. Both 
boards were to make loans available to local authorities for 
housing. All expenditure incurred by these bodies was to be 
defrayed from a National Housing Fund to which all the assets of 
existing provincial housing loan funds would be transferred. This 
was to be a revolving fund with funds appropriated annually by 
Parliament. 
Throughout the sixties and seventies the financing of state housing 
£.or non-Africans continued to be met through the National Housing 
Fund. The ~revision of low-cost housing (economic and 
sub-economic) was through the local authoritieG with the aid of 
funds from the National Housing Conunission; while the Department of 
Community Development, set up in 1961, was responsible for housing 
of a higher standard. 
But for Africans the unfolding of the apartheid programme led to 
restrictions being placed on the availability of finance for housing 
in the so-called White areas with the emphasis switching to the 
development of reserve townships. Substantial resources were 
directed towards urban housing in the reserves. ~· were 
allocated through the SA Bantu Trust, the reserve authorities and 
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also the Bantu Affairs Administration Boards.37 From 1968 
home-ownership rights for Africans living in townships in urban 
areas in the Republic were withdrawn and restrictions were placed on 
the provision of family housing. The inevitable result of the 
severe housing shortage which !ollowed this clamp down was 
ove~ding and illegal squatting. 
Home-ownership leasehold rights were re-introduced early in 1976 
before the countrywide disturbances began in June - and were 
extended to the 99-year leasehold provisions later that same year. 
Events following the disturbances led to re-adjustments in 
government policy regarding the 'temporary' status of urban 
Africans. In November 1977 the government allocated RlOO million 
for African housing - half of this was for reserve townships and 
half for housing in the Republic. For Coloured and Indian housing 
an additional RlSO million was set aside. 
The Housing Amendment Act of 1979 abolished the Bantu Housing 
Board. Loans for Africans, as for other groups, would be obtained 
through the National Housing Commission with Africans again becoming 
eligible for sub-economic interest rates on the same basis as for 
other groups. 
From 1982 the sources of finance of the National Housing Commission 
were extended beyond the parliamentary appropriations and the 
Commission could, with Ministerial permission, borrow money from any 
source, either locally or abroad. In spite of this, and in the 
same year, there was a major change in government policy towards 
public provision of housing. Glover and Watson reported: 
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"This re-orientation has taken the form, firstly, 
of a partial withdrawal of state responsibility 
for low income housing and a shift in the burden 
to the private sector and the low income group 
itself. Secondly, in those areas of housing 
provision for which the state will continue to 
take responsibility, there is to be a cutback in 
financial commitment through the dropping of 
housing standards. 11 38 
Important aspects in this new housing policy include: 
(a} more involvement by the private sector in the provision of 
accommodation; 
(b) a switch to home-ownership by the selling-off of houses 
originally funded· by the National Housing Commission; 
(c) new dwellings to be provided only for households earning under 
RlSO per month; 
(d) the above dwellings to be of a lower standard than before; 
(e) the provision of sot loans for the purchase of houses for the 
RlSO per month to R800 per month earners; 
Cf) loans for materials for building on self-help schemes: 
(g} restructuring of rent formulas to bring rents in line with 
market values for those earning over RlSO a month 
In terms of the new Constitution, the norms, standards and 
allocations of finance for housing are to be dealt with as a general 
affair so that the responsibility for housing will not be fragmented 
by group. 
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4.5.2 PROCEDURE FOR ALLOCATION OF HOUSING EXPENDITURE 
For the purposes of this study, the problem was to estimate the 
extent of the housing subsidy received by households in the 
survey. The components of this subsidy were different for township 
and squatter households. 
For township residents, their monthly housing payment could be 
divided into {i) a basic rent for tenants, or a monthly loan 
repayment in the case of home-owners; (ii) certain additional 
charges. 
Basic rent or loan repayments were fixed according to a formula laid 
down by the Department of Community Development which took into 
account the monthly income of the tenant, the value of the house and 
the amount of interest charged on the loan.39 Additional 
charges varied in different areas but usually included all or some 
of the following: 
an administrative charge to recover wages and salaries; 
a site rent to cover access roads, storm water drainage and 
similar expenses; 
a rates contribution to cover the cost of electricity. water 
and refuse removal; 
a community charge towards the costs of halls. libraries and 
other recreational facilities; 
- 116 -
a school levy in the case of Africans; and 
sundry other fees to cover maintenance, insurance and the loss 
due to unpaid rentals. 
For squatter residents there was no actual rent payment, but a fee 
was charged to cover water, refuse removal, and sewerage disposal 
services and, in some cases, also a monthly charge for site 
occupation. 
The calculation of subsidies for township and squatter households 
was estimated as the difference between an approximation of the cost 
to the authorities of the house plus services - or in the case of 
squatters, only the services - and the monthly housing repayment of 
the household. There were no apparent problems attached to 
obtaining the latter. Households were asked in the questionnaire 
to give their monthly payments. Prinsloo was confident that 
housing payments - being a constant amount every month - were 
reliably recorded by respondents and more accurate than the 
irregular expenditures of households.40 However, estimates, of 
an 'economic cost' to the authorities of the house, plus services, 
were more problematic. Ideally, for township residents records for 
every survey house would have had to be individually assessed to 
obtain its approximate value; while for township and squatter 
residents the accounts of relevant local authorities or 
administration boards would have needed thorough investigation to 
render the 'economic costs' of providing services to particular 
communities under their jurisdiction. !t was felt that this was 
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beyond the scope of this investigation and that for our purposes it 
would suffice to make certain generalisations regarding costs. 
These are outlined separately for township tenants, township 
home-owners and squatters. 
The areas surveyed were under the jurisdiction of four separate 
local authorities. The Cape Town African households fell under the 
Western Cape Administration Board; the Cape Town Coloured 
households fell under the Cape Town City Council; some of the 
Durban African households fell under the Port Natal Administration 
Board and the remainder under KwaZulu administration. 
TOWNSHIP TENANTS 
(a) Rents 
The basis used here for calculating the real cost of a 
dwelling to the authorities was that referred to as the 
'opportunity-cost' method; namely the real cost of the 
dwelling was taken as the income that could have been earned 
if the equity locked up in the dwelling had been invested at a 
rate of return obtainable from substitute investment 
opportunities, such as government securities.41 
The question arose as what to value the 'equity' at. It was 
decided to use a general estimate of the replacement value, in 
1982, of a sub-economic house as all tenants surveyed in both 
areas were in the sub-economic income group. Estimates made 
for the approximate costs of a standard sub-economic house of 
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SO square meters were put at R2 500 at 1978 prices, exclusive 
of land and services.42 For our purposes, the cost of 
land was not taken into consideration; while the cost of 
services was included in additional charges. 
If the cost of R2 500 was inf lated to a 1982 price using the 
general production price index for South African conunodities, 
the cost of the equivalent dwelling in 1982 would have been 
R4 263. If this money had been invested in three-year RSA 
stock at the November 1982 interest rate of 10,0%, the annual 
return would have been R426,36 or R35,53 monthly. This 
monthly amount was taken as the real cost to the authorities 
of a sub-economic dwelling, excluding land and maintenance 
costs. 
(b) Additional Charges 
Calculation of economic charges to households for services 
provided by local authorities were assumed equal for all 
township residents, regardless of area or race group. The 
estimate used was that provided by the Western Cape 
Administration Board for the Peninsula Area, inflated to 
R63,08 43 from the 1981/82 figure of R53,so.44 
Using these costs for Peninsula African townships as estimates of 
costs elsewhere would be inaccurate to the extent of: 
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(a) items included in the charges of the Peninsula African 
townships but not provided for Peninsula Coloured townships or 
Durban African townships; 
(b) items not included in the charges of the Peninsula African 
townships but provided for Peninsula Coloured townships or 
Durban African townships; 
(c) any difference in costs of provision of the items by the 
different authorities.45 
In the absence of better data, it was felt that these estimates were 
sufficient as an approximate indication of economic costs for the 
additional charges for all townships, regardless of group or area. 
TOWNSHIP HOMEOWNERS 
None of the Cape Town households - African nor Coloured - were 
home-owners. However, in the Durban townships of Kwamashu, 
Lamcntville and Urnlazi there was some degree of home-ownership. 
For homeowners a problem was encountered in that the questionnaire 
did not ask whether households were still in the process of repaying 
loans. However, communication with the Kwamashu Housing Offices 
confirmed that given the housing payments of respondents in the 
Kwamashu and Umlazi townships that these households were not 
repaying loans but only paying service charges. Subsidies to these 
homeowners was then the difference between the economic cost of 
additional charges - R63,08 - and their monthly housing payment. 
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The other Durban township where a small number of respondents were 
homeowners was Lamontville. Housing payments here did include a 
loan repayment at a subsidized rate. The real cost of this subsidy 
to the state was calculated in exactly the same way as the rent 
subsidy for township tenants but only on 90% of the replacement 
value of the house as homeowners were usually required to make a 
deposit of 10%. The real cost of the loan to the authorities 
workedout at R31,97 monthly.- This amount was then added to the 
economic cost of additional charges to give the full un-subsidized 
cost of housing provision . to home.owners. Any difference between 
this cost - R95,05 - and th.eir monthly housing payment was taken as 
a h,ousing subsidy. 
SQUATTERS 
Local authorities and administration boards usually provided water, 
refuse removal services and sewerage disposal services for squatter 
conununities. In addition to these, some authorities charge a 
monthly rent for oc~upation of the site. For our estimates of an 
economic charge for squatter households, a cost for land use was not 
considered. 
A breakdown for 1981/82 of additional charges by the Cape Town City 
Council for sub-economic municipal houses in their areas gave the 
proportional contribution of 33,7% for electricity, water and refuse 
remova1.46 A similar breakdown of the service charge in 
Grahamstown for the 1982/83 financial year gave these same 
components plus sanitation a share of 35,1%.47 Squatter areas 
were not provided with electricity. They did however benefit 
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indirectly from some other facilities provided for in the additional 
charge paid by township residents - for example access roads, 
stormwater drainage, some community facilities - and their presence 
I 
did involve some administrative cost. For the allocation procedure 
adopted for squatters it was assumed that the proportional costs of 
these additional benefits indirectly received plus the costs of 
water, refuse removal and sewerage disposal was one-third of the 
economic cost of additional charges in the township. 
Accepting these assumptions implied that the monthly cost of a 
squatter household to the authorities was R21,03 - exclusive of any 
charge for the land use. Any squatter household having a monthly 
housing repayment of less than this was assumed to be receiving a 
subsidy to the extent of the difference. 
4.6 PASSENGER TRANSPORT 
4.6.1 HISTORICAL SKETCH OF STATE FINANCING 
\ 
Provision of adequate transport systems has become accepted as a 
legitimate function of public authorities. Initially 
responsibility was restricted to the establishing and maintaining of 
roads; this was extended to the direct provision of a range of goods 
and passenger transport services; and later, to their subsidization 
when privately provided. 
The concern in this study was with urban passenger transport and 
the subsidies which operate to reduce fares below their economic 
level. Pass.anger transport services include:48 
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(a) urban rail and road services provided by the South Africa 
Transport Services; 
(b) bus services provided by local authorities, mainly to service 
the White community and operated as part of the municipal 
organization through which it is usually heavily subsidized; 
(c) bus services owned by local authorities but under the control 
of a metropolitan transportation board and financially 
independent of the local authorities; 
(d) bus services provided by private operators such as PUTCO in 
Johannesburg. Pretoria and Durban; and City Tramways in 
Capetown and Port Elizabeth: 
(e) taxi services which are not subsidized at all by the state and 
wero therefore not considered in this analysis. 
Transport services provided and controlled by South African 
Transport Services and the local authorities did not require special 
legislation in order to be subsidized. Losses on the former were 
met from transfers through the State Revenue Fund while local 
authorities covered losses on their bus services from other 
municipal revenues. It was not until the 'fifties that special 
legislation was passed providing for specific subsidies on 
transport. This was contained in the Bantu Services Levy Act of 
1952. 
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In terms of this Act, a levy of up to 25 cents weekly was to be paid 
by all employers of adult male Africans, in the larger towns, who 
did not supply free acconunodation. This levy would be paid into a 
Services Levy Fund. Provision was made in the Act for up to 
5 cents out of this 25 cents to be used for subsidizing transport 
services. In these towns where employers contributed to the fund, 
local authorities or private companies which ran transport services 
for African conunuters could apply for subsidies.from the levies 
collected in their area.49 The size of the subsidy was 
calculated on two factors: the operating costs of the bus company 
or local authority concerned, and the ability of the conunuter to pay 
the economic fare. The difference between the 'economic fare' and 
the affordability of this fare to conunuters in the area would be met 
with a subsidy paid directly to the bus. company and payable only on 
a weekly clip-card or monthly ticket to bona fide workers. 
An announcement towards the end of 1956 that fares were to be 
increased for commuters in Johannesburg and Pretoria led to a bus 
boycott, beginning January 1957 in the Alexandra Township, and 
spreading widely. As a direct result of this, the Ba~tu Transport 
Services Act was passed in June of that year to supplement the Bantu 
Services Lavy Act. In terms of this new Act the control of that 
portion of employer levies used for subsidizing transport services 
was transferred from the then Native Affairs Department to the 
Department of Transport, and provision was made to allow the 
Minister to increase employer contributions from 5 cents to a 
maximum of 10 cents weekly. 
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Over the years these contributions proved insufficient to meet the 
subsidy requirements for bus services and central government were 
called upon to pay a balance of R3,8 million over the period from 
1957 to 1972.so In this latter year the Act was amended with 
employer contributions being extended to include employers of all 
African women, with the exception of domestic workers. 
amount payable was raised to 20 cents per worker. 
The maximum 
Also passed in 1972 was the Transport Services for Coloured Persons 
and Indians Act which made allowances for the Minister to extend the 
provisions for employer contributions to Coloured and Indian workers 
within declared areas. These contributions would be paid into a 
Coloured Transport Account and an Indian Transport Account 
respectively. 
There were two other forms of subsidy already in operation, not yet 
mentioned, namely: 
(a) the fares of African conunuters travelling daily between the 
reserves and their places of employment were subsidized from a 
share of township liquor profits paid over to the then 
Department of Bantu Administration and Development; and 
(b) the fares of third class railway journeys between the urban 
centres and certain townships were subsidized by the 
Department of Transport. 
In 1974 the Bantu Transport Services Amendment Act widened the area 
in which levies could be imposed on African workers and changed the 
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contribution to a monthly basis, fixing the maximum amount at Rl per 
worker per month. Some- indication of the extent of all subsidies 
at about this time can be obtained from Table 13 which presents 
figures for the financial year 1976/77. 
TABLE 13 
CONTRIBUTIONS FROM TRANSPORT LEVIES AND SUBSIDIES BY THE STATE 
TOWARDS PUBLIC TRANSPORT COSTS 
SOURCE OF FUNDS 
BUS TRANSPORT 
Funds voted by Parliament - Africans 
Funds voted by Parliament - Coloured Persons 
Black Township Levies Account 
Coloured Transport Levies Account 
Profits on Sales of Liquor in African Townships 
TRAIN TRANSPORT 
Funds voted by Parliament 
TOTAL 
AMOUNT (R) 
29 074 626 
975 653 
10 054 556 
6 403 214 
2 500 000 
38 000 000 
87 008 049 
Sources: South Africa, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into 
Legislation Affecting the Utilisation of Manpower, R P 
30/1979, p 125; South Africa, Second Interim Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry into Bus Passenger Transportation in 
the Republic of South Africa, R P 103/1982, p 35. 
Given low wages and the siting and relocation of African and 
Coloured residential areas on the outskirts of cities, the transport 
costs of workers from their homes to their work-place were 
progressively needing higher levels of subsidizing. With employer 
contributions remaining constant post - 1976, the state's share of 
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the transport subsidy was increasing. · The Black Transport Services 
Amendment Act of 1982 sought to 'correct' this imbalance between the 
employers' and departments' contributions by making provision for 
increases in employer contributions. These increases were effected 
later that same year when the maximum rate for African workers was 
increased from Rl to R3 monthly and for Coloured and Indian workers 
from 20 cents to 60 cents weekly. Contributions were now also 
payable in respect of domestic workers who did not sleep in. 
By the 1982/83 financial year, the year used for to this analysis, 
the total amount paid in public transport subsidies was in the 
region of R402 million, R374 million of which came from the central 
Treasury and R28 million from employers' contributions.51 This 
excluded the subsidy of local authority bus services from revenue 
obtained from other municipal sources, mainly property rates. The 
Welgemoed Conunission into Bus Passenger Transportation estimated 
this to be in the region of R30 million or mor~ per annum.52 
4.6.2 PROCEDURE FOR ALLOCATION OF PASSENGER TRANSPORT SUBSIDIES 
In the case of bus subsidies paid to local authority or private 
operators, the level of subsidy depends on a number of factors:-
(a) the average wages of workers to be transported; 
(b) the distance over which passengers have to be transported; 
(c) the passenger density; and 
(d) the operating costs of the bus operator. 
The first of these provides an estimate of the amount workers can 
afford; the remainder are used to calculate the 'economic tariff' 
which must be charged in order to provide the service profitably. 
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The difference between the two, as calculated by the Department of 
Transport, gives the subsidy paid. Subsidy levels will therefore 
vary considerably by route and area. It has been estimated that 
bus commuters in Cape Town and on the Witwatersrand pay an average 
of about 50% of the economic tariff while those in Bloemfontein and 
Pretoria pay more than this.53 Other examples of subsidies 
paid on four specific routes are shown in Table 14. 
TABLE 14 
SUBSIDIES TO PASSENGERS ON SPEC~FIC ROUTES: 1981/82 
AREA ROUTE PASSENGER SUBSIDY TOTAL % OF 
DISTANCE PAYS FOR 10 FOR 10 FARE ECONOMIC 
J'OURNEYS J'OURNEYS ·FOR 10 FARE PAID 
J'OURNIES BY 
PASSENGER 
RURAL AREAS 
(From Bophutat-
swana) 
Lichtenburg 65,00km R3,25 R9,98 Rl3,23 25% 
Rustenburg S0,90km R3,00 R9,64 Rl2,64 24% 
URBAN 
Durban 30,03km R4,15 R4,15 RS,30 50% 
Johannesburg 29,20km R5,l0 R3,90 R9,00 57% 
'Source: South Africa, Second Interim Report of Commission of 
Inquiry Into Bus Passenger Transportation in the Republic 
of South Africa, R P 103/1982. 
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In allocating transport subsidies to our households the first 
assumption which needed to be made was what percentage of the 
economic fare was paid by those workers in this sample who used 
subsidized transport. This would obviously have varied for each 
worker but for the purposes of this study it was necessary to settle 
for an average for all workers. Given the above calculations of 
Voges' and those given in table 14 , it seemed reasonable to assume 
that bus commuters paid 50% of the economic fare. In the absence 
of any better estimates, it also seemed not too improbable that 
subsidies on rail services were of the same order as those on 
buses. This resulted in the first assumption becoming that all 
workers who commuted to and from work on subsidized transport - bus 
or rail - paid exactly half of the economic fare with the other half 
being met through state and employer subsidies. 
The second assumption to be tackled was the proportion of commuting 
to and from work which took place on subsidized transport - as 
opposed to in private cars and taxis. As with the first as~umption 
it was necessary to make a generalization applicable to all workers 
and this was done using projections provided in the Driessen 
Committee of Inquiry into Urban Transport Facilities; these are 
shown in Table 15. 
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TABLE 15 
• 
PROJECTIONS OF PERCENTAGE USAGE OF ALTERNATIVE MODES OF TRANSPORT 
FOR AFRICAN, ASIAN AND COLOURED COMMUTERS: 1980 
MODE OF TRANSPORT CAPE TOWN DURBAN 
% % 
Car 33,0 30,1 
Taxi 0,4 1.9 
Bus 36,0 34,5 
Railway 30,6 33,5 
TOTAL 100,0 100,0 
Source: South Africa, Report of the Committee of Inguiry Into Urban 
Transport Facilities in the Republic, RP 60/74, p 92. 
Being poor, the respondents in our households would most probably 
have used cars less than the average amount, if at all. On the 
other hand, the Driessen Commission may well have underestimated the 
increase in usage of taxi-kombis as an. alternative to public 
transport. It was decided to increase the bus and train proportion 
from approximately two-thirds to three-quarters, leaving 25% of 
expenditure to be shared between expenditure on private cars and 
taxis. This resulted in the second assumption being that, for all 
households, 75% of commuting to and from work was on subsidized bus 
or rail transport. 
Lastly, it was necessary to divide household expenditure on 
transport between weekly transport to and from work using a 
clip-card and other transport where no subsidy was granted. This 
• 
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was apportioned using the difference between the transport 
allocation of the Minimum Living Level and that of the Supplemented 
Living Level, on the assumption that the former was 'essential' 
travel and the latter 'additional' travel. This difference was 
looked at for Coloured households in Cape Town and Indian households 
in Durban; African expenditures could not be used as additional 
travel allowed for in the Supplemented Living Level included the 
cost of holiday trave1.54 For Coloured and Indian households 
the proportion of essential travel to total travel costs averaged 
out at 84%. This was reduced to 80% to allow for some essential 
shopping travel where no subsidy would apply. 
Combining assumptions 2 and 3 above resulted in the estimate that 
60% of each house's reported transport expenditure was on subsidized 
public transport to and from work, i.e. 75% of 80% of expenditure. 
With the first assumption that exactly half of the economic fare was 
paid in the form of subsidies, the extent of benefits to household 
from state and employer subsidies, was therefore assumed to be also 
equal to 60% of their stated expenditure on transport. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ANALYSIS OF STATE SPENDING ON WELFARE SERVICES TO SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS 
This chapter explores the incidence of state expenditure on sample 
households in the form of social security payments, education, 
health, housing and transport. Direct expenditure and subsidies 
by government on these items of state welfare amounted to 
approximately RS,O billion in 1983.1 This accounted for 35% 
of total government expenditure. In contrast to other public 
spending, expenditure on these items, is more easily allocated to 
individuals or groups. 
The assumptions under which these state expenditures and subsidies 
were quantified and allocated to sample households were developed in 
the previous chapter. Allocation routines were applied separately 
to each household which then enabled distributional effects from 
spending to be analyzed with respect to various household 
characteristics. The following were found to be of interest: 
income, race, household size and settlement type. Benefits from 
... 
expenditures were looked at both in absolute terms and in relation 
to original household income; the latter being defined as all 
disposable (after tax) income from wages, lodgers and any other 
payments excluding contributions from sqcial security. 
Before discussing redistribution by household characteristic, the 
next section presents a general description of the benefits accruing 
to households from each of the items considered. Taken together 
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the overall money value to the average household from all five items 
was Rl 822 per annum with spending varying from a maximum value of 
RB 516 per annum to a minimum of Rl99 per annum. Table 16 gives 
the distribution of expenditure within this range. 
TABLE 16 
DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFITS TO SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS FROM STATE 
EXPENDITURES ON WELFARE IN RANDS PER ANNUM 
CLASS INTERVALS IN 
RANDS PER ANNUM NO 
0 0 
1 - l 000 156 23,4 
1 001 - 2 000 270 40,5 
2 001 - 3 000 159 23,9 
3 001 - 4 000 49 7,4 
4 001 - 5 000 18 2,7 
> 5 000 14 2,1 
TOTAL 666 100,0 
5.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF STATE EXPENDITURES ON WELFARE 
5.1.l STATE WELFARE EXPENDITURES PROVIDING CASH BENEFITS 
Cash benefits were obtained from the four social security payments 
included in this study: namely pensions, maintenance grants, 
foster-care grants and family allowances. Benefits received from 
these expenditures could be distinguished from those received from 
education, health, housing and transport in that while all composed 
a social wage to households, it was the former which actually 
increased their money income. 
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From Table 17 it appears that less than one-quarter of households 
were social security recipients. Most of the payments came from 
pensions. Households falling in the highest class interval all 
had more than one recipient of benefits per households with the 
maximum being three in any one household. For households receiving 
payments the average annual receipt from social security worked out 
at R912 per annum. 
TABLE 17 
DISTRIBUTION OF CASH PAYMENTS TO SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS FROM SOCIAL 
SECURITY IN RANDS PER ANNUM 
CLASS INTERVALS IN 
RANDS PER ANNUM 
0 
1 - 100 
101 - 200 
201 - 300 
301 - 400 
401 - 500 
501 - 600 
601 - 700 
701 - 800 
801 - 900 
901 
- 1 000 
> 1 000 
TOTAL 
SOCIAL SECURITY PAYMENTS 
NO % 
513 77,0 
1 0,2 
1 0,2 
6 0,9 
17 2,6 
20 3,0 
11 1,7 
2 0,3 
7 !,l 
37 5,6 
4 0,6 
47 7,1 
666 100,0 
Using the minimum living level (MLL) as an asses~ment of extreme 
poverty, more than half of the households receiving payments could 
be termed very poor in that their original incomes fell below the 
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MLL relevant to their household circumstances. Table 18 shows that 
in absolute terms this meant tHat 84 out of the 153 social security 
recipient households were very poor. Of these~ouseholds 
with pre-transfer income below the ML~n~ad their incomes 
pushed above the MLL after receipt of transfer income. 
TABLE 18 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS COMPARING INCOME LEVELS BETWEEN 
HOUSEHOLDS RECEIVING AND NOT RECEIVING SOC!AL SECURITY PAYMENTS 
INCOME 
STATUS 
Below MLL 
Above MLL 
TOTAL 
RECIPIENT 
HOUSEHOLDS 
84 
69 
153 
NON-RECIPIENT 
HOUSEHOLDS 
174 
339 
513 
From Table 18 it also emerges that in addition to the 
TOTAL 
258 
408 
ssa 
very 
poor households who received payments. there were more than double 
this number who had incomes below the MLL but were not being caught 
in the safety net of social security. Most of these would not have 
been eligible for relief under the existing social security system 
which only provides a limited range of selective benefits to 
households as opposed to general means-tested assistance to all 
these in poverty. However there was some evidence of potential 
recipients not claiming benefits - for example. there were 27 cases 
of eligible over pensionable age. not claiming their 
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social pensions. Reasons for this could not be ascertained from 
the coded data but probable causes could have included 
administrative delays and problems, ignorance of rights and, 
perhaps, fear that to claim would draw attention to an 'illegal' 
aspect of their life such as unauthorised presence in an area. 
TABLE 19 
DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS RECEIVING SOCIAL SECURITY PAYMENTS BY 
AREA AND SETTLEMENT TYPE 
AREA SETTLEMENT NO OF HOUSE- NO OF HOUSE- (1) AS A 
TYPE HOLDS RECEIVING HOLDS % OF (2) 
SOCIAL SECURITY SAMPLED FOR EACH 
PAYMENTS AREA 
(1) (2) 
CAPE TOWN 
Crossroads African 9 126 7,1% 
Squatter 
Gugulelu African 
Township 17· 90 18.9% 
Modderdam Coloured 
Squatter 6 52 11.5% 
Uitsig Coloured 
Township 40 72 55,6% 
Bonteheuwel Coloured 
Township 2-9 55 52,7% 
DURBAN 
Chesterville ·African 
Township l 8 12,5% 
Clermont African 
Squatter 4 34 11,8% 
Folweni African 
Squatter 4 39 10,3% 
Inanda African 
Squatter 4 53 7,5% 
Kwamashu African 
Township 12 46 26,1% 
Lamontville African 
Township 8 14 57,1% 
Malukazi African 
Squatter 3 28 10,7% 
Umlazi African 
Townsip 16 49 32,7% 
ALL AREAS 153 666 23,0% 
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Households receiving benefits from social security were not evenly 
spread throught the sample areas. From Table 19 distinct biases in 
the incidence of households receiving social security can be 
noted. Firstly. of the Coloured households in the sample 42% 
received income from social security compared to the 16% of African 
households who benefitted from payments. Secondly, township 
households scored better than their squatter counterparts with 9% of 
the latter receiving income from social security compared to the 37% 
of township households who benefitted from payments. 
Heads of households tended to be older in households receiving 
social security with mean age of 57,9 years compared to that of 43,2 
years for households not receiving benefits. The former also 
recorded relatively more female headed households. Table 20 shows 
this to have been consistently true for each of the three groups -
Durban Africans, Cape Town Africans and Cape Town Coloured - with an 
overall average of 52% of female headed households amongst social 
security recipients and oniy 25% amongst non-recipient households. 
TABLE 20 
COMPARISON OF PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF GENDER OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 
BETWEEN HOUSEHOLDS RECEIVING AND NOT RECEIVING SOCIAL SECURITY 
PAYMENTS 
GROUP AND GENDER OF % DISTRIBUTION % DISTRIBUTION % DISTRIBUTION 
AREA HOUSEHOLD FOR HOUSEHOLDS FOR HOUSEHOLDS FOR ALL 
HEAD RECEIVING NOT RECEIVING HOUSEHOLDS 
SOCIAL SOCIAL 
SECURITY SECURITY 
African Male 50,0 74,0 69,4 
Durban Female 50~0 26,0 30,6 
Total 100 20 10020 100,00 
African Male 50,0 72,6 69,9 
Cape Town Female 50,0 27,4 30,1 
Total 100 1 0 100 2 0 lOOeO 
Coloured Male 46,7 83,7 68,2 
Cape Town Female 53,3 16,3 31,8 
Total 100 20 100 20 ·10020 
- 145 -
The deviation of household structure from the average was in the 
expected direction with relatively fewer nuclear families amongst 
households receiving social security and relatively more extended 
families. Households receiving benefits also recorded fewer 
compound households. Table 21 shows this to have been the pattern 
for each group and area. The net effect of these differences was a 
slightly larger household size and more adult members for households 
receiving benefits. These households averaged 6,7 members of whom 
4,1 were adults in comparison to the equivalent rates of 6,3 members 
and 3,6 adults for households not receiving benefits. 
TABLE, 21 
COMPARISON OF PERCENTAGE D!STRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE BETWEEN 
HOUSEHOLDS RECEIVING AND NOT RECEIVING SOCIAL SECURITY PAYMENTS 
GROUP AND HOUSEHOLD % DISTRIBUTION %DISTRIBUTION % DISTRIBUTION 
AREA STRUCTURE FOR HOUSEHOLDS FOR HOUSEHOLDS FOR ALL 
RECEIVING NOT RECEIVING HOUSEHOLDS 
SOCIAL SOCIAL 
SECURITY SECURITY 
African Solitary 1,9 0,9 1,1 
Durban Unrelated ..:. 1,4 1,1 
Nuclear 13,5 56,4 48,l 
Extended 82,7 35,8 44,8 
Compound 2,3 1,9 
Compound 
and 
extended 129 322 320 
TOTAL 10020 10020 10020 
African Solitary 
Cape Town Unrelated 1,1 0,9 
Nuclear 53,8 72,6 70,4 
Extended 46,2 22,l 25,0 
Compound 2,1 1,9 
Compound 
and 
extended 2!1 129 
TOTAL 10020 10020 10020 
Coloured Solitary 1,0 0,6 
Cape Town Unrelated 2,7 1,1 
Nuclear 37,3 56,7 48,6 
Extended 49,3 23,1 34,1 
Compound 6,7 12,5 10,l 
Compound 
and 
extended 420 6!7 5!6 
TOTAL 10020 100!0 10020 
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5.1.2 STATE WELFARE EXPENDITURES PROVIDING BENEFITS IN-KIND 
The four welfare expenditures analyzed in respect of the in-kind 
benefits which their provision transferred to households were 
education, health, housing and transport. Households were eligible 
for each of these collectively provided services according to the 
conditions set out in the allocation routines developed in the 
previous chapter. A great number of assumptions and estimates were 
made in establishing these allocation procedures and the results 
must be interpreted with care. Table 22 sets out the frequency 
distribution of benefits to households under each of the routines. 
TABLE 22 
DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFITS TO SAMPLE.HOUSEHOLDS FROM STATE SPENDING ON 
EDUCATION, HEALTH, HOUSING AND TRANSPORT IN RANDS PER ANNUM 
CLASS INTERVALS EDUCATION HEALTH HOUSING TRANSPORT 
NO 
' 
NO 
' 
NO % NO % 
0 163 24,5 0 8 1,2 88 13,2 
1-100 0 41 6,2 18 2,7 304 45,6 
101-200 45 6,8 191 28,7 219 32,9 168 25,2 
201-300 0 -163 24,5 87 13,l 63 9,5 
301-400 72 10,8 107 16,l 0 21 3,2 
401-500 76 ll ,4 53 8,0 l 0,2 10 l,S 
501-600 22 3,3 28 4,2 2 0,3 s 0,9 
601-700 68 10,2 27 4,l 59 8,9 4 0,6 
701-800 0 19 2,9 13 2.0 0 
801-900 50 7,5 4 0,6 63 9,5 0 
901-1000 53 8,0 8 1,2 145 21,8 l 0,2 
>1000 117 17,6 25 3,8 51 7,7 1 0,2 
TOTAL 666 100,0 666 100,0 666 100,0 666 100,0 
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Benefits from state spending on education were allocated to 
households according to the number of primary and secondary 
schoolchildren in each household. Only one-quarter of households 
registered no children at school with the average over the sample 
being two per household - 1,3 at primary school and 0,7 at secondary 
school. Given per capita expenditures on African and Coloured 
education, the money value to the average household would have been 
R443 per annum if African and Rl 394 per annum if Coloured.2 
This inequality of expenditure between groups had two separate 
components. In part it could be explained by blatant 
discrimination against African schoolchildren which would be 
reflected in indicators such as pupil:teacher ratios in 1982 of 39:1 
for African schoolchildren against the equivalent ratio of 27:1 for 
Coloured schoolchildren.3 But a second factor contributing to 
the lower per capita expenditure on African pupils would have been 
the lower qualifications of teachers in African schools which would 
have served to reduce the wage share portion of overall e~penditure 
on African education. For example whereas only 24% of African 
teachers had a school qualification above a standard 8, half of all 
Coloured teachers had attained this level or higher;4 
The allocation routine for assigning health expenditure apportioned 
some expenditure according to reported utilization - with the 
remainder being allocated on a per capita basis according to 
household size. Both were problematic. Regarding the former it 
was felt that Coloured households in particular had tended not to 
respond accurately to the question relating to monthly medical 
spending. It was hoped however that reported utilization at least 
reflt:1c.;·;:ed the rank order of benefits from state health; in other 
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words, households reporting zero expenditure per month. used the 
health services less than those answering to a positive monthly 
health expenditure. 
The remaining allocation, according to the nu.~ber of household 
members, was racially based in that it had been estimated that per 
capita health spending on Africans was almost half that for Coloured 
persons - R46 per capita as opposed to R84 per capita. This could 
have overstated the differences in health services accessible to 
urban Africans relative to Coloured persons if services in the rural 
areas were in fact responsible for pulling down the African average. 
In the absence of comparative microstudies on urban-rural 
differences the allocation routine was accepted - with reservation -
as a rough approximation of health spending on sample households. 
Health expenditure for households ranged from a maximum of R4 132 
per annum to a minimum of R23 per annum with the mean averaging out 
at R350. This was slightly more than half the household average of 
R621 per month on education - reflecting the lower proportion of 
government spending on health relative to education. 
With households almost equally divided between township residents 
and squatter residents, the frequency distribution for benefits from 
state spending on housing was bimodal with squatter households 
receiving on average Rl72 per annum while township households 
received R888 per annum. This difference was the result of 
township households receiving either a rent or loan subsidy from the 
state and, in addition, benefitting from a higher level of 
subsidized services. 
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The gap in state spending between township and squatter residents 
must be carefully interpreted. It reflected the ~ubstantially 
higher cost to the state of conventional housing in comparison to 
the lower cost involved in the provision of alternative housing. 
Households in the sample who had secured township houses through 
past priority on housing lists were beneficiaries of this higher 
state spending at the time of the survey. But future state housing 
policy is to be aimed at reducing this subsidy either by the selling 
off of homes or the increasing of rent payments to economic levels 
for all except those earning less than RlSO per month. This is to 
be coupled with a policy of increased provision of servicert sites. 
If implemented, this policy would tend to reduce the future 
differential in state spending between township and other residents. 
Transport subsidies were allocated according to reported household 
expenditure on transport. Eighty-eight or 13% of households 
recorded no transport expenditure. Presumably the majority of 
these were households with no employed persons and those with 
earners working in the informal sector - either at home or close to 
home. Transport expenditure increased for households as the number 
of earners per family increased and also according to distances 
travelled between home and work. Of the four welfare expenditures 
rendering in-kind benefits - education, health, housing and 
transport - the latter had the lowest average transfer at Rlll per 
annum or R9 monthly. Of this approximately 7% was a subsidy from 
employers.s 
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5.2 ANALYSIS OF BENEFITS FROM STATE EXPENDITURES BY INCOME GROUP 
The above discussion was limited to the absolute size of 
transfers. But transfers can also be assessed in relation to 
original income to enable an analysis of biases in the distribution 
of transfers towards different income categories. For this 
purpose, rather than using original income to rank beneficiaries of 
state expenditure, it was decided to use the annual per capita 
poverty gap which was a linear transformation of income and felt to 
be a better measure of overal household welfare than original income. 
The annual poverty gap is calculated as the difference between the 
original pre-transfer disposable income for each household and the 
minimum living level (MLL) for that household.a It therefore 
relates the income of each household to its needs as measured by the 
MLL - that is the theoretical minimum financial requirement of a 
household if it is to survive and have acceptable standards of 
~and clothing. A negative annual poverty gap indicates the 
shortfall in annual income relative to the MLL; a positive annual 
poverty gap indicates the surplus in annual income relative to this 
minimum. It must be emphasized that this is a surpluc relative 
to the MLL and not a surplus of income.? 
Although the annual poverty gap relates income to household 
requirements, it fails to take into account household size when 
presenting the actual shortfall or surplus. Dividing through by 
household size, the resultant annual per capita poverty gap becomes 
a useful measure of relative family welfare against which transfers 
can meaningfully be assessed. It has· the advantage over original 
income in that it takes into account economies of scale in living 
' . 
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costs, and by definition, allows for household size and differences 
in the age composition of household members. 
For each household the annual per capita poverty gap was calculated 
using the MLL relevant to their household circumstances - that is, 
their race, urban area and size. Households were then ranked and 
grouped according to annual per capita poverty gap. For each 
household, benefits from state expenditure on each of the five 
welfare items was calculated using the allocation routines.Table 23 
shows annual mean benefits for each decile of poverty gap. 
TABLE 23 
ANNUAL MEAN BENEFITS FROM STATE WELFARE EXPENDITURES ON SAMPLE 
HOUSEHOLDS, GROUPED BY DECILE OF POVERTY GAP PER CAPITA 
DECILES OF NO OF ANNUAL MEAN ANNUAL MEAN ANNUAL MEAN 
ANNUAL PER HOUSE· BENEFITS FROM BENEFITS FROM BENEFITS FROM 
CAPITA POVERTY HOLDS CASH PAYMENTS IN-KIND CASH AND 
GAP PAYMENTS IN-KIND 
PAYMENTS 
(R) (R) (R) (R) 
~ -357 66 637 l 709 2 346 
356 to -205 65 268 l 798 2 066 
-204 to -105 68 156 l 607 l 763 
-104 to 20 67 143 l 612 l 755 
21 to 141 66 149 1 720 l 869 
142 to 262 66 193 l 545 l 738 
263 to 413 67 167 l 581 l 748 
414 to 620 67 159 l 576 l 735 
621 to 955 67 162 l 558 l 720 
> 955 67 69 l 431 l 500 
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In general, as households became less poor - that is, as they moved 
from a negative to a positive annual poverty gap - cash payments 
tended to decrease. However1 the relationship was not monotonic 
with relative payments from the third through to the ninth deciles 
fluctuating around a mean of Rl6l per annum. . Comparing the annual 
average payments of R637 and R268 for the bottom two deciles with 
that of R69 per annum for the top decile does however suggest that 
these payments favoured the poorest poor. 
This pro-poor bias was not as pronounced for in-kind payments. If 
these payments were broken down by welfare item it was apparent that 
while the education and health components were inversley related to 
per capita proverty gap, benefits from housing and transport varied 
proportion~tely. 
Table 24 relates benefits to annual mean income for each decile of 
poverty gap. Their lower income combined with a higher level of 
benefits emphasized the importance of payments to poorer households 
in the sample. This was particularly striking for households in 
the first decile whose average pre-transfer income was only R512 per 
annum. For one-third of these households their pre-transfer income 
was zero. Even after adding cash payments disposable i.ncoma for 
this group only averaged Rl 149 per annum or R96 monthly. 
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TABLE 24 
ANNUAL MEAN BENEFITS FROM STATE WELFARE EXPENDITURE AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF ANNUAL MEAN PRE-TRANSFER INCOME FOR SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS GROUPED BY 
DECILE OF POVERTY GAP PER CAPITA 
DECILES OF ANNUAL ANNUAL CASH ANNUAL IN-KIND ANNUAL TOTAL 
ANNUAL PER MEAN PAYMENTS AS A PAYMENTS AS A PAYMENTS AS A 
CAPITA POVERTY INCOME % OF ANNUAL % OF ANNUAL % OF ANNUAL 
GAP (R)' MEAN INCOME MEAN INCOME MEAN INCOME 
1 512 124% 334% 458% 
2 1 914 14% 94% 108% 
3 2 562 6% 63% 69% 
4 3 294 4% 49% 53% 
5 4 123 4% 42% 45% 
6 4 473 4% 35% 39% 
1 5 156 3% 31% 34% 
8 6 335 3% 25% 27% 
9 1 353 2% 21% 23% 
10 9 994 1% 14% 15% 
The households characteristics of this poorest decile overlapped to 
a degree with the profile of social security recipients outlined in 
section 5 .1.1. This was to be expected with 56% of households in 
this decile registering at least one beneficiary in their 
households. This meant that amongst these poorest 10% of 
households there was proportionately more Coloured households than 
the average over the whole sample and there was also a higher than 
average number from the townships. Head of households were older 
than the sample average and a higher proportion were females. 
Household struqtures were biased away from nuclear households to 
extended and compound households. 
Durban African households and Cape Town Coloured households were 
over-represented in this decile. Table 25 compares the percentage 
frequency of household size for households in this poorest decile 
with that for the full sample. There were only five Cape Town 
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African households - too few to enable any generalization on 
household size amongst the poor. But for Durban African housettolds 
poorer households tended towards being either of size 2 or less or 
of size 8 or more - with there being proportionately fewer middle 
sized households of 3-7 members.· For Cape Town Coloured household 
it was the smaller households of sizes two or three which had the 
proportionately higher representation amongst the poorest poor. 
TABLE 25 
COMPARISON OF PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD SIZE BETWEEN 
HOUSEHOLDS IN POOREST DECILE AND OTHER HOUSEHOLDS 
GROUP AND 
AREA 
HOUSEHOLD 
SIZE 
% DISTRIBUTION 
FOR HOUSEHOLDS 
IN POOREST DECILE 
% DISTRIBUTION 
FOR HOUSEHOLDS 
IN TOP NINE 
DECILES 
% DISTRIBUTION 
FOR ALL 
HOUSEHOLDS 
African l 5,7 0,4 1,1 
Durban 2 8,6 6,8 7,0 
3 5,7 7,S 7,4 
4 - 1 25,7 50,8 47,6 
> 7 54,3 34,3 36,9 
TOTAL 100,0 100,0 100,0 
African l 
Cape Town 2 20,0 2,4 2,8 
3 4,3 4,2 
4 - 7 60,0 71,6 71,3 
> 7 20,0 21,8 21,8 
TOTAL 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Coloured l 0,7 0,6 
Cape Town 2 26,9 3,3 6,7 
3 19,2 7,2 8,9 
4 - 7 46,2 64,7 62,0 
> 7 7,7 24,2 21,8 
TOTAL 100,0 100,0 100,0 
A linear regression equation was fitted between total payments from 
state welfare as the dependent variable (Y) and annual per capita 
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poverty gap as the independent variable (X). The resultant 
equation was: 
Y = 1804 - 0,29X S.E. (regn co-ef) = 0,063 
R2 = 0,03 
Statistically, therefore, annual per capita poverty gap was not a 
useful explanatory variable in determining the overall size of 
benefits which households could expect to receive from state 
welfare. Total welfare spending needed to be broken down into its 
component items of expenditure to identify significant influences of 
annual per capita poverty gap. 
With the sample being small, it was decided to classify households 
by thirds of annual per capita poverty gap rather than by deciles as 
done above. The thirds divided as follows: 
Annual Per Capita Poverty Gap 
<-R 76 per annum 
-R76 to R356 per annum 
> R356 per annum 
Lowest Third . 
Middle Third 
Highest Third 
All households in the lowest third had negative poverty gaps 
indicating original pre- transfer income below the MLL. In the 
middle third, household income ranged from slightly less than the 
MLL to just above the supplemented living level (SLL) which is 
defined at approximately 20% above the MLL and allows for additional 
expenditure on a few items. The highest third of households had 
incomes above the SLL with average household income, for this group, 
being R7723 per annum. 
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TABLE 26 
BENEFITS FROM STATE EXPENDITURES FOR SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS GROUPED BY 
THIRDS OF ANNUAL PER CAPITA POVERTY GAP, IN RANDS PER ANNUM 
NO OF HOUSEHOLDS 
MEAN PRE-TRANSFER 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
(!n Rands per Annum) 
MEAN BENEFITS PER 
HOUSEHOLD 
Social Security 
School Education 
Health 
Housing 
Transport 
TOTAL BENEFITS PER 
HOUSEHOLD 
ANNUAL PER CAPITA POVERTY GAP 
ALL 
HOUSEHOLDS 
666 
4 583 
209 
(4,6) 
621 
(13,6) 
350 
(7,6) 
531 
(11,6) 
111 
(2,4) 
1 822 
(39,8) 
LOWEST 
THIRD 
222 
1 820 
316 
(17 ,4) 
665 
(36,5) 
413 
(22,7) 
498 
(27,4) 
83 
(4,6) 
1 975 
( 108, 5·) 
MIDDLE 
THIRD 
221 
4 191 
190 
(4,5) 
669 
(16,0) 
328 
(7,8) 
504 
(12,0) 
115 
(2,7) 
1 806 
(43,l) 
HIGHEST 
THIRD 
223 
7 723 
123 
(1,6) 
530 
(6,9) 
309 
(4,0) 
590 
(7,6) 
135 
(1,7) 
1 687 
(21,8) 
NOTES: ROW 1 
ROW 2 
Mean benefits per household in rands per annum 
(Figures in brackets) - Mean benefits per 
household expressed as a % of mean pretransfer 
income for each third 
Figures may not add exactly due to rounding 
Table 26 gives benefits from each of the public expenditures by 
third of annual per capita poverty gap. Grouped by thirds, the 
bias of social security payments was pronounced with mean transfers 
for the lowest third of households substantially higher than for the 
other two thirds. This was obviously a direct result of the higher 
incidence of recipients in this group - particularly of 
pensioners. This is illustrated by the following figures: 
Lowest Third 
Middle Third 
Highest Third 
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Mean No of Pensioners 
per Household 
0,28 
0,19 
0,13 
Transfers for school education were closer in range than were social 
security payments with payments to the lower and middle thirds very 
close in absolute terms. Given household sizes of 7,1, 6,3 and 5,7 
for households in the lower, middle and upper thirds respectively, 
the distribution of school pupils shown below could be expected; 
although the fewer number of secondary pupils in the lowest thirds 
was anomalous. A possible explanation could perhaps have been a 
higher drop-out rate for children in these poorest households with 
there being few incentives to remain at school and a high 
opportunity cost attached to not seeking employment. 
Lowest Third 
Middle Third 
Highest Third 
Mean No of 
School Pupils 
Per Household 
2,5 
2,2 
1,5 
Mean No of 
Primary Pupils 
Per Household 
!,8 
1,4 
0,8 
Mean No of 
Secondary Pupils 
Per Household 
0,6 
~:~ J' 
Transfers from public health expenditure also favoured the lowest 
income poor; partly because of their larger household sizes and 
also partly from higher utilization due to ill-health. It is 
generally believed that the poor get sick due to bad nutrition, 
inadequate housing and poor sanitation and this would be a 
contributory factor to their increased share of public health 
expenditure. In fact, not only do the poor get sick, but there 
the J exists often a vicious circle in that the sick also get poor and 
one reinforces the other. 
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Absolute values of housing expenditures tended to favour the highest 
income third above the lowest and middle income groups. This 
resulted from the greater proportion of households in township 
accommodation in the highest third and the subsidy they received 
from charges being set at below the economic rate. With average 
incomes above Rl 800 per annum for households in each of the }~ thirds, most of these households would be amongst those to be affected by the governm~nt's new policy towards the withdrawal of 
state subsidized housing to those earning above RlSO per month. 
Transfers for transport followed the same pattern as housing with 
increasing absolute amounts being received as households become less 
poor, although - as for housing - as a proportion of mean original 
income households in the lower thirds scored best. Higher absolute 
benefits from transport subsidies reflected, in part, the higher 
average number of earners in the less poor thirds. Earners would 
have to commute daily to and from work, thus qualifying for state 
subsidies from clip-card tickets. 
Lowest Third 
Middle Third 
Highest Third 
Mean No of 
Earners per 
Household 
1,7 
2,4 
3,0 
To formalise these results, differences in public expenditures 
received by thirds of annual per capita poverty gap were tested for 
statistical significance using analysis of variance tests which, 
under certain assumptions, test for statisti.cal differences between 
the means of groups or categories.a 
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TABLE 27 
F-RATIOS OBTAINED FROM ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE BETWEEN MEANS FOR 
HOUSEHOLDS GROUPED BY THIRDS OF ANNUAL POVERTY GAP PER CAPITA 
Social Security Payments 
School Education 
Health 
Housing 
Transport 
Total Benefits 
F-RATIO 
10,29 
3,16 
11,41 
4,29 
10,83 
4,38 
,,e,- a 
PROBABILITY OF EXCJDlliG--
F-RATI O IF GROUP MEANS 
WERE EQUAL 
0,0000 
0,0429 
0,0000 
0,0140 
0,0000 
0,0128 
For all items of welfare expenditure the size of the F-ratio 
obtained in these tests was of the order to suggest group 
differences in payments between thirds of annual per capita poverty 
gap, although in the case of education, the level of significance 
was only 95%. For all the others this level was above the 99% 
confidence level. 
However, there was substantial variation in payments within each 
third of poverty gap indicating that there were other explanatory 
va-I'-iables also. influencing the level of benefits to households. 
Three of these will be looked at in turn - sections 5.3, 5.4 and s.s 
examine the effects of race, household size and typo of settlement 
on level of benefits received. 
- 160 -
5.3 ANALYSIS OF BENEFITS FROM STATE EXPENDITURES BY RACE 
In South Africa race is an obvious choice for explanatory variable 
underlying public spending with there having been marked racial 
differences, since Union, in the provision of expenditure on 
groups. As outlined in the historical sketches in the previous 
chapter, policies have not always been uniformly applied but have 
changed over time. 
Table 28 confirms that race was indeed a useful indicator of public 
expenditure benefits with transfers to Coloured households exceeding 
those to African households for all items with the exception of 
public transport. 
Looking first at social security payments, it can be seen that mean 
payments to Coloured households were almost five times those to 
African households and mounted to. 10% of mean income for Coloured 
households and only 2% for African households. This resulted both 
from the higher rate of payments to Coloured beneficiaries and the 
greater incidence of recipients amongst Coloured households. The 
latter is shown below for pensioners. 
Mean No of 
Pensioners per Household 
African 
Coloured 
0,15 
0,34 
On average African households had less than half the number of 
pensioners as Coloured households. If African households were 
broken down by urban area, it was the Cape Town households 
particularly which recorded the lowest incidence of pensioners. 
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This was not surprising - the enforcement in the Western Cape of the 
Coloured Labour Preference Policy has restricted the movement of 
. 
non-workers to Cape Town, thus 'giving Cape Town an atypical age 
distribution pyramid. Published 1980 census results showed that 
while on a national level 3,5% of the African population was 65 
years of age or older, in the Cape Peninsula only 2,1% fell into 
this age group. This was more pronounced in the squatter areas 
than the townships - residents in the latter areas were more likely 
to have had permanent urban residence rights and their household 
structures to conform to normal demographic patterns. 
Mean No of African Pensioners by Urban Area and Settlement Type 
African African 
Durban Cape Town 
Squatter Settlements 0,12 0,07 
Townships 0,26 0,16 
The black education system in South Africa has been in crisis since 
1976 with the expenditure differences by the state being one reason 
for the continuing school unrest. The effects of these 
inequalities between Coloured and African households can be gauged 
from Tabla 28 which shows annual average expenditures of R504 for 
African households compared to R939 per annum for Coloured 
households. The disparity in expenditure was less for household 
expenditures than for per capita expenditures because of the higher 
incidence of school children in .Urican households. This held true 
at both the primary and secondary levels. 
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TABLE 28 
BENEFITS FROM STATE EXPENDITURES FOR SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS GROUPED BY 
RACE, IN RANDS PER ANNUM 
AFRICAN AFRICAN COLOURED 
AND 
COLOURED 
NO OF HOUSEHOLDS 666 487 179 
MEAN PRE-TRANSFER 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME 4 583 4 496 4 821 
(in.Rands per Annum) 
MEAN BENEFITS PER 
HOUSEHOLD 
Social Security Payments 209 101 506 
(4,6) (2,2) (10,5) 
School Education 621 504 939 
(13,6) (11,2) (19,5) 
Health 350 298 492 
(7,6) (6,6) oo ,2 > 
Housing 531 471 693 
(11,6) (10,5) (14,4) 
Transport 111 114 104 
(2,4) (2,5) (2,2) 
TOTAL MEAN BENEFITS 1 822 l 487 2 734 
PER HOUSEHOLD (39,8) ) (33,l) (56,7) 
Notes: ROW 1 Mean benefits per household in rands per annum 
ROW 2 (Figures in brackets) - Mean benefits per 
household expressed as a % of mean pretransf er 
income for each race 
Figures may not add exactly due to rounding 
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Mean No of Primary Mean No of Secondary 
Schoolchildren per Schoolchildren per 
Household Household 
African 1,4 0,85 
Coloured 1,2 0,35 
Differences in these figures may have been still greater were school 
attendance compulsory for African children. For Coloured children 
compulsory school attendance has gradually been introduced as from 
1974. 
Health transfers showed a similar pattern to those for education: 
again resulting from a higher Coloured per capita expenditure. 
Estimated per capita expenditure for Africans was R44 per annum 
while for Coloured persons it worked out at almost double, at RSS 
per annum. 
The allocation routine for housing did not make a racial distinction 
but apportioned according to ownership and type of settlement with 
~ 
subsidies to township households ex~hose for squatters. The 
larger mean transfer to Coloured households from housing resulted 
from the sampling procedure with 71% of Coloured households sampled 
being township residents compared to only 43% for African 
households. On average. Coloured households had a higher monthly 
housing payment than African households - R22,49 for township 
households and R7,35 for squatter households as compared to RlS,12 
and RS,79 respectively for African households. 
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Transport was the only item of welfare expenditure for which the 
payments to Africans ~that to Coloured households. As 
benefits from transport were calculated from reported expenditure on 
transport. this indicated more being spent, o~ average, by African 
households. Transport expenditures would have varied for 
households depending on their number of earners, home location and 
daily distances travelled to and from work. 
The net outcome of these differences in expenditures between races 
resulted in mean total benefits of Rl 391 per annum to African 
households and almost double this, R2 655 per annum to Coloured 
households. Again, differences were tested for significance using 
analysis of variance. 
TABLE 29 
F-RATIOS OBTAINED FROM ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE BETWEEN MEANS FOR 
HOUSEHOLDS GROUPED BY RACE 
F-RATIO PROBABILITY OF....._ EXCEDING } y 
F-RATIO IF GROUP MEANS'"' 
WERE EQUAL 
Social Security 119,10 0,0000 
Payments 
School Education 70,82 0,0000 
Health 64,53 0,0000 
Housing 49,83 0,0000 
Transport /. .. 0,77 0,3797 
Total Benefits 239,91 0,0000 
From the computed F-ratios it seemed that, with the exception of 
transport, race was an important factor in determining the benefits 
from expenditure on welfare items. This was to have been expected 
given both the present and past biases of South African state 
spending. 
With both race and income important as explanatory variables it 
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seemed worth combining these to examine their joint influence on the 
level of transfers received by households. Results for this are 
shown in Table 30. 
Social security payments fell for both races as the poverty gap rose 
- both in absolute and proportional terms. For each third, mean 
social security payments to Africans were less than one fifth those 
to Coloured households. This resulted from both the lower rate 
paid to Africans and the lower incidence of African recipients in 
each category. 
TABLE 30 
BENEFITS FROM STATE EXPENDITURES FOR SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS GROUPED BY 
RACE AND THIRDS OF ANNUAL PER CAPITA POVERTY GAP, IN RANDS PER ANNUM 
AFR I C A N COLOURED 
ALL ANNUAL PER CAPITA ANNUAL PER CAPITA 
HOUSE POVERTY GAP POVERTY GAP 
HOLDS LOWEST MIDDLE HIGHEST LOWEST MIDDLE HIGHEST 
THIRD THIRD THIRD THIRD THIRD THIRD 
NO OF HOUSEHOLDS SSS 1S9 !SS 152 53 55 71 
MEAN PRE-TRANSFER 
±· HOUSEHOLD INCOME 4 583 2 002 4 104 1 697 1 239 4 455 7 779 
· (In Rands per 
' - Annum) 
~MEAN BENEFITS 
PER HOUSEHOLD 
:....:_::_~ocial Security 
Payments 209 149 94 54 849 478 271 
(4,S) (7,4) (2,3) (0,7) (S8,5) (10,7) (3,5) 
School Education S21 567 . 529 401 979 1 091 793 
(13,6) (28,3) (12,9) (5,3) (79,0) (24.5) (10,2) 
Health 350 400 269 216 453 509 508 
(7,6) (20,0) . (6,6) (2,8) (36,6) (11,4) (6,5) 
. Housing 531 427 440 555 723 699 666 
( 11,S) (21,3) (10,7) (7,2) (58,4) (15 ,,7) (8,6) 
Transport 111 94 115 133 49 115 138 
(2,4) (4,7) (2,8) (1, 1) (4,0) (2,6) (1,8) 
TOTAL MEAN BENEFITS 
PER HOUSEHOLD 1 822 1 637 1 447 1 3S5 3 052 2 891 2 376 
(39,8) (81,8) (35,3) (17,7) (246,3) (64,9) (30,5) 
NOTES: ROW l Mean benefits per household in rands per annum 
ROW 2 (Figures in brackets) - Mean benefits per household as 
a % of mean pre-transfer income for each category 
Figures may not add exactly due to rounding 
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The pattern for school education differed slightly between African 
and Coloured households, but both reflected the distribution of 
school pupils across thirds of annual per capita poverty gap. The 
lower level of transfers for Coloured households in the lowest third 
resulted from the high incidence of elderly persons with no children 
in this category. 
Health transfers varied more across poverty gap categories for 
African households than for Coloured households with the latter 
appearing to receive more or less the same quantities of health 
transfers regardless of income while, for the former, utilization 
was inversely related to per capita poverty gap. 
The patterns for African and Coloured housing subsidies were mirror 
images of one another. The pattern for African households 
suggested that there were more squatter households amongst the less 
poor households, while for Coloured households the reverse was true 
with more squatter households among the less poor households. 
Benefits from transport were very similar for African and Coloured 
households in all but the lowest third. Coloured households in 
this category had a high incidence of pensioners and a low incidence 
of earners and this tended to keep transport expenditures low. 
In total, benefits to both African and Coloured households tended to 
be inverseley related to annual per capita poverty gap - in other 
words, higher average payments were made to the poorest poor and 
vice-versa. However, as expected, payments to African households 
were substantially below those to Coloured households at all levels 
of income. 
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5.4 ANALYSIS OF BENEFITS FROM STATE•EXPENDITURES BY HOUSEHOLD SIZE 
This study adopted the household as the unit of allocation for 
expenditure benefits. As such, it seemed worth measuring how 
transfers varied across households of difference sizes. Looking 
first at total benefits Table 31 shows that in absolute terms, total 
benefits increased considerably with household size - although as a 
proportion of original income, benefits were worth more to smaller 
than larger households. 
Smaller households had the largest mean transfers from social 
security payments which resulted from their higher incidence of 
welfare recipients, particularly pensioners. Middle-sized 
households - with four to seven members - recorded the lowest 
incidence of pensioners .• 
No of Persons 
in Household 
4 7 
~8 
Mean No of 
Pensioners 
0,30 
0,15 
0,26 
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TABLE 31 
BENEFITS FROM STATE EXPENDITURES FOR SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS GROUPED BY 
HOUSEHOLD SIZE, IN RANDS PER ANNUM 
ALL NO OF PERSONS IN HOUSEHOLD 
HOUSEHOLDS ~ 3 4-7 ~8 
NO OF HOUSEHOLDS 666 86 394 186 
MEAN PRE-TRANSFER HOUSE-
HOLD INCOME (in Rands 4 583 2 570 4 375 5 956 
per Annum) 
MEAN BENEFITS PER 
HOUSEHOLD 
Social Security Payments 209 332 ·. 172 232 
. (4.,6) (12,9) (3,9) (3,9) 
School Education 621 67 592 939 
(13,6) (2,6) (13 ,5) (15,8) 
Health 350 224 319 475 
(7,6) (8,7) . (7 ,3) (8,0) 
Housing 531 545 523 542 
(ll,6) (21,2) (12,0) (9,1) 
Transport 111 82 104 140 
(2,4) (3,2) (2,4) (2,4) 
TOTAL MEAN BENEFITS l 822 l 250 1 708 2 328 
PER HOUSEHOLD (39,8) (48,6) (39,0) ( 39, l) 
NOTES: ROW 1 Mean benefits per household in rands per annum 
ROW 2 (Figures in brackets) - Mean benefits per 
household as a % of mean pre-transfer income for 
each category of household size 
Figures may not add exactly due to rounding 
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Education transfers rose in both absolute and proportional terms as 
household size increased. Bigger households tended to have more 
schoolchildren at both the primary and secondary level; this was 
particularly pronounced for African households reflecting 
demographic patterns resulting from a young population still 
experiencing very high rates of population increase. 
No of Persons 
in Household 
" 3 4 - 7 
~ 8 
Mean No of Schoolchildren 
Per Household 
African 
o.1s 
2.0 
3.5 
Coloured 
0,21 
1.4 
2.1 
On a national level the African population can be shown to have a 
more youthful age structure than the other groups which has resulted 
from declining mortality not yet having been matched by declining 
fertility. Total fertility rates for African and Coloured women 
were estimated at s.2 and 3.29 respectively for 1980.9 
Health transfers increased with household size, which was to be 
expected. Housing however remained more or less constant across 
household size with households of varying sizes equally represented 
in both squatter and township communities. 
Larger households obtained more in the way of transport transfers 
than did smaller households which resulted from their averaging 
three earners per household compared to only two for middle-sized 
households and one for smaller households. 
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With the exception of housing, all other payments showed significant 
differences by household size confirming the importance of household 
size on the distribution of welfare expenditures. 
TABLE 32 
F-RATIOS OBTAINED FROM ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE BETWEEN MEANS FOR 
HOUSEHOLDS GROUPED BY SIZE 
Social Security Payments 
School Education 
Health 
Housing 
Transport 
Total Benefits 
F-RATIO 
4,64 
61,07 
17,88 
0,24 
9,11 
32,02 
PROBABILITY OF EXCEEDING 
F-RATIO IF GROUP MEANS 
WERE EQUAL 
0,0100 
0,0000 
0,0000 
0,7851 
0,0001 
0,0000 
5.5 ANALYSIS OF BENEFITS FROM STATE EXPENDITURES BY SETTLEMENT TYPE 
The final explanatory variable explored in this chapter was 
settlement type. Households in the sample were almost equally 
divided between squatter and township residents. It seemed 
possible that there would be differences in key demographic 
variables leading to welfare spending being unequal for households 
in these two settlement types. Table 33 suggests that this was 
indeed the case. In absolute terms mean total benefits to squatter 
households were less than half those to township households; while 
in proportional terms squatter household received one quarter of 
their mean original income in benefits compared to almost one half 
for township residents. 
Social security payments were heavily biased in favour of township 
households. If households were further broken down by race and 
urban area, the number of social security recipients in the 
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townships was consistently higher.for each of the three subgroups -
Durban African, Cape Town African and Cape Town Coloured. In the 
case of pensioners, for example, the average number per household in 
the township areas was double that recorded fo~ squatter settlements. 
Mean No of Pensioners Per Household 
African African Coloured 
Durban Cape Town Cape Town 
Squatter 0,12 0,07 0,14 
Township 0,26 0,16 0,42 
This, in part, reflected the lower incidence of older members of 
pensionable age in the squatter areas. But there was also some 
evidence of higher numbers of potential pensioners not claiming 
benefits amongst squatter households. Residing in illegal 
structures may have prevented some squatter pensioners from applying 
for pensions for fear of being noticed by the authorities and thus 
increasing the risk of having their shacks demolished. 
Mean No of Potential Pensioners 
per household not claiming benefits 
Squatter areas 
·Township areas 
African 
Durban 
0,071 
0,068 
African 
Cape Town 
0,024 
0,011 
Coloured 
Cape Town 
0,077 
0,039 
It was, interesting that in Durban this difference was only 
marginal; authorities-in the areas falling under Kwazulu 
I 
administratioon are apparently more tolerant than in other areas of 
squatting as a housing option.10 
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TABLE 33 
BENEFITS FROM STATE EXPENDITURES FOR SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS GROUPED BY 
SETTLEMENT TYPE, IN RANDS PER ANNUM 
BOTH TYPE OF SETTLEMENT 
SETTLEMENT SQUATTER TOWNSHIP 
TYPES 
NO OF HOUSEHOLDS 666 332 334 
MEAN PRE-TRANSFER 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME (in 4 583 4 392 4 774 
Rands per Annum) 
MEAN BENEFITS PER 
HOUSEHOLD 
Social Security Payments 209 68 350 
(4,6) (1,5) (7,3) 
School Education 621 546 698 
(13,6) . (12,~) (14,6) 
Health 350 @ 360 (7,6) (7,5) I 
Housing 531 172 888 
(U,6) (3,9) (18 ,6) 
Transport 111 102 120 
(2,4) (2,3) (2,5) 
TOTAL MEAN BENEFITS' 1 822 l 228 2 413 
PER HOUSEHOLD (39,8) (28,0) (50,5) 
NOTES: ROW 1 Mean benefits per household in rands per annum 
ROW 2 (Figures in brackets) - Mean benefits per 
household as a % of mean pre~transfer income for 
each settlement type. 
Figures may not add exactly due to rounding 
For education and health the higher per capita expenditure recorded 
in Table 33 for township households was misleading. A breakdown 
revealed that it was the Durban township areas with their larger 
household sizes which had swung the relationship this way. For 
~ 
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Cape Town African and Cape Town Coloured households the reverse was 
in fact true with squatter households receiving higher payments than 
their township counterparts for both these two expenditures. 
Underlying these differences in payments was relative household 
sizes. Durban township households were particularly big, whereas 
in the case of both Cape Town African and Cape Town Coloured 
households, average number of household members was significantly 
lower for township households. Number of schoolchildren per 
household reflected these same tendencies as household size. 
Mean No of Schoolchildren per Household 
Afrcian African Coloured 
Durban Cape Town Cape Town 
Squatter areas 1,5 2~7 1,7 
Township areas 2,7 2,3 1,4 
Mean Household Size 
African African Coloured 
Durban Cape Town Cape Town 
Squatter areas 5,8 6,8 6,3 
Township areas 8,2 5,5 5,5 
Benefits from housing for township residents were substantially 
above those for squatter households which was to be expected given 
the allocation procedures. Under the assumptions adopted in the 
routines township households were subsidized on their rent or loan 
repayment - depending on their occupancy status. In addition 
township households benefitted from a higher level of subsidized 
services than did their squatter counterparts. 
In general benefits from transport subsidies worked out to be higher 
for township residents. But, as with education and health, this 
result was not uniform across all groups with the exception being 
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Cape Town Coloured households for whom the reverse held true. 
Mean Benefits per Household From 
Transport Expenditure. in Rands Per Annum 
Squatter areas 
Township areas 
African 
Durban 
119 
153 
African 
Cape Town 
11 
104 
Coloured 
Cape Town 
112 
101 
A tentative reason which could explain the low transport expenditure 
in the African Cape Town squatter area - namely Crossroads - would 
have been the higher involvement in the informal sector, which may 
have tended to suppress the extent of work coltll'!luting amongst 
household earners. 
As_ an explanatory variable influencing the relative magnitude of 
state welfare spending, settlement type threw up both some clear and 
some confounded results. Regarding expenditure on social security 
payments and housing, biases did seem to exist towards township 
households. On the other hand for benefits from expenditure on 
education, health and transport there were conflicting tendencies 
not well explained by type of settlement. 
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CHAPTER 6 ANALYSIS OF THE INCIDENCE OF SELECTED TAX PAYMENTS ON 
SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS 
This chapter examines the distribution of the costs of public 
spending to sample households in the form of taxes. In secton 6.1 
some aspects of South Africa's tax system, both past and present, 
are highlighted; in section 6.2 the tax allocation routines for 
allocating tax burdens to sample households are developed; and in 
section 6.3 these routines are applied to the sample to give the 
incidence of taxes both in absolute terms and grouped by each of 
annual per capita poverty gap, race, household size and settlement 
type. Section 6.4 concludes by setting up mobility matrices for both 
taxes and welfare expenditures. 
6.1 SOME ASPECTS OF SOUTH AFRICA'S TAX SYSTEM 
South Africa's tax ratio - the ratio between the total amount of 
taxes collected and national income ~ had risen to 30% by the 
financial year 1982/83 from a level of 18 % in 19671, the year 
of appointment of the Franzsen Commission of Enquiry into Tax in 
South Africa. Even at 30% this total tax ratio was lower than that 
of many of the highly developed economies. Thomas and Links provided 
the following international comparisons of taxes collected as a 
ratio of Gross National Product for 1976:2 
Sweden Sit 
Netherlands 46% 
West Germany 39% 
United Kingdom 36% 
Italy 33% 
Switzerland 31% 
United States 30% 
Spain 22% 
- 178 -
Taxes imposed by the authorities are of two kinds: 
(i) direct taxes levied directly on the income of individuals and 
companies; and 
(ii) indirect taxes levied on certain commodities and transactions. 
The most important source of the former is the normal income tax 
levied by the Central Government in terms of the Income Tax Act of 
1962. From 1914 to 1969 all taxpayers in similar financial 
circumstances paid similar amounts of tax, regardless of race. 
However, from 1969 and until February 1984 Africans were taxed 
separately in terms of the provisions of the Bantu Taxation Act, 
later renamed the Taxation ~f Blacks Act. Under this Act they were 
disadvantaged to the extent of the Act not taking into account their 
family circumstances and not making available provisions for 
deductions and rebates allowed under the Income Tax Act. From March 
1984 the position reverted to its pre-1969 situation with 
discriminatory rates for Africans being abolished and the taxation 
of all groups again being under a single Act. 
The main sources of indirect taxes are the general sales tax, 
introduced in 1978, and the customs and excise duties levied in 
terms of the Customs and Excise Act of 1964. Other central 
government revenue from indirect tax is raised from transfer and 
stamp duties and taxes on marketable securities while the provinces' 
main sources of indirect taxes are the licensing of motor vehicles 
and taxes on entertainment, auction sales, racing and betting. For 
local authorities the main sources of revenue are made up of 
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property rates and taxes. 
Table 34 gives a breakdown of taxes and other revenues collected by 
the central government departments of Inland Revenue and Customs and 
Excise. As a percentage of total taxes, the central government is 
responsible for the collection of approximately 95% of all taxes 
with the remaining 5% accruing to the provinces and local 
authorities.3 The figures in Table 34 are for 1982/83, the year 
the empirical work for this investigation was undertaken. 
In a paper on 'Shifts in Indirect Taxation: A Special Type of Racial 
Discrimination', Theron has periodised significant changes in the 
effects of indirect taxation on low-income groups.4 In his 
analysis he identified four periods within which more or less 
coherent trends could be identified. 
(a) Before 1969 
In this period leading up to the recommendations of the Franzsen 
Commission, the relative proportion of direct to indirect taxes in 
overall revenue collections increased. By 1968 Graaff estimated the 
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TABLE 34 
MAJOR DIRECT TAXES, INDIRECT TAXES AND OTHER INCOME COLLECTED BY 
DEPTS OF INLAND REVENUE AND CUSTOMS AND EXCISE: 
1982/83 
DIRECT TAXATION 
INCOME TAX 
Individual Income Tax 
Company Income Tax 
Interest on Overdue Tax 
OTHER TAX 
Non-Resident Shareholder Tax, 
Non-Resident Tax on Interest and 
Undistributed Profits Tax 
TOTAL DIRECT TAXATION 
INDIRECT TAXATION 
Customs and Excise 
Sales Tax 
Mark.etable Securities Tax, Stamp 
Duty, Transfer Duty and Diamond 
Export Duty 
TOTAL INDIRECT TAXATION 
OTHER SOURCES 
Donations Tax, Estate Duty, 
Leases. to Mining Companies 
OTHER REVENUE 
Interest and Dividends, Levies, . 
Recoveries of Loans and Advances, 
Departmental Activities and 
Close Corporations 
TOTAL COLLECTIONS 
AMOUNT 
R 000 
4 288 012 
5 140 521 
14 312 
266 038 
9 708 883 
2 346 000 
3 183 453 . 
409 847 
5 939 300 
462 157 
1 340 888 
17 451 228 
Source: South Africa, Department of Finance, Inland Revenue 
Statistical Bulletin No 3, 1985. 
24,6 
29,5 
0,1 
1,5 
55,6 
13,4 
18,2 
2,3 
34,0 
2,6 
7,7 
100,0 
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combined contribution to total revenue of direct taxes on personal 
incomes and company profits to stand at about 60 per cent.5 This 
shift in emphasis to direct taxation was due to the share of 
personal income tax increasing and that of customs duties decreasing 
- this latter a result of government policy encouraging import 
replacement. The importance of personal income tax as one of the 
principal taxes had inevitably led to high average rates to maintain 
yields; and to achieve progression, marginal rates had to exceed 
average rates, so both were high.6 
(b) 1969 - 77 
In view of the relatively high marginal tax rates on personal income 
and in order to broaden the tax base, the report of the Franzsen 
Commission recommended the introduction of a selective sales duty at 
the importer/manufacturer stage. Special care was taken to exclude 
essential items of consumer expenditure so not to burden low inome 
groups. This recommendation was accepted by the government and a 
selective sales duty was introduced in 1969 at an average rate of 
10%. Concessions to cushion its impact included the lowering of the 
rate for income tax on individuals and the reduction of the annual 
general poll tax on African men from R3,SO to R2,50 per person. 
The selective nature of the sales duty in exempting food, clothing 
and all essentials and in taxing other necessities at reasonably low 
rates prevented any real broadening of the tax base as envisaged by 
the Franzsen Commission. Contrary to their expressed intention, the 
share of direct taxes in overall tax revenue continued to grow -
from 61% in 1969 to 71% by 19777 - with a significant share of 
this being collected from personal income tax on individuals. 
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Theron argued that in spite of the introduction of the selective 
sales duty the incidence of this change in tax policy did not fall 
heavily on low income groups; in fact it seemed that an effort was 
made to protect them from too heavy a tax burden. The maximum 
marginal rate of personal income tax remained high throughout the 
period. In spite of a Franzsen Commission recommendation that the 
maximum rate be 60%, by 1977 it had reached 66%, or an effective 72% 
if the effect of the loan levy was taken into account. 
(c) 1978 - 1984 
The failure of the selective sales duty to broaden the tax base led 
in 1978 to the introduction of the general sales tax (GST) at a rate 
of 4% to be levied on a·ll i terns which were not destined for resale 
or processing. Concessions introduced to compensate for this tax on 
consumption included: 
(i) to the .high income groups, the abolition of the surcharge on 
personal income tax which effectively reduced the rnaxirnu.~ 
marginal rate first to 60% and later to 50%; 
(ii) to the low income groups there were some transitional 
concessions which included increases in social pensions and 
food subsidies and the abolition of the general poll tax on 
African men. 
The introduction of a general sales tax had considerable success in 
increasing the proportional share of indirect taxes in total tax 
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revenue. The rate at which GST was levied was increased to 5% in 
March 1982; to 6% in September 1982 and to 7% in February 1984. By 
the 1983/84 financial year the contribution of GST to total tax 
revenue had increased to 19% while the share of personal income tax 
had fallen from just more than 30% at the start of this period to 
around 25% by 1982. 
The shift in taxation over this period was therefore from a 
progressive personal income tax to a regressive sales tax and Theron 
argued that the incidence of this shift fell to a large extent on 
low income groups rather than other groups. · This was the case, he 
argued, in spite of tax concessions made between 1978 and 1984; of 
particular note being the abolition from March 1984 of the Taxation 
of Blacks Act, discussed above. 
(d) July 1984 onwards 
In July 1984 there was the simultaneous announcement of an increase 
in GST to 10% and of the exemption of certain basic foodstuffs from 
GST. Items to be exempted were the following - bread, maize meal, 
unsifted wheat flour, raw meat, raw fish, fresh fruits and 
t 
vegetables, f~esh milk, butter, margarine and raw eggs. 
Theron argued that although these July exemptions ~ad considerable 
impa~t on reducing the proportion of consumption expenditure subject 
to GST for the low income groups, the disposable incomes of these 
groups had still been detrimentally affected by the introduction of 
GST. His calculations showed that the progressive effects of the 
exemptions were almost completely neutralized by the simultaneous 
hike in GST to 10%. For African households in Kangwane, Ciskei and 
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Venda his figures showed that even if the July exemptions were taken 
into account, these groups suffered a real loss of between 4,9% and 
5,8% of their disposable income as a direct result of the evolution 
of GST. Hence his conclusion - 'beyound dispute' - of the 
regressiveness of GST as a source of tax revenue. 8 
In terms of international trends it does seem that sales taxes have 
assumed an important role in the tax portfolios of most countries. 
South Africa's rate of 12% - increased from 10% as from March 1985 
and with exemptions for basic foodstuffs - is fairly average as can 
be gauged from the following examples given for January 1984.9 
(i) United States of Amercia - Sales tax is levied on a state 
rather than a national level; ranges from nil in some 
states to highest rate of 8,25 per cent in New York City. 
(ii) Australia - Three separate tax rates imposed by the Federal 
Government. New household goods subject to a 7,5 per cent 
sales tax; exempt are food and clothing. On consumer items, 
sales tax of 20 per cent levied; while luxury items on 
non-essential items subject to a 32,5 per cent sales tax. 
(iii) Britain - Basic VAT (value added tax) rate is 15 per cent 
imposed on a·wide variety of goods excluding transport, 
children's clothes and essential foods. 
(iv) Sweden - Rate of 23 per cent levied on most consumer goods 
including food. 
{v) Denmark - Rate of 22 per cent. 
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<vi> Italy - Tax ranges from 8 - 24 per cent. 
(vii) France - Ranges from 3,5 - 33 per cent. 
(viii) Portugal - Tax is 17 per cent, but excludes such utilities 
as electricity. 
(ix) Zimbabwe - Sales tax on basic goods 18 per cent; on 
consumer and luxury items 23 per cent. 
6.2 PROCEDURES FOR ALLOCATION OF TAX BURDENS TO SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS 
In the setting up of tax allocation routines the tricky theoretical 
questions regarding burdens and incidence needed to be tackled. 
These were discussed in chapter 3, together with other 
methodological issues relating to budget incidence studies. To 
recap, a distinction had to be made between the immediate money 
burden of each tax and the long run changes made in the economy as a 
result of a given tax structure. By not taking the latter into 
consideration the investigation assumed a static nature; this was 
standard practice for empirical studies of this type. 
Having restricted the analysis to assessing direct money burdens, 
the problem became that of determining the incidence of each of the 
taxes. This is not always a straightforward task with the real 
taxpayer not always being the one who actually pays the tax. Taxes 
may be shared between different groups; or shifted backwards or 
forwards onto others. 
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For our purposes only those taxes whose incidence was relatively 
clear were allocated to households. These were: 
(i) individual income tax;,,/ 
(ii) sales tax and ./' 
(iii) customs and excise duty. /' 
As a contribution to total tax revenue these three taxes combined to 
give a share of central government tax revenue of 53,2% - of which 
24,6% came from individual income tax, 18,2% from sales tax and 
13,4% from customs and excise duty.10 
Although the analysis was therefore only partial, interesting 
patterns emerged in the distribution of tax burdens amongst 
households. These are discussed in.section 6.3. 
For purposes of allocation the standard incidence routines were 
adopted. Individual income taxes were assumed to be fully borne by 
the taxpayer, while sales tax, excise duties and customs duties were 
assumed to be shifted completely forward into higher prices for 
consumers. 
Assuming no tax evasion, income tax was apportioned on wage earnings 
to households according to the two schedules of tax rates in 
operation in 1982 - Coloured households were allocated taxes under 
the Income Tax Act of 1962 while African households were allocated 
taxes under the Taxation of Blacks Act of 1969. The differences 
between the two Acts have been outlined in section 6.1. 
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Sales tax was standing at 6 per cent from the last quarter of 1982. 
Household consumption expenditure on all taxable items was therefore 
summed and a rate of 6 per cent levied on this expenditure to give 
~
an estimate of sales tax paid by households. 
The same allocation routine was dopted for customs and excise 
duties, but with these being levied at different rates depending on 
the item of expenditure, two simplifying assumptions needed to be 
made: 
(i) all expenditure on liquor by households was on local 
semi-sweet white wine; and 
(ii) all expenditure on cigarettes and tobacco was on cigarettes. 
Both of the procedures for allocating tax burdens from sales taxes 
and customs and excise duties relied on the stated consumption 
expenditures of households. 
Prinsloo remarked on the difficulties of collecting accurate data on 
household expenditure.and the lack of precision which could emerge. 
She concluded however: 
"I feel that the expenditure data gathered in a 
study such as this is useful, despite its 
possible difficulties of precision, as long as 
details are not attributed with a pcwor greater 
than they deserve. 11 11 
\ 
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TABLE 35 
COMPARISON OF HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE BY ITEM, IN RANDS PER MONTH: 1982 
ITEM OF EXPENDITURE 
Food 
Liquor 
Cigarettes 
Clothing (including uniforms) 
Housing payments, fuel and light 
Washing and cleaning materials 
Education 
Transport 
Medical and dental services 
Replacement of household equipment 
Taxes 
Recreation 
TOTAL. 
MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE 
(R) 
SAMPLE 
HOUSEHOLDS 
95,44 
8,74 
7,52 
28,90 
37,48 
10,18 
11,45 
15,66 
7,63 
18,79 
2,92 
3,82 
248,53 
MINIMUM 
LIVING LEVEL1 
117 ,22 
32,80 
43,80 
4,95 
2,81 
.13,61 
4,10 
7 ,71 
1,09 
228,09 
1. Average for Durban African, Cape Town African and Cape Town 
Coloured households. 
source: Bureau of Market Research, The Minimum and Supplemented 
Living Levels of Non-Whites Residing in the Main and Other 
Selected Urban Areas of the Republic of South Africa, 
February 1983, Research Report No 99, 1983. 
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For the purposes of analyzing the tax burdens of sale tax and 
customs and excise duties, it was assumed that stated household 
expenditures were sufficiently accurate to be used for the basis of 
this tax incidence study. As a check on their accuracy, average 
expenditure on essential budget items for this sample was compared 
with those calculated by the Bureau of Market Research (BMR) for 
their Minimum Living Levels. These results are shown· in Table 35. 
The comparison of respondents' household expenditure with that 
estimated by the BMR suggested no major differences - particularly 
if it was considered that many of the items for which sample 
household expenditure exceded the BMR amounts were items for which 
additional expenditure was allowed for in calculating the 
supplemented living leve1.12 It should also be noted that the 
average housing expenditure for the sample was considerably 
decreased by the lower monthly payments of squatter households. 
6.3 ANALYSIS OF BURDEN OF TAXES 
6.3.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DISTRIBUTION OF TAXES 
For each of the taxes, Table 36 sets out their distribution between 
households. All households paid a contribution to sales tax - the 
average being R145 per annum or R12 monthly. With the rate of sales 
tax being 6%, this suggested that households monthly expenditure on 
taxable items was approximately R200. 
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TABLE 36 
DISTRIBUTION OF TAXES PAID BY SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS, IN RANDS PER ANNUM 
CLASS SALES TAX EXCISE TAX INCOME TAX TOTAL TAXES 
INTERVALS 
IN RANDS NO % NO % NO % NO % 
PER ANNUM 
0 0 240 36,0 415 62,3 0 
1 - 100 213 32,0 293 44,0 217 32,6 123 18,5 
101 - 200 327 49,1 85 12,8 17 2,6 252 37,8 
201 - 300 95 14,3 36 5,4 4 0,6 136 20,4 
301 - 400 22 3,3 5 0,8 3 0,5 69 10,4 
401 - 500 8 0,9 4 0,6 1 0,2 42 6,3 
>500 3 0,5 3 0,5 9 1,4 44 6,6 
TOTAL 886 100,0 668 100,0 868 100,0 686 100,0 
One-third of the households professed no expenditure on liquor, 
tobacco or cigarettes. Although this could not be reliably checked 
it is commonly felt that respondents tend to under-estimate their 
expenditure on these items in an attempt to appear virtuous. For 
most households their contribution to customs and excise duties 
through the consumption of liquor and cigarettes was less than R100 
per annum - the mean annual payment for the sample being R60. 
Just less than two-thirds of the households were not liable ior any 
income tax with their taxable incomes falling below the threshold. 
Of the remaining third, most were eligible for payments of less than 
R100 per annum with the mean annual payment - at R43 per annum -
being lower than for sales or excise tax. 
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6.3.2 ANALYSIS OF TAX BURDENS BY ANNUAL PER CAPITA POVERTY GAP 
In absolute terms table 37 shows that although the relationships 
were not all monotonic, each of the taxes tended to increase as 
annual per capi~poverty gap increased. This result was to be 
expected. The increased levels of consumption expenditure associated 
with relatively higher incomes would inevitably have led to larger 
absolute contributions to sales and excise taxes while progressive 
income tax schedules are defined so that income tax payments 
increase with increasing income. The slight drop in mean income tax 
payment between the third and fourth deciles could be explained by 
households having been taxed according to the two separate tax 
schedules. The fourth decile had relatively more Coloured households 
who, being taxed under the Income Tax Act, most likely had a taxable 
income below the threshold demanding tax payments. 
In fact, households in this sample paid very little in the way of 
income tax with only the top decile having a significant mean 
contribution of R328 annually. The effect of a sales tax in 
broadening the tax base can clearly be illustrated by comparing tax 
collections from the different taxes. With the exception of the top 
decile, taxes collected from sales tax was far greater for all other 
deciles than collections from either excise or income tax. Looked at 
in another way, households in the. sample had a total annual tax 
contribution of R165 177 of which 58% (or R96 489) cam3 from sales 
tax. As it could be safely assumed - given their relative income 
levels - that tax payments under the pre-1978 selective sales tax 
were minimal, the introduction of a general sales tax in 1978 more 
than doubled the tax burden for this sample of households. 
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TABLE 37 
ANNUAL MEAN TAXES PAID BY SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS GROUPED BY DECILE OF 
POVERTY GAP PER CAPITA 
DECILES OF NO OF ANNUAL ANNUAL. ANNUAL ANNUAL 
ANNUAL PER HOUSEHOLDS MEAN MEAN MEAN MEAN 
CAPITA SALES EXCISE INCOME TOTAL 
POVERTY TAX TAX TAX TAXES 
GAP (R) (R) (R) (R) 
1 66 90 29 0 119 
2 65 112 36 1 149 
3 68 115 49 5 169 
4 67 139 75 4 218 
5 66 145 66 7 219 
6 66 135 44 1 185 
1 67 148 66 12 226 
8 67 164 65 23 252 
9 61 183 73 41 297 
10 67 215 98 328 641 
TABLE 38 
ANNUAL MEAN TAXES AS A PERCENTAGE OF MEAN PRE-TRANSFER INCOME FOR 
SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS GROUPED BY DECILE OF POVERTY GAP PER CAPITA 
DECILES OF ANNUAL SALES EXCISE TAX INCOME TAX TOTAL TAXES 
ANNUAL PER MEAN PRE- TAX AS % AS% OF AS A % OF AS A % OF 
CAPITA TRANSFER. OF MEAN MEAN PRE- MEAN PRE- MEAN PRE-
POVERTY INCOME ORIGINAL TRANSFER TRANSFER TRANSFER 
GAP (R) INCOME INCOME INCOME INCOME 
1 512 17,6 5,7 0,0 23,2 
2 1914 - 5,9 1,9 0,1 7,8 
3 2562 4,9 1,9 0,2 6,6 
4 3294 4,2 2,3 0,1 6,6 
5 4123 3,5 1,6 0,2 5,3 
6 4473 ·3,0 1,0 0,2 4,1 
7 5156 2,9 1,3 0,2 4,4 
8 6335 2.~ 1,0 0,4 4,0 
9 7353 2,5 1,0 0,6 4,0 
10 9994 2,2 1,0 3,3 6,4 
A useful technique for presenting the results of tax incidence 
studies is to express taxes as a percentage of income for each 
decile and then to assess the pattern over the range of deciles. The 
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advantage of this method is that it allows the relative 
progressiveness or regressiveness of the tax to be gauged. A tax is 
described as progressive when the ratio of taxes paid to mean income 
rises; and regressive when this ratio decreases. These concepts are 
linked to the ability-to-pay approach to taxation which had its 
foundations in the writings of both Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill. 
According to this approach taxes should be levied according to what 
individuals could afford to pay. According to Mill: 
" all are thought to have done their part 
fairly when each has contributed according to his 
means, that is, has made an equal sacrifice for 
the common object ...... 13 
The notion of 'equal sacrifice' is controversial and will not be 
dealt with here beyond mentioning it as a commonly used arguement 
for progressive rates of taxation. 
Table 38 illustrates the regressive nature of the sales and excise 
taxes with poorer households paying. e relatively higher proportion 
of their incomes towards these taxes than less poor households. 
Income tax on the other hand is progressive with households in the 
bottom nine deciles all paying insignificant but increasing 
proportions of their incomes in tax and households in the top decile 
having the highest average income tax rate of 3,3%. With sales and 
excise taxes dominating tax contributions for the bottom nine 
deciles of households, the overall impact of taxes considered here 
were, on balance, regressive over these deciles. However, this 
pattern was broken in the tenth decile when the effect of 
progressive income tax rates on average tax rates could be noticed. 
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For symmetry with the method adopted in Chapter 5 for welfare 
spending, Table 39 summarizes Tables 37· by presenting the taxes by 
thirds of annual per capita poverty gap. All trends in both absolute 
and relative terms were identical to those discussed above for the 
analysis by decile. Furthermor F-ratios calculated for each type of 
tax and total taxes showed significant differences between thirds at 
levels of significance exceeding 99%. 
TABLE 39 
TAX PAYMENTS BY SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS GROUPED BY THIRDS OF ANNUAL 
POVERTY GAP PER CAPITA, IN RAND PER ANNUM 
ANNUAL PER CAPITA POVERTY GAP 
ALL LOWEST MIDDLE HIGHEST 
HOUSE- THIRD THIRD THIRD 
HOLDS 
NO OF HOUSEHOLDS 666 222 221 223 
MEAN PRE-TRANSFER. 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME 583 1820 4191 7723 
(in Rands per Annum) 
MEAN TAXES PER HOUSEHOLD 
Sales Tax 145 108 144 183 
(3,2) (5,9) (3,4) (2,4) 
Excise Tax 60 40 60 80 
(1,3) (2.~) (1,4) (1,0) 
Income Tax 43 2 8 118 
(0,9) (0,1) (0,2) (1,5) 
TOTAL MEAN TAXES 
PER HOUSEHOLD 248 150 213 381 
(5,4) (8,2) (5,1) (4,9) 
NOTES: ROW 1 Mean taxes per household in rands per annum 
ROW 2 (Figures in brackets) - Mean taxes per household 
as a % of mean pretransfer income for each third 
Figures may not add exactly due to rounding 
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When exploring the incidence of benefits from welfare spending on 
households three variables other than income were suggested as 
explanatory variables. These were race, household size and type of 
settlement. These variables also have some bearing on taxes paid and 
sections 6.3.3 throgh to 6.3.5 look briefly at these. 
6.3.3 ANALYSIS OF TAX BURDENS BY RACE 
In Section 5.3 significant differences were shown to exist in 
welfare entitlements by race. Thi~ot a surprising result given 
discriminatory legislation and practice in South Africa. On the tax 
side differences by race were also evident. These are shown in Table 
40. Sales and excise tax payments of African households were lower 
in both absolute and relative terms than for Coloured households 
with analyses of variances testing for differences in group means 
being signficant at above the 99% level of confidence for sales tax, 
and at the 98% level of confidence for excise tax. Some of the 
difference in these tax payments could be attributed to a lower mean 
original income for African households which would in turn have led 
to lower consumption expenditure. But the other important claim on 
the budget of African households - which would have lowered their 
disposble income avaiable for consumption - was remittance payments 
to extra household individuals.Whereas only 5% of Coloured 
households reported contributing money to other individuals or 
households on a regular basis, 38% of African households were 
remittance senders. Of these 64% reported spending in excess of R300 
annually. 14 Of course, some of this money could in turn have 
been paid in sales taxes by remittance recipients - although a 
significant amount was reported by respondents as having been 
specifically earmarked for the schooling of children in rura1 areas. 
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Returning to Table 40 and the income tax row, the effect of the 
Black Taxation Act in extracting higher tax payments from African 
earners can clearly be seen. This resulted both from the lower 
threshold at which African incomes were taxable and from there being 
no rebates or deductions for African taxpayers. Tax schedules are 
fairly complicated with tax payments very specific to marital 
status, number of depe'ndants and source of income. In this respect 
it should be noted that there were exceptions to the above 
generalisation that all African taxpayers were discriminated against 
under the Black Taxation Act. It was estimated by the government 
that approximately 20% of African taxpayers actually paid less under 
the Black Taxation Act than they would under the Income Taxation 
Act. l5 
TABLE 40 
TAX PAYMENTS BY SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS GROUPED BY RACE, IN RANDS PER ANNUM 
NO OF HOUSEHOLDS 
PRE-TRANSFER HOUSEHOLD 
MEAN INCOME 
(in Rands per Annum) 
MEAN TAXES PER HOUSEHOLD 
Sales Tax 
Excise Tax 
Income Tax 
TOTAL MEAN TAXES PER 
HOUSEHOLD 
AFRICAN AND 
COLOURED 
666 
4583 
145 
(3,2) 
60 
(1,3) 
43 
(0,9) 
248 
(5,4) 
AFRICAN 
487 
4496 
132 
(2,9) 
55-
(1,2) 
55 
(1,2) 
243 
(5,4) 
COLOURED 
179 
4821 
180 
(3,7) 
73. 
(1,5) 
9 
(0,2) 
262 
(5,4) 
NOTES: ROW 1 
ROW 2 
Mean taxes per household in rands per annum 
(Figures in brackets) - Mean taxes per household 
as a % of mean pretransfer income for each race 
Figures may not add exactly due to rounding. 
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TABLE 41 
TAX PAYMENTS BY SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS GROUPED BY RACE AND ANNUAL PER 
CAPITA POVERTY GAP, IN RANDS PER ANNUM 
ALL AFRICAN COLOURED 
HOUSE- ANNUAL PER CAPITA ANNUAL PER CAPITA 
HOLDS POVERTY GAP POVERTY GAP 
LOWEST MIDDLE HIGHEST LOWEST MIDDLE HIGHEST 
THIRD THIRD THIRD THIRD THIRD THIRD 
NO OF HOUSEHOLDS 666 169 166 152 53 55 
MEAN PRE-TRANSFER 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME 4583 2002 4104 7697 1239 4455 
(in Rands per Annum) 
MEAN TAXES PER 
HOUSEHOLD 
Sales Tax 145 104 131 165 122 186 
(3,2) (5,2) (3,2) (2,1) (9,8) (4,2) 
Excise Tax 60 39 59 70 42 64 
(1,3) (1,9) (1,4) (0,9) (3,4) (1,4) 
Income Tax 43 3 10 164 0 3 
(0,9) (0,1) (0,2) (2,1) (-) (0,1) 
TOTAL MEAN TAXES 248 145 200 398 164 252 
PER HOUSEHOLD (5,4) (7,2) (4,9) (5,2) (13,2) (5,7) 
NOTES: ROW 1 Mean taxes per household in rands per annum 
ROW 2 (Figures in brackets) - Mean taxes per household 
as a % of mean pretransf er income for each 
category. 
Figures may not add exactly due to rounding 
71 
7779 
218 
(2,8) 
102 
(1,3) 
22 
(0,3) 
342 
(4,4) 
The differences between races in contributions from sales and excise 
taxes on the one hand, and income taxes on the other, cancelled out 
and mean overall tax payments were very similar for African and 
Coloured households. Table 41 combines race and income to show 
their joint influence on tax liability. These presented no 
surprises. For both races absolute tax payments increased with per 
capita poverty gap for each tax while in relative terms sales and 
excise taxes were regressive and income tax progressive. Overall tax 
burdens were heavier for Coloured rather than African households in 
the lowest and middle thirds, whereas for the highest third the 
effect of the Black Taxation Act was apparent in its effect on 
imposing a heavier burden on African households. 
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6.3.4 ANALYSIS OF TAX BURDENS BY HOUSEHOLD S!ZE 
The effects of household size on sales tax was in the expected 
direction with taxes paid increasing with household size. 
Households of size three or less spent on average R153 per month on 
taxable items compared to the monthly expenditure of R197 and R231 
for middle-sized and big households respectively. 
TABLE 42 
TAX PAYMENTS BY SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS GROUPED BY HOUSEHOLD SIZE, IN 
RANDS PER ANNUM 
NO OF HOUSEHOLDS 
MEAN PRE-TRANSFER 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
ALL 
H/HOLDS 
566 
4583 
NO OF PERSONS IN HOUSEHOLD 
~ 3 4-7 ~ 8 
,86 394 186 
2570 4375 5956 
(in Rands per Annum) 
MEAN TAXES PER HOUSEHOLD 
Sales Tax 
Excise Tax 
Income Tax 
TOTAL MEAN TAXES 
PER HOUSEHOLD 
NOTES: ROW 1 
ROW 2 
145 110 142 167 
(3,2) (4,3) (3,2) (2,8) 
60 56 56 70 
(1,3) (2,2) (1,3) (1,2) 
43 42 50 28 
(0,9) (1,6) (1,1) (0,5) 
248 207 249 265 
(5,4) (8,1) (5,7) (4,4) 
Mean taxes per household in rands per annum 
(Figures in brackets) - Mean taxes per household 
as a % of mean pretransfer income for each 
category 
Figures may not add exactly due to rounding 
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Excise taxes paid were identical for the first two categories of 
household size suggesting no increase in consumption of liquor and 
cigarettes in spite of the increase in the number of household 
members. One causative factor could have been the greater proportion 
of Coloured households in the category of households of size three 
or less - Coloured household expenditure on these times being 
reported as higher than that for African households. The 
distribution of income tax between households of different sizes was 
interesting. In spite of their higher overall household income, 
households with more than eight members carried the least income tax 
burden. These households - mainly African and therefore taxed under 
the Black Taxation Act - averaged three earners and it was their 
lower earnings per worker which reduced their tax liability to below 
that for other household sizes. Most of the higher wage earners in 
the sample belonged to middle-sized households which in turn 
resulted in more income tax than either smaller or larger households. 
Total taxes increased with household size but in proportion to 
pre-transfer income were regressive. These differences in tax burden 
between households of different sizes were tested using analysis of 
variance but were found to be statistically insignificant. 
6. 3. 5 ANALYS.IS OF TAX BURDENS BY SETTLEMENT TYPE 
The procedure adopted for assigning tax burdens to sample households 
did not use type of settlement as a basis for any of the 
allocations; neither did tax legislation discriminate against one or 
other of squatter and township households. With both average 
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household size and number of earners per household similar for both 
settlement types, differences in relative tax burdens were 
influenced by sampling procedure which led to 57% of African 
households being squatter residents compared to 29% of Coloured 
households. This resulted in the squatter vs township pattern of tax 
distribution tending towards that for the African vs Coloured 
distribution. This is presented in table 43. Squatter households 
paid less sales tax, less excise tax and more income tax than their 
township counterparts. The cancelling out effect led to total tax 
liability being almost identical for both squatter and township 
households. 
TABLE 43 
TAX PAYMENTS BY SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS GROUPED BY SETTLEMENT TYPE, IN 
RANDS PER ANNUM 
NO OF HOUSEHOLDS 
MEAN PRE-TRANSFER 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
(in Rands per Annum) 
MEAN TAXES PER HOUSEHOLD 
Sales Tax 
Excise Tax 
Income Tax 
TOTAL MEAN TAXES PER 
HOUSEHOLD 
BOTH 
SETTLEMENT 
TYPES 
666 
4583 
145 
(3,2) 
60 
(1,3) 
43 
(0,9) 
248 
(5,4) 
SETTLEMENT TYPE 
SQUATTER TOWNSHIP 
332 334 
4392 4774 
128 162 
(2,9) (3,4) 
55 65 
(1,3) (1,4) 
65 21 
(1,5) (0,4) 
249 247 
(5,7) (5,2) 
NOTES: ROW 1 
ROW 2 
Mean taxes per household in rands per annum 
(Figures in brackets) - Mean taxes per household 
as a % of mean pretransfer income for each 
category 
Figures may not add exactly due to rounding 
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6.4 MOBILITY MATRICES 
Often ignored in studies of redistribution is the fact that both 
taxing and state spending policies can alter the ranking of 
households within the original market determined income 
distribution.16 This changing of position of households, 
relative to other households, introduces the concept of mobility to 
the tax-transfer reshuffle with some households gaining at the 
expense of others. Without developing the idea fully, this section 
looks briefly at this mobility amongst sample households. 
For each household there were three states which could be 
identified. First there was the pre-tax state which was the 
first-round distribution of income dictated by market conditions. 
This was modified by the imposition of progressive individual income 
taxes and regressive sales and excise taxes to give the post-tax 
state for each household. Finally, benefits in the form of social 
security payments, education, health, housing and transport were 
supplied to households to give a post-tax plus post-benefit state. 
Table 44 presents a mobility matrix for households as they moved 
from their pre-tax to their post-tax states. A two-way table was 
constructed dividing households into deciles according to their 
• 
pre-tax annual per capita poverty gap for the columns and according 
to their post-tax annual per capita.poverty gap for the rows. Any 
movement of households between deciles illustrates a degree of 
mobility resulting from taxing policy. 
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TABLE 44 
PRE-TAX VS POST-TAX MOBILITY TABLE 
POST-TAX DECILE GROUP PRE-TAX DECILE GROUP OF ANNUAL PER 
OF ANNUAL PER CAPITA CAPITA POVERTY GAP 
POVERTY GAP 
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 8 
1 65 1 
2 1 60 5 
3 4 59 5 
4 4 57 6 
5 5 56 4 
6 4 51 6 
' 
6 55 . 5 
8 6 60 
9 2 
10 
An inspection of the table shows that the diagonal elements are 
dominant. This suggests limited re-ranking of households induced 
through taxing with intra-decile movement limited to the relatively 
~ few elements bordering the diagonal. The can· be contrasted to the 
~
results shown in Table 45 which compares pre-tax deciles of poverty 
gap with post-tax plus post-benefit deciles. Here the dominance of 
the diagonal element is clearly no longer the case with there being 
evidence of substantial intra-decile shifting resulting from the 
tax-benefit reshuffle. 
The factors behind this intra-decile shifting would be twofold. 
Despite the original pre-tax state of households having been 
standardized into deciles according to per capita poverty gap, 
within each decile there would have been households with differing 
needs. For example, large-sized households would demand more 
resources in the form of public goods than smaller ones. This 
would drop them below the diagonal to join others who had also 
9 10 
1 
61 3 
4 64 
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gained relatively over households in their original decile. This 
component of intra-decile shifting - based on the needs of 
households - could be justified on equity grounds. 
However, the other cause of mobility between deciles would be the 
favouring of one group of households at the expense of others. 
This form of discrimination would be a violation of the horizontal 
equity principle which dictates that households in similar 
circumstances get equally treated in fiscal policy. Gaps in 
equivalent spending levels between African and Coloured households 
would fall into this category. On average Coloured households would 
have improved their original ranking in the pre-tax 
distribution,relative to African households with identical needs. 
Separating out these two components of re-ranking - that is, those 
based on need and those based on discrimination - would have 
provided an additional method of assessing the patterns of fiscal 
redistribution. 
) 
PRE-TAX VS POST-TAX-PLUS-BENEFITS MOBILITY TABLE 
POST-TAX AND POST- PRE-TAX DECILE GROUP OF ANNUAL 
BENEFIT DECILE PER CAPITA POVERTY GAP 
GROUP OF ANNUAL 
PER CAPITA 
POVERTY GAP 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 8 9 10 
1 36 26 3 1 
2 1 20 29 10 
3 3 8 20 29 8 
..; 8 6 9 9 25 8 1 
5 2 1 2 10 !9 25 1 
6 3 3 2 4 9 19 24 3 
1 5 1 2 2 8 17 31 
8 1 1 1 2 3 5 15 27 12 
9 1 1 1 ·3 5 44 12 
10 1 1 10 55 
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION 
7.1 SUMMARY OF OBJECTIVES, DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH SUGGESTIONS 
( 
This study set out to investigate some aspects of South Afrkan 
state welfare policy as it has evolved to its present stage of 
collectivised provision of a range of goods and services. The 
development of a global welfare budget was not attempted; rather, 
attention was only directed to specific welfare expenditures and 
sources of tax revenues. Allocation routines were established 
whereby benefits from state spending and burdens from tax payments 
were assigned to households in the sample. All households were 
urban-based and being drawn from either squatter or sub economic 
communities identified as 'poor'. This was confirmed by survey data 
which suggested that: 
(i) one-third or respondents had household income below the 
minimum living level (MLL); 
(ii) one-half had household income below the supplemented living 
level (SLL). 
Most of the difficulties encountered in this exercise centered 
around the setting up of procedures for allocating benefits to 
households from state spending. Social security payments and 
education did not present any problems in that recipients could be 
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more easily identified and benefits quantified. But for each of 
health, ~ousing and transport recourse had to be made to a series of 
simplifying assumptions to enable allocation procedures to be 
established. Some of these were standard assumptions commonly used 
in the construction of all welfare budgets. Others resulted from 
insufficient data collected from respondent households on relevant 
welfare issues. 
Regarding this latter, it must be remembered that the original 
questionnaire was not designed with a welfare budget in mind. 
Prensloo's principle interest was with 'the perceptions and 
attitudes of people living in poverty concerning their problems, 
pleasures, goals, activities and abilities to generate income, 
involvement with their neighbours and community, opinions about 
causes of poverty and responsibilty for remedies, and ideas about 
who they consider to be poor'.1 It just happened that as a 
by-product of the detail extracted from the questionnaire, there was 
sufficient information to allow this study of budget incidence. Any 
future work involving the construction of a welfare budget from 
household records should take particular care to include specific 
questions on each household's utilization of, and access to, state -
provided and subsidized services. 
Unfortunately this gap in data requirements could not always be 
filled by turning to comparable studies and accepting their 
utilization rates and imputed benefits. There has hitherto been a 
lack of South African microstudies concentrating on the benefits 
accruing to communities from particular forms of state spending. 
If there had been results available from previous studies on the 
- 208 -
distributional impact of individual public expenditures, these would 
have allowed for the refinement and sophistication of procedures 
adopted in our allocation routines. 
For Britain, Le Grande has recorded the findings of the numerous 
microstudies and research in the fields of education, health, 
housing and transport.2 Benefits from state.spending on 
specific items have been analyzed across a number of variables 
including race, class, age group, and geographical area. In many 
instances the results have tended to undermine established beliefs 
about the use of services by differnt groups. This has led to the 
questionning of the ability of the welfare state to achieve 
redistribution through the provision of social services. In the 
final paragraph of his book Le Grande concluded: 
"The strategy of equality through public 
provision has failed. It failed primarily because 
it implicitly accepted the ideology of 
inequality. Any alternative strategy has to have 
as an essential part an attack on that ideology; 
otherwise it too will fail" • 3 
Considerable potential exists for similar studies of the welfare 
services to be undertaken in South Africa. Race, class and gender 
differentials, urban-rural differences and age specific utilization 
rates are all amongst the alternatives open for future research. 
These microstudies into welfare expenditures would highlight 
differentials in both entitlements and utilization rates between 
groups and areas and provide a springboard for more 
macro-investigations into overall budget incidence. 
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7.2 SOME IMPORTANT FINDINGS AND MAJOR ISSUES 
Although data problems made it necessary to rely on some brave 
assumptions, it is hoped that these would have had their effect on 
the actual quantification of benefits as opposed to on the broad 
trends to have emerged. All welfare budgets lean heavily on 
assumptions and need to be interpreted with care. McGrath 
conunented on this and described these attempts at measuring budget 
redistribution as intricate pieces of "forensic economics".4 
General trends to have emerged in the benefits and burdens of state 
activity were presented and discussed in previous chapters. 
Different entitlements to state spending or burdens from taxes were 
usually explained either by household-specific characteristics or by 
the special circumstances in which households found themselves. 
Household size was an example of the former. More household members 
tended to increase benefits from health for large-sized households; 
more schoolchildren directly affected their benefits from education; 
and more earners per household increased their share of subsidy from 
transport. In terms of total benefits, table 31 shows that 
large-sized households cost the state almost double in spending on 
welfare than did small households. 
An example of how welfare benefits can be related to household 
circumstances can be obtained from the analysis by settlement type. 
The additional cost to the state of conventional housing over 
squatter housing averaged out at approximately fourfold. Housing was 
assumed to also include some ~ costs, essential services 
and conununity facilities. But table 33 also shows that type of 
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settlement had an effect on other benefits. Payments from social 
security were heavily biased in favour of township households and 
the effect of large household sizes in the Durban African township 
was reflected in a higher average education expenditure on township 
households. 
It would be repetitive to summarize all the patterns to have emerged 
when expenditure and taxes were analyzed by income, by race, by 
household size and by settlement type; chapters 5 and 6 contain 
these details. Arising out of the empirical analysis in these 
chapters, four issues have been singled out as important for further 
discussion. These are: lack of social security provision; 
differences in entitlements between African and Coloured households; 
privatization of welfare services and the question of affordability; 
and the burden of general sales tax on low income groups. 
7.2.1 LACK OF SOCIAL SECURITY PROVISION 
Almost one quarter of households had household income below the 
(MLL) yet were not recipients of any form of social security. A 
further one-tenth recieved social security payments but were still 
left with incomes below the MLL. 
Two points about this must be emphasized. First that it was 
household income that fell below the MLL, not the breadwinner's 
income or the income of a single earner only. And secondly, the MLL 
is a very harsh measuring rod against which to compare household 
income. 
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Formally the MLL is defined ·as 'the minimum financial requirements 
of members of a household if they are to maintain their health and 
have acceptable standards of hygiene and sufficient clothing for 
their needs'.s It is a theoretical minimum in that rational 
expenditure is assumed throughout. Given this, Budlender 
that the ~s in fact not reache~e 
suggested 
wage is at 
least equal to the SLL which works out at approximately 1,2 times 
higher than the MLL.s Households with overall incomes below 
the MLL are therefore indisputably poor. 
Under the existing system of social security in South Africa, no 
provision is made for these households to safeguard them against 
their destitution or to raise their incomes to an estimated poverty 
line. It is felt that these households shotitd at least qualify for 
some 'safety-net' provision of social security particularly those in 
long-term need such as the long-term unemployed, the disabled, those 
suffering long illnesses, single-parent families, widows and 
deserted wives not readily able to work. This recommendation is 
conservative; even the new Right accept this typb of minimum 
payment as falling within the proper limits of state action.7 
7.2.2 DIFFERENCES IN ENTITLEMENTS FOR AFRICAN AND COLOURED 
HOUSEHOLDS 
Of course it did not need the construction of a welfare budget to 
illustrate the discrimination governing entitlements between race 
groups in South Africa. There is more than enough evidence of this 
documented elsewhere. However, Table 28 giving the breakdown of 
benefits from state spending by race does succeed in emphasizing the 
cumulative effect of this discrimination when spending on the 
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specific welfare payments of social security, education, health, 
housing and transport are combined. This bias of spending 
favouring one group over another would have been even more 
pronounced had White households been included in the survey. 
Accepting that justice or equity requires non-discriminatory welfare 
entitlements, the formidable problem becomes that of narrowing this 
racial gap in spending. Simkins et al have examined this question 
in a budget exercise assessing the feasibility of redressing 
discriminatory expenditures between groups over the period from 
1983/84 to 1990/91.8 They assumed three scenarios for 
government revenue and expenditure - pessimistic, median and 
optimistic. Under each scenario education, ·health, social security 
payments and housing were assigned as priority expenditures. With 
the exception of health which was not dealt with racially, all real 
increases in welfare spending were assumed to accrue to Africans 
with expenditures on other groups remaining pegged at their 1983/84 
level. On their median and optimistic scenarios - based 
respectively on compound annual growth rates in the economy of 3,6% 
and 4,8% - noticeable advances in relative African expenditures 
could be realized. Under their pessimistic scenario, which assumed 
a compound annual growth rate of 2,4%, only a small movement in the 
direction of greater equality would be attained. 
It is of interest to apply their scenarios for social security 
payments and education to respondent households in this 
survey.9 Table 45 sets out the results that priorities towards 
greater equality would realize for households in the sample by the 
year 1990/91. It has been assumed that household characteristics 
remained constant and that the full increase in social security 
expenditure was used to increase monthly rates of payments.10 
- 213 -
TABLE 46 
FORECAST OF POTENTIAL BENEFITS FROM STATE EXPENDITURE ON SOCIAL 
SECURITY AND EDUCATION FOR SAMPLE HOUSEHOLD GROUPED BY RACE, IN 
RANDS PER ANNUM: 1990/91. 
MEAN POTENTIAL 
BENEFITS 
PER HOUSEHOLD 
Social Security 
Payments 
Education 
SCENARIOS 
Pessimistic 
Median 
Optimistic 
Pessimistic 
Median 
Optimistic 
AFRICAN COLOURED! 
152 628 
204 628 
290 628 
785 1 052 
896 1 052 
1 163 1 052 
1. Expenditure on Coloured households has been increa~ed to the 
1983/84 levels, the base year used by Simkins.et al. Social 
security payments increased by 24,1%, between 1982/83 and 
1983/84 while per capita education expenditure was assumed to 
have increased by 12%. 
Given these assumptions average benefits from social security for 
African households woui'd remain below those for Coloured households 
under all scenarios. With annual rates of payment and number of 
recipients both low for African households in base year 1983/84, 
overall social security expenditure would need to increase by more 
than the annual rate of 2,4%, 4,5% and 7,2% allowed respectively in 
' each scenario for households to receive more equal benefits from 
these payments. 
However with education afforded a higher priority ranking than 
social security, the potential advance in education spending on 
African households is evident. Also, African households averaged 
2,25 schoolchildren per household compared to the 1,55 for Coloured 
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households and this significantly increased their household 
allocation from education spending. 
These advances towards more equal welfare entitlements could only be 
achieved by a purposeful assault on current inequities. This 
assault will obviously be constrained by both structural and 
political factors. Simkins et al single out the latter in their 
conclusion. 
7.2.3 
"We are well aware that the goals of justice and 
development are not always served by the working 
of political forces. If changes of the sort 
discussed here or better ones are to be realised, 
the dedication of many people with technical 
expertise and political commitment will be 
required."11 
PRIVATIZATION OF WELFARE SERVICES AND THE QUESTION OF 
AFFORDABILITY 
For each of education, health, housing and transport privatization 
has been proposed by the state in order to supplement public 
provision. The De Lange commission into education recommended that 
if pupils continued through to formal secondary education, finance 
was to be drawn from 'the individual and the community, to 
supplement the state's contribution'.12 The guide to the 
Health Act proposed a shift in responsibility of health care to the 
individual and to private practitioners.13 Various state 
appointed housing commissions have motivated a reorientation in 
housing policy with the burden of housing to be shifted from the 
state to the private sector and the low income group itself.14 
And the Welgemoed Commission into bus transportation was 'of the 
opinion that it is necessary to phase out subsidies in the long 
term'.15 
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The question of private provision of welfare services is a sensitive 
one and the debate being waged over public vs private provision will 
not be entered into here except regarding its effects on households 
who are poor. The estimates provided in Table 26 suggest that 
overall benefits to households from welfare spending amounted to 
approximately 40% of original income. For the poorest third of 
households - all of whom had incomes below the MLL - benefits from 
the state slightly ~d original income with total benefits ) 
estimated at 109% of income. These households would have had no 
room in their budgets to make up any reduction in state spending on 
welfare. Living at this level already precludes any surplus income 
over and above the minimum for existing. If privatization was to 
be introduced into the delivery of welfare services. this cost would 
serve to prohibit the access of poor households. unless either: 
(i) wage levels were to increase; or 
(ii) households were provided with a form of negative income tax 
or similar security payment. 
7.2.4. BURDEN OF GENERAL SALES TAX ON LOW INCOME GROUPS 
The introduction of the general sales tax ·(GST) in 1978 was an 
attempt to broaden the tax base and reduce the reliance on direct 
taxes. By the 1983/84 financial year tho contribution of GST to 
total tax revenue had increased to 19%. For the average household 
in this sample the introduction of GST almost doubled their 
immediate tax burden - from Rl03 per annum before the 1978 
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announcement to Rl89 per annum afterwards. Having low incomes had 
led to many households having.minimal tax obligations pre - 1978. 
The effect of GST in lowering the threshold and widening the tax 
base so as to include t~ese households as taxpayers is clearly 
evident. 
Table 47 traces average contributions to GST through the changes in 
the rates from its introduction - assuming that household 
expenditure remained constant over the period. For the average 
household in the sample, annual sales tax contributions increased. 
from RBS in 1978 to R213 in March 1985 - or from 2,1% to 4,6% of 
annual income. This can be compared to the relative burdens of 
income tax and customs and excise duties which averaged out at 0,9% 
and 1,3% of original incomes. 
TABLE 47 
ANNUAL CONTRIBUTION TO GENERAL SALES TAX BY THE AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD IN 
THE SAMPLE: 1978-1985 
DATES 
1978-March 1982 
March-Sept 1982 
Sept 1982-Feb 1984 
Feb 1984-July 1984 
July 1984-Mar 1985 
March 1985-
RATE OF 
SALES TAX 
4% 
5% 
6% 
7% 
10%1 
12%1 
ANNUAL 
ANNUAL CONTRIBUTION TO 
CONTRIBUTION TO GST AS A % 
GST IN RANDS OF INCOME 
86 1,9% 
108 2,4% 
129 2,8% 
151 3,3% 
177 3,9% 
213 4,6% 
1 From July 1984 basic foodstuffs exempted from GST. It was 
assumed the.t two-thirds of households expenditure on food was on 
these basic foodstuffs, i.e. on bread, maize meal, unsifted 
wheat flour, raw meat, raw fish, fresh fruits and vegetables, 
fresh milk, butter, margarine and raw eggs. 
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These results confirm Theron's findings that disposable incomes of 
low income groups had been detrimentaily affected by the 
introduction of GST - despite the exemption of basic 
foodstuffs.16 Budlender argued that the exempted goods are not 
often those bought by the very poor who, without adequate 
refrigeration, are forced to buy tinned and other food which is not 
exempt. Other essential goods which she cited as not included in 
the exemptions are rice, tea and sugar.17 There seems a case 
for arguing that to ease the burden of GST on low income groups 
basic foodstuffs should be more widely defined to include a greater 
range of items. For example, Budlender quoted Kupugani - an 
organisation which attempts to provide cheap food to the poor - as 
having found that only 3 out of the 84 lines which they stock 
qualified for exemption.18 
7.3 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The overall impact of the state on the redistribution of income is 
impossible to quantify, especially when all aspects and 
ramifications of government activity are taken into consideration. 
The empirical work in this study has dealt with only a fraction of 
the redistribution to occur within the functioning of the welfare 
state. Tullock pointed out that this redistribution is a 
relatively minor part of the redistribution to occur in the modern 
state. His voting theory, outlined in Chapter l, concentrates on 
explaining what he terms as the 'massive redistribution of income' -
both visible and invisible - that occurs through the political 
process. These transfers of funds are not those from the wealthy 
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to the poor, but mainly among people who lie between the twentieth 
and the ninetieth percentile of income - 'the group with the largest 
taxable capacity, and also the area where political power is 
concentrated in a democracy'.19 
However, it was to Tullocks 'relatively minor transfers' that 
attention was turned in this study. State protected minimum 
standards for social security, education, health, housing and public 
transport have all become legitimate entitlements within the welfare 
state. Together with food and clothing they constitute the 
physical basic needs which are usually defined a5 forming the core 
of the developmment process.20 In South Africa, legislation 
both past and present has strongly influenced the entitlements of 
different groups. Chapter four has outlined some of these 
discriminatory practices as they have developed historically. 
for all groups there does exist a modicum of a welfare state. 
Yet 
Why? 
As so often the case, many interpretations fit the observed 
phenomena with both traditional Liberal and Marxist theories able to 
, explain the development of welfarism in South Africa. 
Liberals would argue that redistrubitron occurs because individuals 
have a preference for a greater degree of equality than the market 
generates. The underlying rationale of the preference for economic 
equality has been explained in many ways of which the classical 
argument is based on interpersonal comparisons of utility. 
Alternative forms of interdependent utility functions were discussed 
in Chapter 1. In summary, either the assumption that individuals 
care for one another, or the assumption that they feel it in their 
own interest to care for one another, leads to externalities which 
result in redistribution. The existence of the welfare state is 
- 219 -
provided as evidence of a particular type of caring whereby only 
specific forms of consumption result in these externalities. 
Country-specific characteristics can be incorporated into this 
Liberal interpretation of redistribution. For example 'unlike 
externalities' could be used to explain the differential in 
entitlements between groups in s.outh Africa. If person A obtains 
a higher utility from person B's consumption or income level, rather 
than person C's, this would result in the discriminating practice of 
person B being favoured over person C in the tax-transfer reshuffle. 
This viewpoint. based as it is on the acceptance of a social 
preference for equality, can be contrasted to the Marxist framework 
which sees the welfare state as part of a post-war settlement 
between the needs of capital and the demands of labour. Marxists 
argue that a class conscious political directorate has emerged in 
order to: 
(i) override the short-term sectional interests of particular 
fractions of capital; and 
(ii) to deal with a more powerful and articulate working-class 
movement.21 
Within the context of South Africa Marxists have explained the 
welfare state in these terms. In the case of transport. for 
example, McCarthy and Swilling suggest that through apartheid,. 
proletarianisation in South Africa has been based on the separation 
of the community and the work place. This separation has 
substantially increased the cost of reproducing the work force and, 
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with wages low, there was a need for the development of a cheap 
transport system. Workers too, joined forces through bus boycotts 
and mass action to express their dissatisfaction with high transport 
fares. It was as a joint response to the needs of capital and the 
demands of workers that 'the South African state, a few transport 
monopolies, and employers formed an alliance to establish a 
capitalist transport system that met this requirement•.22 
Through this alliance the transportation of bona fide workers became 
subsidized. 
A third interpretation of the welfare state which can be argued 
infers social rights of state provision from civil and political 
rights. Okun, an adherent of this approach, commented: 
"It would be hard, indeed1 to imagine any set of 
consistent social preferences that would give 
weight to each citizen's freedom of speech (or 
suffrage, or any other right) and none to his 
ability to exercise that right in the face of 
malnutrition or inadequate health care. 
Starvation would, to put it mildly, compromise 
'mutual respect• 11 .23 
This is more a pragmatic approach than a theoretical one, and for 
this reason was excluded from the theoretical discussion of Chapter 
l. Furthermore in South Africa where civil rights are curtailed 
and full political rights not granted to the majority of the 
population, this approach of explaining the welfare state as the 
extension of citizenship to encompass civil, political as well as 
social rights must lack relevance. 
More feasible in the South African context if inferences are to be 
drawn from the domain of rights, would be the arguement that the 
satisfaction of basic needs through the provision of state welfare 
is the right of each individual simply because of his 
- 221 -
existence. 24 While not in itself a theory explaining the 
development of welfare capitalism,~his basic needs approach does 
provide both a normative stance on rights and a motive to explain 
state redistribution through the welfare state. 
Whichever theory is chosen to explain state welfare provision in 
South Africa, it is likely that issues relating to redistribution 
will become increasingly salient in this country. Education, 
housing and public transport are already all highly politicized as 
evidenced in student protests, refusals to pay rent and bus 
boycotts. Pressures will be placed on the state to direct more 
resources to welfare provision. Some changes may be attempted to 
alter the boundaries between public and private provision. 
However, it will be politically unfeasible to remove the bulk of 
welfare rights and entitlements which have some bearing on 
maintaining minimum standards. 
It is to be hoped that questions of justice and equity will become 
central in future changes and development in the provision of 
welfare in South Africa and that policies will be planned so as to 
be more equitable between individuals and groups. This priority 
would lead to questions of the benefits and burdens of state 
activity becoming fundamental to ·policymakers with decisions between 
alternative expenditure and tax systems having a direct effect on 
the levels of welfare and the quality of life of communities. This 
research into budget incidence is a contribution,to an area of study 
which could become increasingly important in the future struggle 
against the inequalities of South African society and the fight for 
social rights. 
' . 
I. 
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APPENDIX A RELEVANT SECTIONS OF SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE USED FOR HOUSEHOLD 
INTERVIEWS 
Household Identification Number -------------------
Street 
Area 
Interviewer --------------------------------------~ 
Record of Unsccessful Visits: 
ONE TWO THREE 
Date 
Time 
Remarks 
Date of Interview 
Time of Interview: From _________________ to ______ ~---- Total Time 
--------
Remarks: 
Hello, 
My name is I am working with some people at the University 
of Cape Town. We are talking with many people in this area to find out what 
they feel are their worst problems. We would be glad if you would help us by 
answering a few questions. We hope to be able to use your information when 
we talk with businessmen, church people and others who wish to start projects 
in this community. 
We do not need your surname. 
All answers are confidential. 
There are no 'right' or 'wrong' answers. 
important. 
It is your own opinion that is 
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GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
THE UNIT OF STUDY 
The basic study unit is the 'Household', defined for this purpose 
as: One or more families, group of persons or a person dependent on 
a common or pooled income, and living in the same house. Persons 
temporarily absent (e.g. household members at boarding school, away 
on holiday, or in hospital) are included in this definition. Also 
included are family members with "live-in" jobs elsewhere, as long 
as that person stays at the household dwelling regularly each week 
and the majority of his wages go to the household. 
Not included are 'boarders' (i.e. persons paying all their own 
expenses, including rent), who are regarded as separate households 
on their own; and family members with established households 
elsewhere, despite the fact that they may contribute some of their 
wages to the household income. 
PERSON(S) TO BE INTERVIEWED 
Interviewer to request to speak with the household head or the most 
senior household member present at the time. The interviewer 
should then ask that senior person to invite all other household 
members who are present and who are 18 years or older to participate 
as well. 
All questions are for joint response unless otherwise indicated. 
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CODING INSTRUCTIONS FOR TABLE A! 
l NUMBER: Write 'R' against the number of all household members 
who participate in answering questions. 
2. NAME: Only first name is necessary. 
3. SEX: Male - M; Female - F. 
4. AGE: Give age in years. 
5. MARITAL STATUS: Married - M 
Living Together - LT 
Widowed - W 
Divorced - D 
Never Married - NM 
6. RELATION TO HOUSEHOLD HEAD: 
Head - HD 
Husband - H 
Wife - W 
Father - F 
Mother - M 
Brother - B 
Sister - z 
Son - S 
Daughter - D 
Grandfather - GF 
Grandmother - GM 
Lodger - L 
Not Related - NR 
Note: · 
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all relationships are indicated by the first letter in 
the words describing the relationship, with the 
exception of 'Z' for Sister. Complicated family 
relationships can be described in the same manner. 
(For example: Mother's Sister's Son would be recorded 
MZS). 
7. ACADEMIC EDUCATION: Record highest educational level 
obtained. If never attended school - o. Record Sub-A as 21 
and Sub-B as 22. 
8. VOCATIONAL EDUCATION: Write in post-j.C. teaching diploma, 
nursing qualification, trade qualifications, etc. 
9. GAINFULLY WORKING: Includes all people who earn money or goods 
for work done in their own house or away from their house. 
10. MONTHS UNEMPLOYED: Write the number of months since last job. 
If never employed, write 'X'. 
11. LOOKED IN PAST MONTH? Write 'Yes' or 'No'. 
12. HOUSEHOLD DUTIES IN OWN HOME: Tick if person has major 
responsibility for child care or domestic work in own home. 
Questions 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20: Tick all answers which 
apply to respondent. 
1AflE Al. QJRNltWSfJGD CDFOSmat 
' _.1. ·--.· ''I . 
First. please tell 112 eoui the pq>le WI> ·uve 1h )Q.'r twseoold . 
' . IF rm WRJaNG 
l'IJ l'fft. l:if'.A· pa MIRl11U. '11:1.Alllft ....... II VUAllU'W ~ 
_ .. , __ UlRD. ~ru; ~- Al . HtllllD 11:.lllEO DIS- lNltrlJ IQ:.!)UHG Ulltl< 
-···-
. • ! · STAlUS 10 Elll'.ATI~ EnrATim RJLlY ltef 1.DYED IN WTIES som. Isom PENSI<JfR ~ ABlED 10 CRm lt0~'1 ~(;; PAST. IN Oil PENSICMR /Ill. taK to..IMY 1 2 3 4· 6 tfAD __ -.6 7 0 9_ 10 IOllHSi KlJSE12 13 14 J6 .. 1~. 17 lAlER 19 20 . 
~ 
'l 
2 
3. 
A 
.. 
J 
.. 
.' 
·-s ; 
6 ' 
., 
8 
·g 
10 
11 . 
.12 
13 -
14 
' ' 
' 15 , 
16 
17 
J8 
LIST ALL OTHER SOURCES OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
LJ 
Source Amount Income/Month 
Support Payments from~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
relatives or others 
Other (Explain) 
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TABLE A3 BUDGET-EXPENDITURE 
Now it would be helpful if you could give us some in£ormation about your househ-
old budget. Please tell me how much money is spent on each of the following it 
ems each month • 
• RANDS CENTS 
1. Housing rent or payment ~----------------------------------------------------------­Tick type of occupancy: own 
rent 
other 
3. Food ~------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Tick type of store where 
major shopping is donas supermarket 
cafe 
other 
4. Clothing and footwear -----------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
5. Education 
Uniforms R /year 
Books R /year 
Fees R /year 
6. Medical Care 
1. Transport 
8. Recreation/Leisure 
What activities: 
9. Fuel and Light------------------------------
R/Honth Kind of fuel 
Cooking ---------------------------------------------
Lighting ----------------------------------
Heating --------------------------------------------
10. Furniture and household equipment ---------------------------------------------------~-
11. Cigarettes and tobacco --------------------------------------------------------------~~~ 
12. Laundry and cleansing -------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. Personal care -------------------------------------------------------------------------~---
14 Liquor -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
15. Insurance ~--------------------------------------_;_------------------------------------~---~---
16. Savings ------------------------------------------------------------------:-------------------
17. Fines-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
18. Remittances to absent 
family -----------------------------------------------------------------
19. Other -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------~~~ 
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APPENDIX B X2 - TEST TO COMPARE SEVERAL SETS OF FREQUENCIES 
The x2 test can be used to compare several sets of frequencies 
simultaneously. Assume there are n sets of frequencies each having m 
different outcomes. These can be arranged in a contingency table. 
X1 
Y1 Ou 
~2 ~21 
. 
. 
Ym Om1 
COLUMN 
"' TOTALS ~OLt 
'"' 
CONTINGENCY TABLE GIVING FREQUENCY 
FOR EACH VARIABLE 
VARIABLES ROW 
.. 
X2 Xn TOTALS . . . . . 
012 ..... 01n :E: 01j 
?22 . . . . . 02n :E,O~j 
' 
' . 
Om2 . . . . . Omn :£.o',.j 
'"" . 4ll GRAND ~oi:i. • , .•• ~O· TOTAL 
. Ln , .. Let 
where Oij = the frequency of the ith outcome Yi 
of the jth variable Xj. 
The question posed is. whether there is a connection between each variable Xj 
and its frequency distribution between the m outcomes • 
... 
The null hypothesis (Ho) assumes there is no connection. Under Ho the 
expected frequency for. each cell of the table can be calculated as: 
Expected frequency for each cell = row total x column total 
grand total 
41 "" 
eij = fr,-oij x i oij 
·~ ~Oij 
, .. , J"'' 
That is: 
The full set of mn expected frequencies is calculated. For each cell 
observed and expected frequencies are compared by squaring their difference 
and dividing through by tho expected value for that cell. that is: 
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These are added for each cell to give a x2.value with (m-l) (n-1) degrees 
of freedom 
X2 (m-1)(n-l) 
The computed x2 - value is compared with the theoretical x2 -
distribution, with the appropriate degrees of freedom. If the computed 
x2-value exceeds the theoretical x2 - distribution at the required 
level of significance, then the null hypothesis of no connection between the n, 
variables and their m outcomes is rejected. In other words, if the observed 
frequencies are considerably different from the expected frequencies this 
suggests significant differences between the m sets of frequencies • 
.. 
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APPENDIX C APPORTIONING HEALTH EXPENDITURE BY PUBLIC AUTHORITIES BETWEEN 
GROUPS: 1982/3 
EXPENDITURE (R'OOO) 
TOTAL AFRICAN ASIAN COLOURED WHITE 
Provinces and reserves 
excluding TBV regions 1 528 713 753 214 37 772 186 549 551 179 
Transkei, Bophutatswana 
and Venda 88 414 88 414 
Dept of Health excluding 
mental health and infect-
ious communicable and 
preventable diseases 128 754 88 261 4 191 13 339 22 963 
Dept of Health - mental 
health 105 393 48 853 3 095 14 636 38 809 
I 
Dept of Health -
infectious, communicable 
and preventable diseases 67 173 54 179 477 11 820 697 
Local Authorities portion 
of expenditure subsidized 
by Dept of Health and 
Welfare 13 318 ·5 610 742 1 998 3 969 
TOTAL 1 931 765 1 039 531 46 277 228 342 617 617 
% distribution by group 100,0% 53,8% 2,4% 11.8% 32,0% 
Annual per capita R63,06 R46,42 R54,25 RS4,10 Rl32,14 
expenditure 
sources: BENSO, Statistical Surveys of Black Development; Central 
Statistical Services, South African Statistics; Reports of the Auditor 
General on the State Revenue Accounts, the Provincial Accounts and the Reserve 
Accounts; Estimates of Expenditure to be defrayed from the State Revenue 
Account. the Provincial Accounts and the Reserve Accounts. 
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APPENDIX D METHOD FOR ESTIMATING NUMBER OF HOSPITAL VISITS PER HOUSEHOLD 
Tariff structures charged in October 1982 by Cape and Natal 
provincial hospitals were obtained from the relevant authorities. 
In the Cape, fees varied according to whether the hospital was 
classified as a teaching or non-teaching hospital. Fees for day 
hospitals were the same as for non-teaching hopsitals, so for the 
purposes of this study the latter were used. Day hospitals were 
started in 1969 and are generally situated in the poorer 
socio-economic areas. Given their easier access to the areas 
surveyed, it seems likely that households in the sample would 
usually have preferred their services rather than undertaken the 
trip to the bigger provincial hospitals. · Tariffs for both teaching 
and non-teaching hospitals are shown in Table Dl. Services were 
provided free to social pensioners, outpatients aged 60 years and 
over and persons with no family income. 
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TABLE·. Dl 
OUTPATIENT TARIFFS CHARGED IN CAPE TEACHING AND NON-TEACHING 
PROVINCIAL HOSPITALS: OCTOBER 1982 . 
GROSS MONTHLY OUTPATIENT FEES PER DAILY ATTENDANCE 
FAMILY INCOME TEACHING HOSPITALS NON TEACHING HOSPITALS 
R R R 
0 - so 0,50 0,50 
50 - 100 2,00 2,00 
100 - 200 5,00 4,00 
200 - 300 10,00 8,00 
300 - 400 12,00 9,00 
400 - 500 13,00 10,00 
500 - 600 14,00 11,00 
Above 600 15,00 12,00 
Although there was no fee differential between the types of 
provincial hospitals in Natal, the tariff structure was more 
detailed. This can be seen from Table D2 where fees are shown to 
vary by income, marital status and number of dependent children. 
For social pensioners, income was to be deducted from gross monthly 
income to obtain relevant rates. For persons over the age of 
seventy, irrespective of income, no fees were charged for 
outpatients. 
Given these fee structures for Cape and Natal hospitals, together 
with gross monthly income, household size and monthly expenditure on 
medical care, it was possible to estimate the number of outpatient 
visits per month if it was assumed that no medical care expenditure 
was spent on private health care or hospitalization. Given the low 
monthly expenditures on health care on average, it seems unlikely 
that this assumption would have been too unreasonable. 
assumptions made were:-
Further 
(a) all pensioners were assumed to seek medical care three times a 
year; 
(b) households which did not respond to the question relating to 
their monthly medical expenditures were assigned the average 
number of visits for their particular race group. Only 24 
households (or 3,6%) fell into this category. These should be 
distinguished from those ·households reporting a zero health 
expenditure. 
Once the number of hospital visits per household were estimated, the 
procedure for allocation of health expenditure outlined in section 
4.4.2 was applied to each household to provide an indication of 
household benefits from state spending on health. 
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TABLE D 2 
OUTPATIENT TARIFFS CHARGED IN NATAL· PROVINCIAL HOSPITALS 
GROSS SINGLE SINGLE WITH FULLY DEPENDENT CHILDREN:-
MONTHLY NO 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
INCOME DEPENDENT OR 
OF FAMILY CHILDREN MORE 
UNIT MARRIED WITH FULLY DEPENDENT CHILDREN:-
NIL 1 2 3 4 5 6 
OR 
MORE 
R R R R R R R R R 
Nil Free Free Free Free Free Free Free Free 
1 - 25 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 
26 - 50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 
51 - 75 1.80 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 
76 - 100 2.20 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50. 1.50 1.50 
101 - 125 2.60 1.80 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 
126 - 150 3.00 2.20 1.ao 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 
151 - 175 3.40 2.60 2.20 1.80 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 
176 - 200 3.80 3.00 2.60 2.20 1.80 1.50 1.50 1.50 
201 - 225 4.20 3.40 3.00 2.60 2.20 1.80 1.50 1.50 
226 - 250 4.60 3.80 3.40 3.00 2.60 2.20 1.80 1.50 
251 - 275 5.00 4.20 3.80 3.40 3.00 2.60 2.20 1.80 
276 - 300 5.40 4.60 4.20 3.80 3.40 3.00 2.60 2.20 
301 - 325 5.80 5.00 4.60 4.20 3.80 3.40 3.00 2.60 
326 - 350 6.10 5.40 5.00 4.60 4.20 3.80 3.40 3.00 
351 - 375 6.50 5.80 5.40 5.00 4.60 4.20 3.80 3.40 
376 - 400 6.90 5.ao 5.eo 5.40 5.00 4.60. 4.20 3.80 
401 - 425 7.20 5.ao 5.80 5.80 5.40 5.00 4.60 4.20 
426 - 450 7.60 6.10 5.80 5.ao 5.80 5.40 s.oo 4.60 
451 - 475 a.oo 6.50 6.10 5.so 5.80 5.eo 5.40 s.oo 
476 - 500 S.40 6.90 6.50 6.10 5.80 5.SO s.so 5.40 
501 - 525 8.80 7.20 6.90 6.50 6.10 5.80 5.SO 5.eo 
526 - 550 9.20 7.60 7.20 6.90 6.50 6.10 5.ao 5.ao 
551 - 575 9.60 a.oo 7.60 7.20 6.90 6.50 6.10 s.ao 
576 - 600 9.60 8.40 a.oo 7.60 7.20 6.90 6.50 6.10 
601 - 625 10.00 a.so S.40 a.oo 7.60 7.20 6.90 a.so 
626 - 650 a.so a.so S.40 8.00 7.60 7.20 6.90 
651 - 675 9.20 a.so a.so s.oo 7.60 1.20 6.90 
676 - 700 9.20 9.20 a.so a.40 8.00 7.60 1.20 
701 - 725 9.60 9.20 9.20 a.so S.40 a.oo 7.60 
726 - 750 9.60 9.60 9.20 a.so a.ao S.40 a.oo 
751 - 775 10.00 9.60 9.60 9.20 8.80 a.so 8.40 
776 - soo 10.00 9.60 9.20 9.20 a.so S.80 
801 - 825 10.00 10.00 9.60 9.20 9.20 a.so 
825 - sso 10.00 9.60 9.60 9.20 9.20 
851 - 875 10.00 9.60 9.60 9.20 
876 - 900 10.00 10.00 9.60 9.60 
901 - 925 10.00 10.00 9.60 
926 - 950 10.00 10.00 10.00 
951 - 975 10.00 10.00 
976 - 1000 10.00 10.00 
1001 - 1025 10.00 10.00 
1026 - 1050 10.00 
1051 - 1075 10.00 
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APPENDIX E ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE AS A METHOD FOR COMPARING GROUP 
MEANS 
Analysis of variance can be used to test whether the means of two or 
more random samples are signficantly different when the populations 
from which they are drawn are normally distributed with equal 
variance. Although it is unlikely that either assumption will be 
strictly met in survey data, the tests are sufficiently robust to 
withstand both some degree of non-normality (e.g. skewness) and also 
. unequal variances. 
The steps taken in testing for signf icant differences between the 
group means of n samples is outlined below. Each sample is assumed 
to have m observations. 
(1) Estimate the population variance from the variance between the 
sample means (MSB in Table E1). 
(2) Estimate the population variance from the variance within the 
samples (MSW in Table E1). 
(3) The F-ratio is calculated by dividing the variance between 
sample means by the variance within sample, that is: 
F-ratio = variance between sample means 
variance within samples 
= MSB 
MSW 
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(4) A high F-ratio suggests that the variation between samples is 
greater than the variation within samples. More formally, if the 
calculated F-ratio exceerls that presented in the F-tables at the 
required level of significance and degrees of freedom, then the 
null hypothesis (Ho) of equal population means is rejected in 
favour of the alternate hypothesis (H1 > that group means are 
signficantly different. 
The above steps are set out in Table E1. 
TABLE E1 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE 
Source of 
Variation 
Between Means 
Within Samples 
(error or un-
explained) 
TOTAL 
where 
Sum of Squares DF Mean Square F-ratio 
fll, .; 
SSB= .fll~(Xj-X )2 m-1 MSB "" SSB MSB 
J=.• m-1 RSV 
SSW"" m(n-1) MSW • SSW 
.fl 
.... 2 mln-1) ~ ~( X··-X) . LJ 
1•1 f"' I 
SST • SSB + SSW mn-1 
Xij • value of 1th observation of sample j 
Xj • mean of sample j 
X = grand mean of n samples 
SSB = sum of squares explained by differences 
between groups 
SSW "" sum of squares of error within groups 
SST = total sum of squares 
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